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Abstract
Intelligent Energy Management for Microgrids with Renewable
Energy, Storage Systems, and Electric Vehicles.
Mosaddek Hossain Kamal Tushar, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2017
The evolution of smart grid or smart microgrids represents a significant paradigm
shift for future electrical power systems. Recent trends in microgrid systems include
the integration of renewable energy sources (RES), energy storage systems (ESS),
and plug-in electrical vehicles (PEV or EV). However, these integration trends bring
with then new challenges for the design of intelligent control and management sys-
tem. Traditional generation scheduling paradigms rely on the perfect prediction of
future electricity supply and demand. They can no longer apply to a microgrid
with intermittent renewable energy sources. To mitigate these problems, a massive
and expensive energy storage can be deployed, which also need vast land area and
sophisticated control and management. Electrical vehicles can be exploited as the
alternative to the large and expensive storage. On the other hand, the use of elec-
trical vehicles introduces new challenges due to their unpredictable presence in the
microgrid. Furthermore, the utility and ancillary industries gradually adding sensors
and power aware, intelligent functionality to home appliances for the efficient use
of energy. Hence, the future smart microgrid stability and challenges are primarily
dependent on the electricity consumption patterns of the home appliances, and EVs.
Recently, demand side management (DSM) has emerged as a useful method to control
or manipulate the user demand for balancing the generation and consumption. Un-
fortunately, most of the existing DSM systems solve the problem partially either using
ESS to store RES energy or RES and ESS to charging and discharging of electrical
vehicles. Hence, in this thesis, we propose a centralized energy management system
which jointly optimizes the consumption scheduling of electrical vehicles and home ap-
pliances to reduce the peak-hour demand and use of energy produced from the RESs.
In the proposed system, EVs store energy when generation is high or during off-peak
periods, and release it when the demand is high compared to the generation. The
iii
centralized system, however, is an oﬄine method and unable to produce a solution for
a large-scale microgrid. Further, the real-time implementation of the centralized so-
lution requires continuous change and adjustment of the energy generation as well as
load forecast in each time slot. Thereby, we develop a game theoretic mechanism de-
sign to analyze and to get an optimal solution for the above problem. In this case, the
game increases the social benefit of the whole community and conversely minimizes
each household’s total electricity price. Our system delivers power to each customer
based on their real-time needs; it does not consider pre-planned generation, therefore
the energy cost, uncertainty, and instability increase in the production plant. To
address these issues, we propose a two-fold decentralized real-time demand side man-
agement (RDCDSM) which in the first phase (planning phase) allows each customer
to process the day ahead raw predicted demand to reduce the anticipated electricity
cost by generating a flat curve for its forecasted future demand. Then, in the second
stage (i.e., allocation phase), customers play another repeated game with mixed strat-
egy to mitigate the deviation between the immediate real-time consumption and the
day-ahead predicted one. To achieve this, customers exploit renewable energy and
energy storage systems and decide optimal strategies for their charging/discharging,
taking into account their operational constraints. RDCDSM will help the microgrid
operator better deals with uncertainties in the system through better planning its
day-ahead electricity generation and purchase, thus increasing the quality of power
delivery to the customer. Now, it is envisioned that the presence of hundreds of
microgrids (forms a microgrid network) in the energy system will gradually change
the paradigms of century-old monopolized market into open, unbundled, and com-
petitive market which accepts new supplier and admits marginal costs prices for the
electricity. To adapt this new market scenario, we formulate a mathematical model to
share power among microgrids in a microgrid network and minimize the overall cost
of the electricity which involves nonlinear, nonconvex marginal costs for generation
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T&D Transmission & Distribution
TOU Time of Use
V2G Vehicle to Grid
VAR Volt Ampere Reactive
VVC Volt-VAR Control
VVCDDR Volt/VAR Control and Distributed Demand Response




1.1 Overview and Objectives
The current electrical grid is perhaps the greatest engineering achievement of the
20th century and is considered to be the largest machine on the planet. However, it
is increasingly outdated and overburdened, leading to costly blackouts and burnouts
[59, 66, 138, 137]. Current studies show that the existing electric grid converts only
one-third of fuel energy into electricity [35]. Almost 8% of the generated electricity
is lost in transmission while 20% of the electric energy is generated to meet peak
demands for only a short period (5%) [83]. Moreover, existing electricity networks do
not contain storage units, which means that the energy generated from fossil fuels and
nuclear power plants must be balanced with the energy consumed by the end users
[86]. In addition, the existing electric grid suffers from domino-effect failures due to
its hierarchical topology of transmission and distribution networks. In fact, nearly
90% of power disruptions occur in power distribution networks [83]. Further, the
current electricity generation relies heavily on fossil fuels and causes 41% of the world
greenhouse gas emissions (Figure 1.1a) [18]. Coal and peat electricity generators emit
more than 70% of CO2 of the total emission of the electricity sector (Figure 1.1b).
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Conventional transportation vehicles operate on the principles of internal combustion
engine (ICE) that runs on fossil fuel (i.e., gasoline, diesel). ICE emits 23% of the
global CO2 emission [18]. The above two mentioned sectors together emit two thirds
of global CO2 as shown in Figure 1.1a. Road vehicles emit 75% of the total amount
of CO2 released by the transport sector in 2008 and 2009 (Figure 1.1c).
(a) World CO2 emission by
sector in 2009
(b) World CO2 emission from
electricity and heat genera-
tion
(c) World CO2 emission from
transportation in 2008-2009
Figure 1.1: World Greenhouse Gas Emission
Thus, transformation efforts are underway to make the current electrical grid
smarter. The future smart grid could be referred to as the modernization of the
current electric grid by increasing its dependency on cyberspace and renewable energy
resources. The smart grid should not be the replacement of the existing grid rather it
is a complement to the existing grid. Smart grid will coexist with the conventional grid
and gradually add capabilities, functionalities and capacities to the existing power
grid by means of an evolutionary path. This coexistence needs a topology which
allows the organic growth by accommodating modern technology and full backward
compatibility with the current system. Further, the organic growth and development
of smart grid is anticipated to come through the plug-and-play integration of essential
structures known as intelligent (or smart) microgrid [35]. Figure 1.2 compares the
existing grid with the future grid.
The smart grid enables two-way flows of information and electricity in order to
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optimize customers power consumption [95]. Smart microgrids can be deployed in
two working modes (i) grid connected microgrid, and (ii) islanded microgrid.
1.1.1 The Vision and Benefits of Smartgrid and Microgrid
The interconnection management system manages the power flow from outside the
microgrid in case of shortage of power and to other microgrids or to the external power
grid in case of excessive power generation. The establishment of microgrids increases
the reliability of the electricity supplies by the existence of storage systems. The use
of the emerging information and communication technology (ICT) is essential for the
smart microgrids, i.e. intelligent power distribution networks which automatically
reroute the power flow in case of unexpected line fault. During a power grid failure,
smart microgrids will operate in islanded mode, which continuously supply power to
the community/area intended for. Various studies (see Table 1.1)[87], assessed the
global and country wide positive impact of reducing the CO2. For example, the GeSI
study [87] emphases four main ways the smart grids could reduce CO2 emissions. The
broken down contributions of the levers identified in the GeSI study (see Fig. 1.3)
[87] emphasizes that the ”transmission and distribution losses” and the ”integration
of renewable energy sources” account for most CO2 contributions, i.e. 1, 72 Gt out
of the total 2, 03 Gt CO2 globally. Also, a substantial reduction of 0.28 Gt could be
obtained by the ”reduced consumption through user information”. Fig. 1.4[87] sum-
marizes the positive impact on the environment from EPRI USA studies. It shows
that three major steps (”direct feedback on energy uses”, ”integration of renewable
energy sources” and ”facilitation of PHEV market”) may reduce the US CO2 emis-
sions from 2, 11 Mt to 0, 46 Mt CO2. The use of efficient management and emerging
technologies, such as ICT enable the smart microgrids to use Electric Vehicles (EV)
batteries for power storage of the electricity generated during off-peak hours. The
4
Table 1.1: Impact of smart microgrids: the GeSI, EPRI and IPTS studies
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Figure 1.3: Positive Environmental Impact of smart microgrids.
charging/discharging cycle decreases the life of the battery. It appears that if the
battery degradation cost is applied, the corresponding profit alone may provide an
incentive to the EVs’ owner to use their battery pack for electricity storage [95]. V2G
(vehicle to grid) service could be sold in an organized market as ancillary services
or it could be used to avoid grid electricity surcharge. The use of wireless charging
technologies allows the EVs, and eventually other household equipments to charge
without delay. Currently over 40% of fossil-fuel is consumed by transportation sys-
tems and residential houses. Deployment of microgrids and EVs may substantially
reduce the use of fossil-fuel near to almost negligible [87]. Charging a large popula-
tion of EVs has a significant impact on the power grid [50]. The US department of
transportation data indicates that, including overnight hours, a vehicle spends nearly
75% parked at home [30]. In the US, it is predicted that by 2020 25% and 2040 two
thirds of light-duty vehicles ought to be EVs. Further, it is expected that current
research outcomes on high power lithium-ion micro battery technology will accelerate
the replacement of internal combustion cars by the EVs [97].
6
Figure 1.4: Positive Environmental Impact of smart microgrids according to EPRI
(2008)
1.1.2 Technology Challenges
Given the fluctuations of power generation in microgrids as a result of unavoidable
natural hazards, and also because the number of EVs charging (simultaneously) is
unknown, therefore, the power sharing between neighboring microgrids must deal
with the following challenges:(a) Integration of intermittent renewable energy sources.
(b) V2G and G2V issues: Policy/protocol and intelligent mechanisms are needed for
V2G operation to provide electric energy to the grid with the high price interval
and for emergency power need. For consuming electricity, EVs need to charge in
low price interval. (c) Wireless and sensor based infrastructure is needed to monitor
EVs’ battery charge level, charging and discharging schedule. (d) Integration of
community energy storage system (ESS). (e) Communication and control required
over microgrids for power generation and consumption. (f) Management System for
Intelligent Power Transmission and Distribution between microgrids. (g) Transition
between ”grid connected” and ”islanded” mode of microgrids. (h) Smart Metering
(i) Frequency and voltage regulation (j) Cyber security: The smart microgrids differ
from the conventional communication networks because they are able to reach every
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equipment which resides in user premises, and return with energy control information
to the microgrid central control system. The microgrids smartly determine the current
energy requirement and decide to distribute and transfer according to the demand,
possibly with valley filling algorithms. So the security of the user data and the secure
transmission of control and electric energy demands are usual concerns.
1.1.3 Thesis Objectives
This research work will investigate and address fundamental and practical problems
related to microgrids resource management and networking. Hence, the technical,
commercial, and residential community will benefit significantly from the extensive
research on microgrids. In particular, this effort will:
• Conduct a first of a kind comprehensive study on stochastic nature of the smart
grid and smart microgrids utilities and renewable energy sources. This will pro-
vide critical guidelines for both, consumers and manufacturers of such utilities.
• Encourage microgrid operators to rely more on renewable energy sources rather
than fossil-fuel electric generators.
• Enable EVs to be used as distributed electricity storage for microgrids, which
will significantly reduce the cost, land space, and investment involved in imple-
menting large electric storage system.
• Integrate community Energy Storage Systems (ESSs) in the grid which will
play a significant role in balancing the generation planning and real-time use of
electricity along with EVs.
This thesis work will focus on the main issues in power generation, distribution and
communications of microgrids.
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The integration of renewable energy sources and electrical vehicles (EVs) into mi-
crogrids is becoming a popular green approach. To reduce greenhouse gas emissions,
several incentives are given to use renewable energy sources and EVs. By utilizing
EVs as electricity storage and renewable energy sources as distributed generators, mi-
crogrids become more reliable, stable, and cost-effective. To optimize energy use, an
optimal centralized scheduling method may play a significant role which jointly con-
trols the electricity consumption of home appliances and plug-in EVs. It discharges
the EVs when they have excess energy, thereby increasing the reliability and stability
of microgrids and giving lower electricity prices to customers.
In a centralized scheduling, customers need to send their detailed information
about the load such as load type, consumption time and duration, driving schedule
of the EV, RES generation pattern, etc., which may expose a potential privacy and
security breach. In addition to this, the centralized system does not give any incen-
tives to EVs owners to participate V2G operation. Also, a centralized system does
not scale well for a large sized microgrid. A distributed real-time electricity alloca-
tion scheme for microgrid based on game theoretic mechanism design may benefit
both the customers and the operator to reduce the client’s electricity bill and lower
the generation in peak-hour. In this scheme, each of the clients is able to choose its
consumption pattern, charging and discharging EVs to reduce their electricity costs
and get incentives from the microgrid operator in real time. The game based mecha-
nism design for real-time consumption will promise to (i) keep privacy of the energy
consumption pattern, (ii) reduce the electricity bill of residential customers, (iii) in-
crease the overall social benefit of the community, as well as (iv) improve the energy
efficiency and reliability of the microgrid to rely on locally generated electricity.
The integration of electric vehicles (EVs), energy storage systems (ESSs) and re-
newable energy sources (RESs) may play a significant role in balancing the planned
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generation of electricity and its real-time use. A utility operator accumulates cus-
tomers day ahead predicted load and plan for the production or purchase power
to serve the clients in the next day. Unfortunately, actual consumption may vary
from the day ahead anticipated demand, thereby increase the instability and reduce
the reliability of the power system which incurs extra cost, and in some cases load
shading. The customer load varies from time to time of a day, which then needs to
generate or purchase more electricity in peak hours compared to off-peak hours. A
two-level real-time decentralized demand-side management may solve this problem.
This system is expected to allow each customer to process the day ahead raw pre-
dicted demand to reduce the anticipated electricity cost by generating a flat curve for
its forecasted future demand. Then at the time of real use, customers will mitigate
the deviation between the real-time consumption and the day-ahead predicted load.
To achieve this, customers exploit renewable energy and energy storage systems and
decide optimal strategies for electricity consumption. It is expected that the decen-
tralized two-level demand-side management system will help the microgrid operator
better deal with uncertainties in the system through better planning its day-ahead
electricity generation and purchase, thus increasing the quality of power delivery to
the customer.
The smart microgrid and its demand-response characteristics are gradually chang-
ing the paradigms of the century-old electric grid and shaping the electricity market.
In this new market scenario, once always energy consumers now may act as sellers
due to the excess of energy generated from newly deployed renewable energy gener-
ators in the consumer premises. Hence, an optimization scheme is required for the
trading of energy among the microgrids and determine overall electricity price. The
marginal cost models for the power generation are nonlinear and non-convex. More-
over, the microgrid network (MGN) uses third party transmission and distribution
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(T&D) system which incurred extra costs to transport electricity from seller to buyer.
Therefore, the solution should be robust enough to find an optimal solution for MGN
in time.
Volt-VAR optimization (VVO) is a well-studied problem, for bringing solutions
to reduce the losses and demand along the transmission and distribution lines. The
current VVO, however, does not acknowledge the role of elastic and inelastic loads,
EVs, and RESs to reduce the reactive power losses and hence the cost of genera-
tion. Therefore, we will develop a method to solve the VVO problem by considering
load shifting, EV as the storage and carrier of the energy, and use of RES. In this
connection, our objective is not only to reduce the reactive load but also flatten the
load curve to reduce the uncertainty in the generation and to decrease the cost. The
system also considers the efficiency of the electrical equipment to enhance the lifetime
of the devices.
1.2 Problem Statement and Motivation
The evolution of microgrid and the integration of renewable energy sources, electri-
cal vehicles (EVs), and energy storage system (ESS) into microgrids is becoming a
popular green approach. The overall load profile of the power grid, as well as of the
microgrid, may change due to the introduction of EVs. Charging a large population of
EVs has a significant impact on the power grid. In addition to this, the intermittent
nature of renewable energy sources and presence of EVs introduce new challenges to
the stability of the power grid. The intelligent management of the integration of EVs,
ESS, and renewable energy sources, as well as of user power consumption may bring
benefits to both operators and consumers.
The construction of efficient energy management systems with the objective of
minimizing energy cost, balancing the energy planning and consumption, reducing the
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transmission and distribution losses, sharing energy among microgrids by integration
of RES, EVs, and ESS is indeed a challenging task, and some solutions already exist.
Most of the existing solutions solve the problems either for integration of RESs or
charging of EVs. Unlike the previous work presented in the literature (chapter 2) our
thesis attempts to solves the energy management problems by utilizing RES, EVs,
and ESS. The thesis investigates and formulates solutions for demand side resource
management to control the power consumption, flatten the load curve, enable energy
sharing among the microgrids, reduce the transmission and distribution losses of
the electrical systems, thereby increasing the reliability and stability by giving lower
electricity prices to customers.
1.2.1 Smart Microgrid: Optimal Joint Scheduling for EV and
Home Appliances
This work investigates a microgrid that is connected to the power grid and has a fixed
number of renewable energy sources (e.g., wind turbine, photovoltaic panels, etc.) for
a small residential community. The microgrid consumers have home appliances and
EVs. In this research, we develop a centralized joint optimal electricity consumption
scheduling method for appliances and EVs with the objective to minimize the amount
of imported electricity from the grid. Here, EVs are used as distributed storage
to store electricity. EVs are mobile and connected to the microgrid in a random
fashion. In case of shortage of power, the microgrid uses the electricity stored in
EVs (with discharge capability) and in cases, when the stored electric energy is not
sufficient, the microgrid gets electricity from the grid. In this model, an independent
residential microgrid is considered which can be operated in islanded mode or grid
connected mode. The scheduling problem is a mixed integer linear programming
problem (MILP) which jointly controls electricity consumption of home appliances as
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well as the charging and discharging of EVs. Our scheduling method results in the
optimal use of electricity generated from renewable energy sources and minimizes the
amount of imported electricity from the grid. Consequently, it reduces the electricity
price for the microgrid customers. Further, the optimal scheduling method enables
EVs to store electricity during peak generation hours, which may be used later during
high demand. In doing so, our approach helps increase the service availability and
stability of the microgrid.
1.2.2 Distributed Real-Time Electricity Allocation (DRTA)
Large Residential Microgrid
The above optimal joint scheduling method is a centralized MILP based method.
Therefore, it is suitable for a small residential microgrid. For a large microgrid, the
centralized method may not produce optimal solutions. Also, the method needs to
send user’s detailed load information to the microgrid operation which may expose
the privacy of the customers and yield potential security breach. Moreover, the
centralized method can be implemented when the load and generation from RES for
the next day is known (by prediction). Unfortunately, the load may vary at the actual
time of consumption.
In this work, we address the problem described above and consider a grid-connected
microgrid with a set of RESs for a large community. The microgrid has a central con-
troller with EMS, servicing a set of homes (customers), each equipped with an AMI
(Advanced Metering Infrastructure) smart meter. We assume a communication net-
work such as NAN (neighborhood area network) which connects smart meters to each
other and the central controller. We propose a new distributed real-time electricity
allocation (DRTA) scheme using mechanism design to reduce the electricity bill of
each microgrid customer and simultaneously increase the overall social benefit of the
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community. In this mechanism design framework, the EMS acts as a controller of the
game and the smart meters act like the players of the game. The smart meter plays
the game to determine the energy consumption strategy of each appliance to reduce
the energy bill based on the current electricity price. If the current set of strategies,
lowering the electricity bill compared to the electricity bill calculated as before then
each smart meter updates its electricity demand and sends it to the controller. The
play will continue until there is no change in the electricity price. The game in the
mechanism design is a non-cooperative repeated game. We show that the game con-
verges to an optimal Nash equilibrium state. In this game, players signal each other
to maximize the their own benefit, which simultaneously reduces the energy bill and
increases fairness.
1.2.3 Real-Time Decentralized Demand-Side Management (RD-
CDSM)
The DRTA method modifies user consumption patterns and allocates electricity in
real time, slot by slot. Hence, the power planner always needs to be aware of mitigat-
ing the variable demand of the customers. This may create an instability problem in
power generation and delivery to the customers. Therefore, we consider a residential
microgrid which is connected to the grid and purchases electricity from it according
to its clients aggregated day-ahead predicted demand. Each client predicts its load
a day-ahead and sends it to the operator. Upon receiving this information, the mi-
crogrid operator plans to purchase electricity for the next day (to satisfy its users’
demands) and determine the power cost accordingly. At the time of operation, how-
ever, the actual user’s demand may change, and the renewable energy generation may
vary, which results in discrepancy and instability in power delivery and thus increases
the cost.
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To solve this problem, we develop a Real-time Decentralized system for DSM
(RDCDSM) which in the first place encourages customers collectively to modify their
day-ahead anticipated coarse consumption to minimize their personal electricity cost,
or inversely increase their payoff to produce a fine-grain predicted demand. Customers
will play a game with mixed strategy profile by sharing their day-ahead anticipated
demand and continuously modify it to increase their payoff. The game terminates in
a Nash equilibrium state, which results in a fine-grain price-aware predicted demand
where a further change of anticipated consumption will not increase the payoff. Then,
each customer sends its resultant predicted demand to the operator. Upon receiv-
ing and accumulating the forecasted demand from its clients, the operator produces
the day ahead aggregate predicted demand and devise a plan to generate and pur-
chase electricity to satisfy the customers. We define this as the prediction phase of
RDCDSM. Next, in step two, known as the allocation phase, the RDCDSM system
encourages customers, in real time, to adjust their consumption pattern by play-
ing mixed strategy in another non-cooperative game to stay close to their predicted
demand. Doing so will allow the microgrid to stick to its pre-determined energy gen-
eration/purchase plan and avoid the higher costs of either activating a new generator
or buying electricity at an instantaneous market price. The RDCDSM will penal-
ize (i.e., higher rate charge) each of deviated users with the proportion of the total
deviation determined by the operator.
1.2.4 Microgrid Network: Energy Sharing and Optimal Elec-
tricity Pricing
It is envisioned that a microgrid network (MGN) may shortly contain hundreds or
even thousands of microgrids (MG) sharing energy with each other [48]. Usually,
an MG produces and consumes energy locally; in the case of shortage, it purchases
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electricity from the neighboring MGs or sells whenever it has a surplus (as in DRTA,
RDCDSM). In such scenarios, the MG operators may not own the transmission and
distribution (T&D) system, and use the existing network which requires T&D costs
besides the generation cost. For the benefit of both customers and providers, an open
competitive market is desirable which accepts new suppliers and admit marginal cost
prices for electricity [54, 28, 128].
Upon developing the internal energy management of the microgrid (such as DRTA,
RDCDSM) an energy management scheme is required for the optimal management
of energy flow amoung microgrids according to their needs. In this circumstances, we
develop a novel method for optimal energy flow between microgrids and to minimize
the electricity cost for the microgrid network (MGN) in a deregulated competitive
electricity market. We study and find that, for a non-decreasing marginal cost, the
model is nonlinear and non-convex. Hence, it does not produce an optimal solution.
Therefore, we decompose the model to separate the marginal cost from the T&D
cost and develop a novel method based on a divide-and-conquer strategy which is
defined as MEPM (minimum electricity pricing model), to solve it optimally. First,
we determine the marginal cost boundary according to the overall demand of the
MGN, also known as the overall marginal cost problem (OMCP). Then, using the
proposed MEPM strategy, we interactively determine the optimal electricity price by
jointly optimizing the OMCP and T&D costs (allocation problem) of the system. The
MEPM algorithm determines the optimal price in a polynomial time [23] for a complex
bidirectional electrical network that uses ICT to control the flow of energy among
the neighborhood grids or MGs. We assume that each MG internally decides its
consumption using a demand response model (such as in [120]) which integrates local
generation from renewable sources, dynamic loads, and storage. The total demand
and the amount generated by each generator and capacity of the generator at the real
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time are known to the MEPM system.
1.2.5 Volt-VAR Control through Joint Optimization of Ca-
pacitor Bank Switching, Renewable Energy, and Home
Appliances
In a microgrid network (MGN) or the existing power grid, most of the energy losses
in electricity transportation are due to the resistance of the energy network and
reactive power which is injected by the reactive load. This causes lower operating
or terminal voltage at the customer (microgrid) point which potentially increases the
demand and reduces the efficiency and lifetime of the user equipment. Therefore,
the generator needs to generate more power to adjust the voltage at the last mile
of the electricity transmission and distribution (T&D) line which again increases
losses. To adjust the voltage level at operating point and reduce the losses often
power T&D system operator uses the compensation devices or mechanism to reduce
the reactive power injected by the user electronic equipment. This is known as the
VVO problem. Several researches have been carried out to solve the VVO problem.
Unlike those, we investigated and found that integration of renewable energy, shifting
consumption from one time slot to another time slot, EVs as energy storage and
community (microgrid) level energy management, along with the conventional shunt
capacitor compensation and CVR (conservative voltage regulation) may solve the
problem optimally and reduce losses and generation cost substantially.
We formulate the problem as a non-cooperative game (VVCO/OECM) between
the communities connected to the feeders. Each of the communities adjusts the
consumption pattern and service drop OLTC tap to minimize its electricity cost (or
maximizes payoff) according to the price signal obtained from the utility. As a result,
the utility operator adjusts the capacitor banks and substation transformers tap and
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recalculate the cost of electricity, known as Volt-VAR and CVR (conservative voltage
regulation) optimization model. The interplay between these two schemes results in
a non-cooperative game which will terminate when there is no change in electricity
cost. This condition is known as the Nash equilibrium state of the non-cooperative
game. The proposed system presents a fine-grain solution for the VVO problem which
considers (1) micro-level DR model, (ii) energy efficiency of the equipment, (iii) roof-
top solar or locally installed energy sources, and (iv) G2V and the V2G control modes
of the electrical vehicles.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
The main contributions of the thesis are summarized as follows:
• We define and classify the residential appliances (in Chapters 3 and 4) according
to their mode of electricity consumption. Then we present the mathematical
models of the load as (i) type-I: hard load which is non-deferrable and non-
interruptable consumption, (ii) type-II: soft load that is non-interruptable and
deferrable consumption, (iii) type-III interruptable and deferrable soft load and
finally (iV) mixed mode appliances which consume electricity like type-I, II or
III in the span of its operational time slots.
• We formulate a centralized MILP mathematical model (Chapter 3) for charging
and discharging of EVs, energy consumption of home appliances and integration
of renewable energy sources to the microgrid to optimize electricity use through-
out the day. Then we simulate the model and evaluate the performance of the
developed joint scheduling method and compare the results with an existing
decentralized and naive allocation method which do not consider discharging of
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EVs and load shifting for a demand-side management of electricity consump-
tion. We show that for all the cases the proposed centralized optimal joint
scheduling of EV and home appliances perform better than decentralized and
naive allocation methods.
• Next, we formulate a game theoretical mechanism design (DRTA) for real-time
distribution of electricity to the residential customer. For the mechanism de-
sign, we define participation constraints for each residential home appliances
and incentive constraints for the electric vehicle. To increase the payoff of a
customer and overall social benefit, a payoff function is defined for the resi-
dential customers. We show that the formulated model converges to a Nash
equilibrium state and results in an optimal solution to the problem. Then, we
develop a simulation to evaluate the performance of the DRTA method and
compare the results with the centralized optimal joint scheduling for EVs and
home appliances, and the unregulated allocation methods. See Chapter 4 for
more detail.
• To balance the day ahead of planned electricity generation and the real-time
consumption, we developed a two-stage solution known as RDCDSM (see Chap-
ter 5). In the first stage, we formulate a mixed strategy non-cooperative game
with MIQP payoff function for the customer to refine their raw day ahead pre-
diction to minimize anticipated electricity costs. Then, for the power delivery
to the customer in real-time, we formulate another non-cooperative game (with
mixed strategy profile) with MILP payoff function to minimize penalty thereby
reduce the deviation of real-time demand from the day ahead refine or price
aware predicted load. In both cases, we show that the mixed integer game
converges to a Nash equilibrium state and produces optimal results.
19
• To solve optimal energy management and the marginal cost pricing problem of
deregulated market, we develop two unique methods (see, Chapter 6). First,
OMCP which determines lower and upper bound overall marginal cost for max-
imum and minimum T&D cost for electricity transportation accordingly. Then
we devise a divide-and-conquer method to select the cost pair (overall marginal
cost and T&D cost) which results in minimum electricity price. To design these
solutions, we analyze the original problem and found that the original MEPM
problem is nonlinear and non-convex. Therefore we decompose the problem
into OMCP and allocation problem) and devise a polynomial solution for the
original MEPM.
• Finally, in VVCO/OECM (see, Chapter 7), we developed a non-cooperative
game to determine the terminal voltage of a community such that the efficiency
of devices which are operated under this voltage will not cross a predefined
acceptable range. Then, with the terminal voltage, all the communities try
to adjust the VAR compensation and OLTC transformer such that power loss
alone the T&D line and electricity cost is minimized. The methods work for
multiple time slots interactively to find an optimal solution. Moreover, we define
mathematical models for the reactive and active loads, EVs and shift them from
a time slot to another slot to get the optimal results. We also prove that the
proposed mathematical model ultimately converges to an optimal solution and
flatten the load curve, therefore, minimizes the electricity cost.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The remainder of the thesis is organized as following. Chapter 2 presents the re-
lated work, smartgrid, microgrid, microgrid components including renewable energy
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sources, EVs, ESS, and background concepts of the techniques used to develop the
mathematical model and the solutions. An efficient centralized optimal joint schedul-
ing for electrical vehicle and home appliances is presented in Chapter 3. A game
theoretic mechanism design based distributed real-time electricity allocation for large
residential microgrid is demonstrated in Chapter 4. Real-time demand-side manage-
ment of energy by exploiting RESs, EVs and ESS to reduce the gap between planned
electricity generation and real-time use of electricity is described in Chapter 5. In
Chapter 6, a novel algorithm for optimal energy management and marginal cost elec-
tricity pricing for MGN is presented. Chapter 7 contains a VVCO/OECM method
which demonstrates that the integration of RES, EVs and load shifting, and dis-
tributed DSM may help to reduce transmission and distribution losses in the grid.





A microgrid, a local energy network, offers integration of intermittent disseminated
energy with elastic loads and energy storage which can operate autonomously to
deliver electricity to customers with the cooperation of existing grid or other micro-
grids. In this chapter, first, we discuss the notion of microgrids, microgrid building
blocks and communication networks, etc. The operation of microgrid may depend on
contending interests among diverse stakeholders in electricity supply such as supply
network operators, DG owners, and operators, use of electric vehicles, energy storage
systems, and customers energy usage pattern. In this context, we present some solu-
tion methodologies which we apply to model most of the problems stated in Chapter





for customer cooperation in the electricity enterprise. They form the building blocks
of the ideal power system. Smart microgrids are composed of central controllers,
loads (e.g., home appliances), sources of energy including wind turbines, photovoltaic
systems, fuel cells, and energy storage units.
2.1.1 Smart Grid/Microgrid Components
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI)
AMI [129] is dubbed as the convergence of the power grid, the communications infras-
tructure and the supporting information architecture. It refers to the systems that
measure, collect, and analyze energy usage from advanced smart devices, including,
in-home devices as well as electric vehicles charging, through various communication
media, for the purpose of forwarding the data to the grid. AMI is designed to help
consumers know the near real time price of electricity and thus to optimize their
power usage accordingly. It as well aids the grid by obtaining valuable information
about consumers power consumption in order to ensure the reliability of the electrical
power system.
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA)
SCADA systems [33], located in the operations domain, are responsible for the real
time monitoring and control of the power delivery network. Through intelligent re-
mote control and distributed automation management, they reduce operation and
maintenance costs in addition to ensuring the reliability of the power supply. There
are three main elements to a SCADA system [12]; various remote telemetry units
(RTUs) and programmable logic controllers (PLCs), communication systems and a
Human Machine Interface (HMI). RTUs and PLCs effectively collect information from
various sites and allow control actions to be performed automatically and remotely.
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Communication systems bring that information from various plants or RTU sites to
a central location, and occasionally returns instructions to the RTU. The HMI dis-
plays the processed information in an easily understood graphical form, archives the
received data, transmits alarms and permits operator control as required.
Electricity Demand and Forecasting
Electricity demand dependent on the area such as industrial, commercial, residential,
etc., but focusing on a particular environment allows a clear perception of it by sec-
tor. This will enable deployment of DR or DSM since different electricity prices could
be offered based on certain guidelines set by utility companies [52]. The electricity
consumption are different in different countries in different seasons and geographical
position. According to 2013 world bank statistic world per person average annual
electricity consumption is 4024.95 kWh, whereas USA annually consumed 12,988.256
kWh, China 3,762.08 kWh, and Canada 15,519.336 kWh [7]. Moreover, daily elec-
tricity consumption varies according to time of the day. Figure 2.3 present the daily
consumption of a typical house hold customer, where energy use is high from 4:00
pm to 10 pm, moderate from 6:00 am to 3:00 pm and low from midnight to morning.
The electricity use is related to daily activity and behavior of the customers.
The evolution and the concepts of the smart microgrid changes and creates new
environment with diverse consideration to optimize energy uses. Inteligence deployed
in building, integration of renewable energy, smart equipment, interconnected sensors
to attain energy efficiency [7]. To achieve the building energy efficiency together with
another model (such as prediction), the control of this equipment must be integrated
within the Home Energy Management (HEMS) system. The energy efficiency can
not be obtained perfectly without the load forecast. Most practical load forecast
models are based on oﬄine schemes, where predictions are conducted in advance. The
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the availability and capacity of the renewable energy sources are dependent on the
geographic position of the microgrids. Renewable energy sources such as wind turbine
and solar energy need weather forecasting model for reliable generation of the tar-
geted amount of electricity which is committed to the energy buyer market. Several
stochastic models exist to predict the short-term and/or long-term power generation
such as ANN, ARMA, hybrid ANN-ARAMA etc [49, 42, 55].
Electric Vehicles (EVs)
EVs and Plug-in Hybrid EVs [13] are environmentally friendly and reduce carbon
emissions, in addition to being a distributed energy storage in the smart grid; that is
parked EVs can supply electric power to the grid. This vehicle-to-grid concept [47]
would improve the efficiency and increase the reliability of the power grid. Electrical
vehicles (EVs) have been around since a century. They were very popular and were
sold reasonably well till 1918 [18]. However, the use of EVs for transportation died out
as the gasoline powered engine continued to improve. As environment preservation
becomes an important issue around the world, EVs are poised to gain more acceptance
from governments and the general public. EVs offer many benefits over traditional
fuel run vehicles, such as high energy efficiency, low greenhouse gas emission, potential
to use locally produced electricity (microgrid). Moreover, EVs’ batteries can be used
as energy storage for microgrids, since for a large amount of time (nearly 90%) they
are idle [3]. The intermittent nature of the energy sources of smart microgrids requires
storage to store excess power generated during off-peak hours in order to use it during
peak hours. Hence, EVs may play a dual role in microgrids. They can appear as loads
when charging and as energy sources when discharging. The EVs charging load on
smart microgrids may vary in time as does the SOC (state of charge) of the vehicle
batteries. Therefore, to charge n EVs at time t, a total electricity (EVd(t)) is required
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{EV isoc(t)− EV isoc(t− 1)}, n ∈ N (2.1)
where EVd(t) equals the total energy demand of n EVs at time t, EV isoc(t) and
EV isoc(t − 1) represent the SOC of i-th EV at time t and t − 1, respectively, with
1 ≤ t ≤ 24 hours. N refers to the set of EVs in the microgrid. If the EVs are used as





{EVjsoc(t)}, m ∈ N (2.2)
where EVjsoc(t) > PEV
min
j , i 6= j, and m is the number of EVs in V 2G (Vehicle to
Grid) operation and m + n = |N |. PEVminj represents the minimum discharge (see,
table 3.1) SOC of EV j, below which EV can not be discharged. If EVjsoc(t) ≤ PEV
min
j
then, the contribution of EV j to grid is zero.
The most significant challenges currently facing EVs are the cost and performance
of their components, namely, EV batteries with $485 to $650 per kWh battery makes
up large portion of an Electric Vehicle costs. With a usable range of 100km, the
24kWh battery-powered Nissan Leaf achieves about one fifth of the compatible ICE
(Internal Combustion Engine) vehicle [3]. All electric vehicle with larger battery
capacity such as, 100kWh ”Telsa Model S” offers 594km [81] with a greater cost
which is out of range of most of the buyers [3]. These limitations seem to be holding
back many potential buyers to buy EVs. Although, a survey shows that in the United
States average distance traveled per person in a day is 46km and average trip distance
is 15km [3]. Recently, the cost of the batteries has been steadily decreasing due to
the public-private initiative in pack design optimization, cell count reduction, lower




vehicles, sensors, and computer and information technology systems. Power industry
gradually adopting different network technology for the partitioning of command-and-
control layer of smart grid/microgrid. Fig. 2.5b [27] shows the smart grid distribution
network communication mechanism. The communication networks of smart grid are
classified as (i) Home Area Network (HAN) and (ii) Neighborhood Area Network
(NAN).
I) Home Area Network (HAN): HANs are composed of three components, [27]
(i) in-house device which provide demand side management such as energy efficiency
and demand response, (ii) smart meter which collects data from the smart devices and
perform specific actions according to the command sent by the grid central controller,
and (iii) the gateway which connects HAN with NAN. Several network technologies
are available to implement the functionality of HAN:
1. WLAN (IEEE 802.11): The 802.11 is a set of standard development technol-
ogy for wireless local area networks. WLAN can be a feasible solution for
HAN. In case of implementation of WLAN as HAN, All smart devices (home
appliances) must be equipped with WLAN adapter. All in-home smart de-
vices communicate with WLAN enabled smart meter (home gateway) to send
demand request to the smart grid/microgrid management system and receive
command-response. WLAN is easy to deploy and home market penetration is
high. Strengths of the WLAN are: (i) easy deployment (ii) cost is falling (iii)
high home market penetration. Weaknesses are: suffer from (i) Eavesdrop, DoS
attack (ii)confidentiality of sensitive information may leak.
2. ZigBee (IEEE 802.15.4 : ZigBee is a specification for small, low power and dig-
ital radio based communication protocol and also known as low rate, wireless
personal area network (LR-WPLAN). ZigBee protocols are intended for embed-
ded applications requires for low rate and low power consumption. The ZigBee
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application profile (also known as ”ZigBee smart Energy”) for home automa-
tion was evolved in Nov. 2007. ZigBee gateway supporting two communication
stream to joining the the utility AMI central database to home appliances.
Strengths of ZigBee are: (i)low power requirement (ii) low implementation cost
(iii) good scalability (iv) design for home and industry use (v) relatively se-
cure. Weaknesses are: (i) limited range, (ii) limited data rate, (iii) flooding and
jamming may cause network unavailability, and (iv) single point of failure.
3. Mobile Communication and Femtocell : Femtocells are cellular network access
point that connects home appliances (in case of HAN) to the mobile operator
core network through ADSL, broadband cable Network or optical fibers network.
The technology behind femtocell is UTMS, LTE and WiMAX. Femtocell is
a costlier solution and signal strength varies on location of the access point
(indoor, outdoor). Strengths of Femtocell are: (i) good scalability, (ii) design
for home and industry use, (iii) relatively secure. Weaknesses are: (i)high cost,
(ii) privacy and confidentiality, (iii) fraud and service theft, (iv) flooding attack,
and (v) possible indoor health issue.
All the current HAN network protocols have their positive and negative issues in
performance, coverage, cost, and security issues. For smart grid/microgrid it is chal-
lenging to choose best HAN protocol which dependent on various constraint like cost,
geographic location, availability of NAN (WAN) technology etc.
II) Neighborhood Area Network (NAN): NAN (WAN) [27] technologies can
be used to control and to manage smart microgrid components. There is various
wide area network technology such as ADSL, cable modem, fiber to home, cellular
network services, satellite services, and etc. Choice of HAN technologies will depend
on various factors such as geography, population densities, availability, as well as the
reliability of the technology, the cost, the security and the network infrastructure
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that is already available. It is emphasized that the ADSL is highly available, but its
bandwidth decreases with the increasing distance while the cable modem has high
bandwidth and high availability, but inconsistent in bandwidth if the number of user
increases. The fiber to the home (FTTH) is highly available in the urban area, it has
high bandwidth and security, but it incurs high deployment costs. Cellular services
have a high coverage area, potentially low costs, but security and policy matters.
WiMax deployment does not require a huge investment as compared to the wired
network, but bad weather may reduce the transmission range. The satellite service,
as universally available technology, has a high cost, low effective bandwidth and low
reliability during bad weather condition. BPL (Broadband over power line) can be
deployed on the existing power line infrastructure specially in the rural area, but
BPL deployment is high. BPL is not suited for applications as it is dependent on
current on the power line and it is mostly proprietary technology. LTE is a wireless
technology for fourth generation mobile network. LTE features are all IP-flat network
with end-to-end quality of service operates on peak download 300Mbps and upload
75Mbps. It renders very promising choice for NAN communication network. The
choice of NAN technology depends on cost, availability and geographic position of
the smart grid/microgrid.
2.2 Game Theory
Game theory can be described as the subject of mathematical paradigms of conflict
and interaction between intelligent, rational players or decision makers. Game theory
presents general mathematical technique explaining a circumstance where two or more
individuals make decisions that will affect one another actions [39, 9]. Normal form
of game can be defined by the tuple (N,A, σ), where,
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• N is a finite set of player,
• A = A1 × A2, · · · ,×An, where Ai is a set of finite actions of player i,
• σ = (σ1, σ2, · · · , σn), where σi → R is a real-value utility (or payoff) function
player i.
We will use agame model to solve the consumption scheduling or energy allocation,
EV charging and discharging problem in this thesis work. In a residential microgrid,
each home’s HEMS acts as player which may have delivery of electricity or control con-
sumption pattern of the equipment of the household. Each of the equipment has a set
of actions for example, EVs’ actions are ‘charging’, ‘discharging’ or ‘remain idle’, hence
the action set for the EVs’ are Aev = (chargingev, dischargingev, idleev) and dish
washer actions are: Ad = (consumed, idled). Now, if the player wants to charge EV
and starts ‘dish washer’ at t, then the set of actions at t is Sti = (chargingev, consumd)
of household i. The set of actions sti is the consumption strategy of player i and the
player has a strategy set sti = Aev ×Ad. Therefore, player i may choose any strategy
at any time t of a day such that its payoff or utility is maximized, let the payoff of
player i be σi then we can define the payoff for player i for consumption of electricity





where f(.) is mapping function to map consumption to cost or price. Therefore,
payoff will be maximum iff σi = min
24∑
t=1
f(sti) which means the household will pay
less. If there are N players, then each energy household wants to maximize their
individual payoff but the production cost of electricity increases with the increase of
demand. Therefore the strategy of each player will affect the payoff of other player.
Game theory is a very rich subject; it is used to solve the strategic problems in variety
of subjects like, economics, business, computer science and logic, philosophy, biology,
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political science and many others.
2.2.1 Mixed Strategy
The pure strategy of a game renders a complete description of how a player will play
a game. In particular, it determines the move of a player in any circumstance he or
she could handle [39, 9]. In the previous example we present the strategy of player i
such as, sti = Aev×Ad. Let the charging and discharging rate of an EV be +9.0 kWh
and -9.0 kWh, and dishwasher consumption be 2.0kWh. Now, if at t the strategy
sti = (+9.0, 2.0) is selected then the strategy s
t
i is a pure strategy. In this case the
player decides to charge (9.0 kWh) the EV and dishwasher consume electricity (2.0
kWh), so the charging and consumption actions are chosen.
Now, let the actions in the strategy be selected with a probability; such as EV
charging with probability p, and discharging with probability (1−p) and consumption
with probability q and idle with probability (1 − q), then the strategy sti of player i
is a mixed strategy.
Nash Equilibrium
Definition 2.1. (Nash Equilibrium) A (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium is a strategic
form of game (N,Si, σi), and the strategy profile s






−i) ≥ σi(si, s
∗
−i)∀si ∈ Si (2.4)
where s∗i is the best response (or best strategy played) of strategies (s
∗
−i) of other
players. There are many cases where a pure strategy game does not have a Nash
equilibrium, i.e., the two players coin flipping game does not have a Nash equilibrium
when the payoff is specified in table 2.1. Let player one strategy be on the top and
player 2’s strategy be on left side of the table. If the game repeated many times, then
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Head Tail
Head -1, 1 1 -1
Tail 1,-1 -1, 1
Table 2.1: Coin flipping game
at least one player always has options to change (best response) the current strategy
to increase the payoff. [39, 9].
Definition 2.2. (Nash Equilibrium) A (mixed strategy) Nash equilibrium is a strate-
gic form of game (N,Si, σi), and the mixed strategy profile s
∗ ∈ S such that for all





−i) ≥ σi(si, s
∗
−i)∀si ∈ Si (2.5)
Here, Si is a set of mixed strategies of any player i. Now, for the above payoff
table 2.1, p and q for ‘head’ of player 1 and player 2 respectively. Hence, (1− p) and
(1 − q) are for choosing action ‘tail’ respectively. Then the game will have a Nash
equilibrium.
Pareto optimality
Definition 2.3. Pareto efficiency, or Pareto optimality, is a state of allocation of
resources in which it is impossible to make any one individual better off without
making at least one individual worse off [39, 9]
A Pareto improvement occurs when a least one individual becomes better off
without someone worse off. Pareto optimality occurs when all the household has the
better price by choosing the best consumption strategy (mixed). There are no other
combination of strategies which gives better results at least for one household. Nash
equilibrium is not always Pareto optimal. Nash equilibrium in the other sense can
be described as the local optimal solution of a problem. The bad move of a player
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may stick to a point which may disable the player to increase its payoff because of
the best response of other players to that move, e.g., prisoner-dilemma game. [39, 9].
2.2.2 Mechanism Design
In mechanism design, one player needs to devise a set of rules so that the other
players’ incentives were aligned with the first player’s goals. The less-informed player
works to create motives for the more informed player to take actions beneficial to the
less informed. The less-informed player is called the principal (the designer) while
the more-informed is referred to as the agent. The process that the principal uses
to devise the correct set of incentives for the agent is known as mechanism design.
One of the examples of mechanism design is auction game in which a seller wants
a higher price for auction and a buyer wants a lower price; they compete to set the
value of transaction neither buyer nor seller has all available information because
only one party holds some information. The game theoretic mechanism design needs
participation constraint and incentive constraint. Participation constraint also is
known as voluntary constraints which allow with the fact that the players are not
obligated to participate a mechanism but can decide whether or not to participate.
The restriction creates rational places constraints for an individual on the level of
expected payoff for participation. A player gets incentives in case of participation,
and an incentive constraint limits the incentives to achieve the designer goal.
In our thesis (chapter 4), the operator designs the consumption game to increase
the overall social benefit. Here, the operator is designer or principal of the mechanism
design. Each of the households decides their energy consumption pattern to maximize
the social benefit. In this mechanism design, the essential participation constraint is
the strategy for charging and discharging EVs. The operator also gives incentives to
EV owners those participates in V2G operation. The user decides the consumption
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strategy, but the payoff and constraint are defined by the operator to achieve the
maximum social benefit.
2.3 Related Work
Microgrid demand response model, use of RES, and charging of EV
Power system planners face today a pressing challenge, which requires engineering
solutions to keep the system running, owing to the bulk growth of renewable energy
based on variable generation technology [3]. Large scale energy storage can play a
vital role in balancing supply and demand; this, however, requires vast land spaces,
high installation and maintenance cost [60]. Conversely, plug-in electrical vehicles
(PEV or EV) can be used as a cheap alternative to the large scale energy storage
and good alternative for conventional vehicles which are considered as significant
GHG emitters, producing 23% of the world GHG [1]. PEVs promise to reduce the
dependency on fossil- fuel, and tap into a source of electricity that is often domestic
and relatively inexpensive. In the long term, EVs are necessary to countries seeking
to decarbonise the transport sector. To meet the IEA’s 2DS (2◦C – BLUE map
scenario) in 2050, transportation systems will play a major role in reducing the GHG
almost by 21%. PEVs can further be used to store excess energy (known as G2V)
when the production is high, and later the stored energy can be dispatched to the
grid (known as V2G) when the output is low.
Evidently, the need for electricity varies throughout the day and across the seasons
[2]. Current power systems are designed to meet peak demands; hence, during the
off-peak period, the system remains underutilized [2]. To ensure proper functioning
and quality of service, systems need to (i) estimate the load, (ii) electricity production
and, (iii) a mechanism to control the electricity use. Hence, based on the electricity
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and load information, smart grids or microgrids (MG) can reduce the peak demand
by giving incentives to users to enable them to shift the consumption (such as EV,
home appliances, etc.) away from the period of peak demand.
Several opportunities and limitations concerning the integration of EVs with the
power grid and renewable energy sources were identified and used to formulate control
methods for charging EVs [22]. The authors discussed two such methods: (i) a
global control method for charging EVs based on global load information that is
communicated utilizing load signaling, and (ii) local control methods for charging
EVs based on local load conditions of the microgrid. Preliminary results show that
an energy control strategy based on load information offers benefits, especially by
avoiding the need for additionally generated capacity, which originates from additional
peak loads. The design goal of both strategies is to charge EVs by shifting the charging
from peak hours to off-peak hours to flatten the electricity demand of the grid. The
authors assume that residential loads are not flexible (i.e., deferrable) to consume
electricity from the grid. Further, the paper does not consider EVs for electricity
storage.
A dispatch model based on a cost-benefit analysis of microgrids for selling electric-
ity from a residential area to office buildings was presented in [76]. Simulation results
show that incorporating EVs into the microgrids not only minimizes the storage and
operational costs but also results in cost savings for the owners of EVs. In [76], the
microgrid charges EV batteries at home at a low electricity price after office hours
and dispatch the energy to office buildings at a higher rate during the day. In their
work, the authors assumed that EVs do not feed power back into the grid.
The authors of [139] demonstrated a decentralized EV charging scheme using the
Nash certainty equivalence principle. Their approach may be viewed as a valley filling
approach. The system shifts the charging of EVs from peak hours to off-peak hours
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by controlling the peak and off-peak electricity prices. The multiplayer game theory
in the Nash equilibrium condition determines the peak and off-peak hour electricity
price. In their work, the authors claimed that centralized control for charging a large
number of EVs is computationally intractable and impractical.
Another decentralized EV charging protocol was proposed in [41]. The primary
objective of this work is to shift vehicle charging from peak hours to off-peak hours by
imposing a penalty on the electricity price. The proposed protocol considers different
prices for different hours of the day and minimizes the peak hour load by imposing
penalties on vehicles intended to be charged in peak hours.
The stochastic nature of EVs and renewable energy sources was considered for
EV charging in [140] and [141]. They model the charging system using a continuous
time Markov chain. Two performance metrics, called vehicle charging-blocking prob-
ability and average reward, are considered to evaluate their charging policies. They
classify EVs on their different charging capacity and prioritize them accordingly [141].
The motivation of the paper is to devise an optimal charging strategy to serve the
maximum number of EVs.
Most of the researchers give emphasis to use RES and microgrid technologies to
charge EVs to lessen the extra burden imposed by a large number EVs to the grid.
Unlike the existing research, we admit EVs as an opportunity and use as a dynamic
storage which can mitigate the intermittency of RES generation by storing extra
energy at high production periods and use it at peak-hour with the obligation that
EV must contain target charge when departing for next drive (see Chapter 3).
Distributed strategy for real-time electricity allocation
Several researchers took initiatives to mitigate the challenges of integrating a large
number of EVs, RESs and varying loads of customers. Most of the initiatives and
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models are based on oﬄine schemes and were simulated either estimating load and
energy generation for a day ahead. Further, a very few of these oﬄine algorithms
consider renewable energy sources. Apart from these, a few online schemes are en-
deavored to mitigate the demand of microgrid customers in the microgrid scenarios
which contains intermittent RESs, EVs, and loads.
In [21], the authors proposed a real time stochastic and robust optimization for a
Monte-Carlo price based demand response management for residential appliances. In
[56] the authors used Lyapunov optimization technique to derive an adaptive electric-
ity scheduling algorithm by introducing the QoSE virtual queue and energy storage
virtual queue to minimize the MG operation cost.
Another online-convex-optimization (OCO) programming for microgrid with sin-
gle turbine-boiler generator is proposed in [82] to minimize the production cost in
each time step of a microgrid. An incentive-based game-theoretic automatic energy
consumption scheduling (ECS) scheme for future residential smart grid with a non-
renewable energy generation is proposed in [80].
In [64] the authors proposed a hierarchical smart grid interactive architecture
for grid stability and quality of service. The authors used a hidden mode Markov
decision process at the controller for centralized sequential decision to maximize an
accumulated reward for the microgrid and distributed auction (Vickrey auction) game
to obtain optimal load profile (a solution derived by the controller) of the customers
(smart homes).
The authors of [72] proposed a stochastic programming for energy planning of
grid-connected microgrid, which contains renewable energy sources. The stochastic
programming model is a two-stage formulation where, in the first-step, decisions are
made for energy generation scheduling and adjustable load set point. In the second
stage, the energy transaction as well as load adjustment decision is made based on
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the load set point. The proposed stochastic programming model is a centralized man-
agement scheme, which deals with energy trading with the main grid by scheduling
energy generation and load adjustment without considering the detailed characteris-
tics of the load.
In [19] the authors presented a smart energy management system (SEMS) for
optimizing the operation of the microgrid; the system consisted of a power fore-
casting module and an energy storage system. There, the optimal management of
energy storage system across multiple time-step, considering energy price structure,
stochastic generation from renewable energy sources, is evaluated and simplified to
a single-object optimization problem. Finally, the authors used a matrix real-coded
genetic algorithm to achieve the underlined objective of the problem.
Unlike the existing online schemes, in Chapter 4, we manifest an online distributed
system which gives responsibilities and opportunities to each customer to determine
their consumption profile by shifting load, utilizing EVs and RES to minimize energy
costs in real-time while increase overall social benefit of the microgrid.
Power generation planning and Demand Side Management (DSM)
The rapid surge in demand for electricity is one of the most significant problems that
is facing the power grid. To achieve higher reliability, robustness, and stability, the
power grid is designed to serve peak demands rather than the average load. This,
indeed, can result in a power generation and distribution system that is under-utilized
as well as the waste of natural resources [108, 44]. Hence, utility companies are
continuously adjusting the power generation of their plants to balance the total loads
and their variations. Indeed, fast-responding generators such as fossil-fuel generators
are costly and have a significant GHG (greenhouse gas) footprint [32]. Power system
planners are also facing a pressing challenge to meet their customers surging demands
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while ensuring electricity systems integrity.
To mitigate problems of uncertainties, numerous methods have been proposed to
regulate users’ consumption profiles. The objectives of these methods (also known as
demand-side management or DSM) are to deploy the current capacity more efficiently
without modifying the existing grid infrastructure [90, 69, 135, 136, 44]. The evolu-
tion of the smart grid, integration of RES, smart meters, EVs and dynamic pricing
schemes have all added momentum to solve the DSM problem efficiently. Further,
the widespread deployment of home energy management systems (HEMS) and com-
municating devices will upgrade the existing power grid structure and transform it
into a more intelligent and decentralized system [17].
Recently, much research work has been done to address the DSM problem. In
[69], the authors presented a heuristic-based Evolutionary Algorithm to solve the
DSM based on a day-ahead load shifting technique for a microgrid which contains
a large number of devices. Their results show that the proposed strategy achieves
substantial savings while reducing the peak load. In [135], the authors studied the
reverse power flow problem from rooftop photovoltaic (PV) elements to the substa-
tion which causes a rise in voltage when generation is larger than the aggregated
load. The authors proposed a DSM system that shifts the operation of deferrable
loads from peak consumption hours to high PV production periods. The simulation
results showed that the proposed methods solve the voltage rise problem in an area
with penetration of PVs. In [136], the authors studied a real-time based demand-side
management system with advanced communication networks and proposed a game
theoretic solution to smooth the peak-to-average ratio. In [79], a new approach to
forecasting the residential electricity demand over 24 hours is presented; each con-
sumer is responsible for predicting his future loads and sharing that outlook with
the operator. For DSM, the authors discuss a reward which will be given to the
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customers based on the accuracy of their forecasts. The authors of [17] provide a
dynamic pricing scheme to motivate the customers to come up with an aggregate
load profile suitable for the utility. In [105], the authors assessed the performance
of exponential smoothing forecasting techniques in forecasting the energy demands
of residential users. A real-time game theoretic distributed algorithm is proposed to
minimize customer bills by reducing peak demand [121].RESs and EVs are used to
transfer energy from one duration to another duration and schedule equipment to
reduce the peak-demand and flatten the load curve [121].
In Chapter 5 we address the challenges of generation planning and DSM system
and build a relation between day-ahead power planning and real-time DSM. Unlike the
existing methods, our solution helps the power retailer to plan a day ahead of a cost-
effective generation or purchase of electricity from the grid and deliver electricity to
customers without modifying the original production plan at the time of consumption.
Enegy management and pricing in micorgrid network (MGN)
Nowadays, a regulatory body controls the vertically integrated energy supply system
with an important feature that is, reliance on average-cost pricing rather than the
marginal cost prices of the competitive market. Under this controlled scenario, it
is nearly impossible for a new player with a small investment (e.g., a microgrid) to
enter the energy market and survive [54]. For the benefit of both customers and
providers, an open competitive market is desirable which accepts new suppliers and
admit marginal cost prices for electricity. Several investigations have shown that the
electricity market paradigm is changing with the modernization of the grid and the
integration of new technology like smart grid, renewable sources, electric vehicle, and
storage system [54, 28, 128].
45
Moreover, the evolution of smart grid, renewable energy sources (RES), and elec-
tric vehicles (EVs) are gradually changing the power flow of the network from unidi-
rectional to bidirectional [68, 36]. It is envisioned that a microgrid network (MGN)
may shortly contain hundreds or even thousands of microgrids (MG) sharing energy
with each other [48]. Usually, an MG produces and consumes energy locally; in
the case of shortage, it purchases electricity from the neighboring microgrids or sells
whenever it has a surplus. In such scenarios, the microgrid operators may not own
transmission lines, and use the existing electrical network which requires transmission
costs besides the generation cost. The economic dispatch model of the MGN, there-
fore, is more complex than the MCP (market clearing price) and LMP (locational
marginal price) model for the existing one-way energy transmission network [110].
Smart grids or microgrids add new features such as, distributed generation, storage
and demand response (DR) which can improve the flexibility of demand but introduce
uncertainty in the unbundled energy market. In [107], the authors studied the problem
based on a game theoretical framework. They proposed an algorithm that forms MGs
coalitions and minimizes the power loss and price within a coalition. In [67], the
authors introduced an optimization problem that minimizes the electricity costs and
peer-to-peer energy sharing losses in a distribution network consisting of MGs. They
initially formulated the problem as a non-convex and later relaxed it to a second-
order cone programming. For calculating the electricity price, they used TOU (time
of use) price given by a central grid. In [132], the authors discussed the energy
trading in a hybrid electricity market controlled by a non-profit or profit oriented local
trading center (LTC) that maximizes the benefits for each consumer and seller. They
formulated the trading as two optimization problems which (i) maximize the benefit of
the consumer and seller with non-profit LTC and (ii) maximize the profit of the LTC
by ensuring the benefits of the consumer and seller. A demand management of an
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electrical network of interconnected MGs formulated as a power dispatch optimization
problem is given in [38]. Here, a real time price is employed as the motivation for
interaction between MGs.
To address the challenges and problems to integrate new suppliers and marginal
cost pricing of electricity in an open competitive market a novel solution for sharing
energy among microgrids in a microgrid network is demonstrated in Chapter 6.
Vol-VAR optimization
Currently, electric power systems use (and for many years have used) Volt-VAR (volt-
ampere reactive) Optimization (VVO) to reduce the distribution losses and increase
efficiency as well as to reduce the electricity peak demand [43, 71]. The primary
goal of VVO is to maintain an acceptable voltage at all points of the distribution
system. VVO is an advanced process which periodically responds to the operator’s
real-time demand using a two-way communication network and adjusts the voltage
regulator and reactive compensation elements for energy delivery. Proper control of
capacitor banks and voltage regulators may yield in reactive power compensation,
which improves voltage regulation, power factor, and quality as well as loss reduction
[74].
A few years back, the American Electric Power in Ohio took several initiatives
to increase the efficiency and improve the service of the electricity delivery system.
As part of the effort, a Coordinate Volt-VAR Optimization (CVVO) system is de-
ployed to decrease the amount of energy necessary to satisfy the customers need with
the quality of service [111]. One of the objectives of the CVVO is to reduce energy
use and peak load by operating at the lower end of ANSI C84.1 band-A standard.
Another objective is to adjust the capacitors to keep the power factor of a substa-
tion near unity [111]. In [71], the author discussed the impact of AMI smart meter,
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distributed energy sources, and demand response (DR) on the Integrated Volt-VAR
Optimization (IVVO). This investigation presents a significant opportunity and bene-
fit to the IVVO and imposes additional constraint to the energy management system.
In [5], the authors proposed VVCDDR (Volt/VAR Control and Distributed Demand
Response), which is an integrated Volt/VAR DR control scheme to improve the reli-
ability and efficiency of the distribution network. The authors modified the original
Integrated Volt/VAR Controller (IVVC) of GridSpice to show that the IVVC with a
single DR event can tighten the voltage profile and facilitate a more effective voltage
conservation. A coordination scheme for DR and VVC is developed and simulated
on American Electric Power distribution feeders in [115]. A different level of DR and
VVC for the various types of loads show that the integration of DR and VVC in real
time can reduce the demand and feeder voltage through redistribution. [84] demon-
strated an Evolutionary Algorithm using the Modified Teaching-Learning-Algorithm
to solve scenario based multiobjective VVC problem in a distribution network which
is powered by various energy sources. In [40], the authors presented a mechanism to
use the bi-directional charges and V2G function of EVs to compensate the reactive
power of the distribution network. Here, the authors define a three-phase inverter
topology together with DC/DC bi-directional converter which has the interface with
EV battery.
In Chapter 7, we present a game prototype to address the challenges and solve
the VVO problem to reduce the customer electricity cost, increase the efficiency of
underline electronic devices by using RESs, EVs and shifting loads from high demand
durations to low demand periods.
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Chapter 3
Smart Microgrids: Optimal Joint
Scheduling for Electric Vehicles
and Home Appliances
In this chapter, we present an efficient centralized optimal consumption scheduling
(COPCS) to solve the energy management problem of a residential microgrid by the
integration of RES, optimal scheduling of charging and discharging of EVs, shifting
elastic load from peak hours to off-peak hours to minimize the amount of imported
electricity from the grid. We show that our COPCS system has notable performance
compare to the existing DR solutions.
3.1 Motivation
In section 2.3 we present numerous aspects of synthesis of renewable energy sources,
use of electric vehicles and the demand response model. Existing solutions do not
consider both G2V and V2G operations of EVs, household load characteristics and




We consider the microgrid shown in Fig. 3.1 with multiple renewable distributed
generators (DGs), a central controller, a set of home appliances N (|N |= N), and a
set of EVsM (|M|=M). For renewable energy sources, home appliances and EVs we
adopt the notations of Table 3.1. The central controller of the microgrid is responsible
for scheduling and controlling the flow of electricity from DGs to the customers’
appliances. A smart meter or aggregator of each customer’s home sends information
(operational time slot, consumption rate, maximum and minimum capacity, etc.) of
each appliance to the central controller. In the following subsections, we discuss each
component of the system model. Finally, in Section 3.2.5 we present the objective
function and constraints of the model.
3.2.1 Renewable Energy
We consider a microgrid with g renewable energy sources (wind turbine, photovoltaic





Note that renewable energy sources are stochastic in nature [116]. Several stochastic
models exist to predict the short-term and/or long-term power generation. In this
thesis, a Markov chain state transition probability is used to predict the next 24
hours of electricity generation, as described next. Also, the proposed system model
is capable to integrate any renewable, non-renewable or weather predicted energy
source model. The only requirement is that the model would be able to forecast
power generation in each time interval for next H (i.e., H = 24) hours.
51
Table 3.1: Notations : Centralized Joint Scheduling of EV and Home Appliances
Symbol Description
H set of time slots, (|H|= H), duration of each time slots is one hour.
Energy Sources
G set of Renewable Energy sources, (|G|= G).
Eg(h) electricity (in kWh) generated from renewable energy source g at h.
E(h) electricity (in kWh) generated from renewable energy sources at h.
W set of wind speed (in m/s2) states, (|W|=W ).
Pr(i, j) Markov first order transition probability from wind speed state i to j
Pcdf(i, k) Markov first order cumulative transition probability from wind speed state
i to k
Vl, Vr wind speed boundary of a location, high and low respectively
Ψ Markov transition probability matrix among solar radiation states.
ψi,j Markov transition probability from solar radiation state i to j.
ΨI solar radiation states (in W/m
2)
Zi uniform random number over [0, 1].
Home appliances
C set of customers.
Ac set of home appliances of a customer (c).
N set of home appliances, (|N |= N).
Q set of type C home appliances.
B set of type B home appliances.
Xhn electricity (in kWh) consumption of appliance n in time slot (hour) h
zhn indicative binary variable, for z
h
n = 1 equipment being used, otherwise idle
Γhn binary value, for Γ
h
n = 1 appliance n is on at h, otherwise switched off.
LTn target energy (in kWh) consumption of home appliance n
EV (Electric Vehicle)
M set of EVs, (|M|=M).
Y hm defines charging and discharging electric energy (in kWh) of EV m in time
slot (hour) h.
shm is an integer variable, where s
h
m ∈ {1, 0,−1}. Equivalent to 1(charging),
0(remain idle) and −1(discharging).
Λhm is a binary value, for Λ
h
m = 1 EV m is plugged-in (present) in time slot h,
otherwise EV m.
PEVam energy (in kWh) level of EV m when arrived.
PEVminm energy (in kWh) level lower bound for EV m.
PEVmaxm energy (in kWh) level upper bound for EV m.
PEVhm energy (in kWh) level of EV m in time slot h.
PEVm net electric energy (in kWh) level consumed by EV m during a day.
PEVTm minimum or target energy (in kWh) level for EV m when departed.
PEVT net electric energy (in kWh) consumed by M EVs during a day.
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Wind turbine
Wind is a highly unstable phenomenon that cannot be fully described by any prob-
ability distribution science wind speed at every hour is correlated with the speed at
previous hours. A Markov chain represents the system transition from one state to
another over time. The order of the Markov chain gives the number of time steps
influencing the present state of the system [113]. A first order Markov chain is used
for the simulation of wind speed prediction. A second or higher-order Markov chain
model can improve the wind speed prediction. Our Markov chain model for wind
speed prediction uses the historical time series data for a given geographic area [98].
Suppose S = {s1, s2, · · ·} is the historical wind speed time series data representing the
hourly wind speed in meter per second (m/s) for a long duration (3 or more years).
LetW denote the states of wind speed for the time series wind speed data (S). Then,










Pr(i, j) = 1 and wi,j is the total number of transitions from wind speed i
to wind speed j for the next hour in the wind speed time series data (S). Synthetic
wind speed data can be generated by taking the cumulative probability distribution




Pr(i, j); ∀i, k ∈ W . (3.3)
For generating sequences of wind speed time series data, an initial state i is selected
randomly. Then a random number is chosen between 0 and 1 using a uniform random
number generator. The value of the random number is compared with the values in
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row i of the cumulative probability distribution of the first order or second order
Markov state transition probability matrix. If the value of the random number is
greater than the previous state and less than or equal to the following state, the
following state is selected. Next, the speed state is converted to wind speed by using
the following equation
V = Vl + Zi(Vl − Vr), (3.4)
where Vl and Vr are the wind speed boundary of the state, and Zi is a uniformly
distributed random number over [0, 1]. In doing so, wind speed time series of any
length can be generated. The validity of this prediction model is described in more
detail in [113].
From the historical (observed) or synthetic wind speed time series data, Markov
first order state transition matrix can be constructed. More precisely, from the current
wind speed using equations (3.3) and (3.4) the next wind speed can be predicted. Let
the predicted wind speed for hour h be V (h). The electricity generated from a wind




· ρ · A · (V (h))3 · Cp, (3.5)
where ρ, A, and Cp represent the air density in kg/m
2, swap area of the turbine
and Betz limit (maximum value of 0.59). Practical wind turbines have a cut-in and
cutoff wind speed approximately from 2m/s to 5m/s and from 15m/s to 25m/s,
respectively. At cutoff wind speed or beyond, a wind turbine generates a constant
amount of electric power at its maximum capacity, whereas below the cut-in wind
speed the wind turbine does not produce any power.
54
Solar power
Markov models for solar radiation using historical data have been successfully used
in climatology. Here, a solar radiation model with impact of cloud intensity on solar
radiation is considered [85]. Solar radiation states can be expressed by the following















γ0 ... γi .... γk
]
, (3.7)
where k is the total number of radiation states. For example, state i = 0 refers to
the case when the sun is fully covered by clouds and solar cells do not produce any
power. For i = k, γk represents the maximum intensity of solar radiation (in w/m
2).
In this case (full sunlight, clear sky), solar cells produce maximum power. In (3.6)
and (3.7), matrices Ψ and ΨI denote the transition probability matrix among solar
radiation states and intensity of the solar radiation (W/m2), respectively. Note that
ψi,j in matrix Ψ denotes the transition probability form solar radiation state γi to γj
in ΨI .
Under the assumption that the cloud size is exponentially distributed with mean
ci, the solar radiation state is γi. Assuming that transitions among solar radiation
states are sequential and circular, the transition matrix for solar radiation can be
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denotes the variation rate between solar radiations [140]. The instantaneous
power of the solar panel, Eg(h), is directly related to the current solar radiation γh.
Thus, the electricity generated by the photovoltaic (PV) panel can be calculated as
follows [73]






2 0 < γh < Kc
ec · γh γh > Kc,
(3.9)
where the value of ec is the corresponding efficiency which depends on the single
PV cell area, ambient temperature, internal impedance, global irradiation, and other
parameters at time h (∀h ∈ H). Kc is a critical radiation point in W/m
2 beyond
which an increase of radiation results in a smaller increase in efficiency. J is the
number of photovoltaic cells in the PV panel. We assume, a 0.01 m2 PV cell with
efficiency ec = 0.10 (unit-less), and Kc = 1000W/m
2 at 25oC.
3.2.2 Home Appliances
Let C be the set of customers and Ac be the set of home appliances (e.g., washer,
dryer, refrigerator) for each customer c ∈ C. Each appliance is scheduled to consume
electricity or remain idle in each time interval (e.g., an hour) during the day. Resi-
dential customers may have different types of appliances namely, first, Type A (hard
load), where certain appliances may have strict scheduling requirement, for example,
a refrigerator should remain operational at all times, second, Type B (soft load),
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where many appliances may require constant amount of electricity consumption in a
continuous fashion with flexible scheduling for a limited amount of time (e.g., wash-
ing machine) and lastly, Type C (soft load), where some appliances may need a fixed
amount of electricity with irregular scheduling (e.g., EV). Let Xhn be the electricity
consumption of a home appliance n ∈ Ac in time interval h. Then, the total electric








n), ∀n ∈ |N |, (3.10)
where, H = 24. In case of a hard load (Type A), for each hour h, zhn is equal to 1 if
Γhn = 1. For a soft load (Type C), if an appliance consumes Ln unit of energy (kWh)
during a day then for each hour zhn ∈ {0, 1} if Γ
h
n = 1. In this case, when z
h
n = 1,
appliance n consumes Xhn units of electricity, otherwise it remains idle. Suppose that
the microgrid has N home appliances, N = |{A1 ∪ A2 ∪ ... ∪ A|C|}|, then the total
electric energy consumed by appliance (Type C) n ∈ Q (Q ⊆ N ) per day must satisfy








n), ∀n ∈ Q. (3.11)
Type B appliances consume electricity in a continuous fashion. Thus, in any time
slot, if a type B equipment n is scheduled to consume electricity, it will continue to
consume electricity until the total consumption is equal to the target LTn such that











denotes the number of time slots needed by appliance n to reach its
target energy consumption LTn and τn(k) is a binary variable, which denotes the start
57
time of type B appliance n. If τn(k) = 1, appliance n starts consuming electricity
in time slot k. As type B appliances consume electricity continuously, the following
constraint must be satisfied
H∑
k=1
τn(k) = 1 ∀n ∈ B. (3.13)
3.2.3 Electric Vehicle
We assume that the arrival of EVs to the microgrid follows a Poisson process with an
arbitrary randomly distributed energy level. The EV stays at home (microgrid) for a
random amount of time period and then departs for driving. At home, an EV charges
its battery to a target energy level for the following driving schedule. EV is a special
type of soft load, which can be scheduled in a flexible way i.e., charging, discharging,
or remaining idle during its residence in the microgrid. If the arrival time of EV m
is tma and departure time is t
m
d , the energy level at arrival is PEV
a
m and the target
energy level is PEVTm. The energy consumption from the microgrid between arrival
(tma ) and departure(t
m





(Y hm · s
h
m) (3.14)
where shm denote the strategies of m (defined in 3.1). If Λ
h
m = 1 for t
m
a ≤ h ≤ t
m
d and









For both safety and longevity of EVs’ batteries, each EV must not discharge below
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the minimum discharge level. Therefore,
PEVhm ≥ PEV
min
m , ∀h ∈ H, (3.16)










m), ∀h ∈ H. (3.17)
Note that for the proposed model when we consider only EVs without discharge
capabilities, we simply ignore the state shm = −1. In this case, s
h
m can either take 0
or 1.
Each EV may charge, discharge, or remain idle throughout the duration of its






The microgrid central controller must ensure that each EV m has the target energy
level when it departs for driving. Thus, the following relation must hold
PEVam + PEVm ≥ PEV
T
m. (3.19)
However, an EV should not charge beyond its battery capacity and discharge below
PEVminm , as given by
PEVminm ≤ PEV
a





We define the cost function ρ(h) (in hour h) as the unit price of the electricity con-
sumption (di) from renewable energy sources, discharging of Evs (dd) as well as im-
ported power (de) from the external grid or microgrids, whereby
ρ(h) =
βi · di + βd · dd + βe · de
di + dd + de
(3.21)
Here, βi (e.g., 0.10
$
kWh




) is a function, which increases with the increase of import from the
external grid or microgrids; βd (e.g., 0.15
$
kWh
) is a constant which represents the
unit selling price of electricity (dd) due to EVs battery discharge; βd is βi plus the
compensation due to the EV’s battery discharge. We assume βi < βd < βe. For each



































n). Therefore, the daily total










The microgrid central controller adjusts the electricity unit price for the whole com-
munity by the amount of imported electricity δ(h) in each hour. The controller does
not charge the price to community if the total electricity demand is equal to or lower
(δ(h) = 0) than that of produced. Consequently, the daily total updated electricity
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N) + δ(h)]. (3.24)




0 if η(h) ≤ 0
η(h) otherwise
, (3.25)
where the import electricity η(h) is obtained as
η(h) = PEVhM + L
h
N − E(h); ∀h ∈ H (3.26)
The adjustment in Equ. (3.25) can be calculated from the following inequalities:
δ(h) ≤ PEVhM + L
h
N − E(h) + L(1− µ(h)) (3.27)
δ(h) ≥ PEVhM + L
h








where ∀h ∈ H, L is an large integer number and µ(h) is a indicating binary variable.
In case of import, µ(h) = 1 otherwise we set µ(h) = 0.
3.2.5 Problem Formulation
To achieve best (i.e., minimum) daily price for customers, while predicting the hourly
renewable energy generation E(h) and fixed activation matrix for appliances (Γhn) and











which requires to determine the values of the variables shm and z
h
n. Therefore, the
optimization problem Equ. (3.30) can be solved by determining the optimal schedule
of the appliances and changing states of EVs during their residence in the microgrid.
Formally,
























n ; ∀n ∈ Q; z
h
n = 1 for type A (3.33)
For type B







n); ∀n ∈ {N −Q} (3.34)
H∑
k=1

























≥ PEVminm , ∀m ∈M,
and Eqs. (3.27)-(3.29).
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The formulated mathematical model contains continuous (shm and z
h
n) and discrete
(δ(h)) decision variables, and hence forms an MILP (Mixed Integer Linear Program-
ming) model). By solving the above MILP problem, we can obtain the optimal
schedule for different working states of home appliances and EVs, respectively. The
minimization of imported electricity model Equ. (3.32) shifts soft loads to consume
electricity from low power generation time slots to high power generation time slots.
EVs charge their batteries in high power generation time slots and discharge, when
the amount of power generated by the microgrid is low. The formulated MILP prob-
lem for joint scheduling of home appliances and EVs is solved using the IBM CPLEX
MILP solver.
3.3 Naive Scheduling Scheme
In our naive scheduling scheme, the microgrid central controller schedules home ap-
pliances and EVs for electricity consumption without prior knowledge of the amount
of generated electricity and operational time slots of the home appliances and EVs.
Thus, as soon as a home appliance and/or an EV is ready, the central controller of
the microgrid schedules the appliance and/or EV to consume electricity regardless
of the amount of electricity generated by the microgrid. Therefore, the amount of








Y hm − E(h), (3.38)








Y hm ≥ PEV
T





n if n ∈ N
. (3.39)
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0, if η(h) > 0
η(h) otherwise.
(3.41)
3.4 Decentralized EV charging control using non-
cooperative game
A Decentralized EV charging control strategy allows each EV to determine its own
charging pattern. The decentralized model is composed of a utility responsible for
collecting all optimal charging strategies proposed by all EVs and broadcasting the
aggregated EV demand along with predicted base demand. The problem is formulated
as a non-cooperative game where each EV is a player and utility of the microgrid is
the controller of the game. Each EV reacts with an optimal charging strategy for
minimizing its own electricity costs by receiving the base and aggregated EV demand.
The game continues until there are no changes in the charging strategy or total energy
costs of any of the EVs. The game is a non-cooperative selfish game because each
EV decides its ”happiness” (charging scheme) by knowing all other EVs’ charging
strategies [139] [70]. For an individual EV m, we adopt the notation in Table 3.1.
Here, base load is calculated by summing up the amount of the electricity requested
by each individual home. Each appliance is scheduled to consume electricity as soon




Xhn , ∀h ∈ H. (3.42)
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For each time slot h between arrival (tma ) and departure (t
m
d ), EVm’s charging control
















with an initial energy level of PEVam. Each EV m must be charged to a target energy
level at the time of departure (tdm). Moreover, the energy level of EV m must not
violate the upper and lower bound while residing in the microgrid. Therefore, the
















where shm represents the charge control strategy at time slot h and Y
h
m denotes the
maximum charging and discharging rate of EV m. Value shm can be chosen from any
finite number of integer values between {−1, 1} that represent the strategies of EV
m. To compare with the proposed optimal charging strategy, the same strategies
(1:charging, 0:remain idle and -1:discharging) are chosen. Therefore, we can define
the set of feasible charging strategies for a predefined target as
Um = {um = (shm); ∀m ∈M, satisfy (3.44) & (3.45)}. (3.46)
Let
u = {um; 1 ≤ m ≤M} (3.47)
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be the set of charging strategies of EVs and
u−n = {um;n 6= m} (3.48)
the set of charging strategies for EVs without EV m. Each EV minimizes its own op-
erating cost by determining a charging strategy with respect to the charging strategy




















Y hm · s
h
m. (3.50)
The price is given by
ρ(h) = ρ(Lhb +M · avg(uh)). (3.51)
Here, ρ is defined as




where dres, ddischarge, dimport represent the amount of electricity used by the microgrid
customers from renewable energy sources, discharged EV battery, and imported elec-
tricity from the grid, respectively. The parameter values of the price function used
for simulation a set to βi = 0.10
$
kWh
, βd = 0.15
$
kWh
and βe = 0.15r
1.5 $
kWh
. Here, r is
the amount of electricity imported from the grid. Here, βi, βd are constant and βe is
convex [70], therefore, ρ is a convex function. Optimal charging strategy for an EV
is obtained via negotiation between electricity cost and cost incurred deviating from
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the strategy. The decentralized charge control strategy thus forms a non-cooperative
dynamic game. Each EV resides at home shares base load information and also tracks
the average charging strategy of the whole EV population. A set of charging controls
u is at Nash-equilibrium if, for all EVs m, um ∈ Um is the charging strategy that
minimizes the operation cost (3.49) with respect to U−m [139] [70]. The negotiation
of charging strategies for a day can be determined by the following procedure [139]
[70]:
(S1) The utility broadcasts the predicted base load Lhb ; ∀h ∈ H to all EV agents.
(S2) Each EV agent proposes a charging control strategy to minimizes its operating
cost (3.49) with respect to the common aggregated EV demand broadcast by
the utility.
(S3) The utility collects all proposed charging control strategies (S2), and updates
the aggregated EV demand. The EVs’ aggregated demand is broadcast to all
EVs.
(S4) Repeat step (S2) and (S3) until the proposed optimal charging strategy of each
EV no longer changes.
Higher values of tracking cost σ put more emphasis on minimizing the deviation
from the average strategy, and on the other hand lower values put more emphasis
on the electricity price. The authors of these algorithms chose σ = 0.007, which
converge the homogeneous system to the Nash-equilibrium by smoothing the valley
filling curve [139] [70]. For heterogeneous system the game converges to -Nash equi-
librium. For each EV agent the minimization of equation (3.49) with the constraints
from equation (3.44) to (3.45) and base load Lhb , becomes the mixed integer quadratic




In this section, we evaluate our proposed algorithms (EVs with and without discharge
capabilities) and compare the results with our optimal results with those obtained
from naive scheduling and decentralized EV charging control schemes. In our pro-
posed model, we consider a wind turbine with radius 10m, air density 1.28 kg/m2,
cut-in wind speed 2m/s, cut-off wind speed 25m/s, Cp = 0.59) and photovoltaic
energy sources with maximum radiation: 1000W/m2, photovoltaic panel area 50m2,
and with a maximum production capacity of 1.5MWh (from equ. (5)) and 0.5MWh
(from equ. (9)), respectively. The amount of electricity from the renewable energy
sources is predicted for each hour of a day by using the renewable energy models de-
scribed in Section 3.2. To generate synthetic time series we took observed wind speed
time series during one day from the NCDC (National Climate Data Center) of NOAA
(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, USA). We assume a small com-
munity with 200 residential subscribers for the simulation. In the simulation, we select
1400 appliances randomly distributed over these 200 household customers. Note that
each customer owns 6 to 8 appliances. Such appliances include hard and soft loads.
Hard loads with daily and hourly consumption include: a 4.0 kWh (2.0kWh per hour)
electric oven, a 0.8 kWh (0.8 kWh per hour) microwave, five (0.1 kWh per hour each)
2.0 kWh light bulb, a 0.36 kWh (0.12 kWh per hour) flat screen TV, a 3.6 kWh
(0.150 kWh per hour) refrigerator, a 6 kWh (1.0 kWh per hour) heating system, and
a 0.25 kWh (0.05 kWh per hour) laptop. Soft loads (Type B) with daily and hourly
consumption include: a 1.6 kWh (0.8 kWh per hour) washing machine, a 2.4 kWh
(1.2 kWh per hour) dishwasher, a 6 kWh (2.0 kWh per hour) dryer, and a 0.027 kWh
(0.009 kWh per hour) battery charger. For the simulation, we vary the number of
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EVs from 10 to 600, where each EV applies 3 kWh per hour charging and discharging
rate with 24 kWh capacity and 3 kWh (13.5%) minimum discharge energy level. The





m ) and target energy level (PEV
T
m is in between 70%
to 100% of PEVmaxm ) are selected randomly, with the restriction that the time span
of each EV is sufficient to charge its battery to the target energy level. We have also
considered certain real life EVs pattern where most of the EVs are unavailable during
morning to afternoon. In this case we took the EVs arrival and departure pattern
extracted from the investigation of NHTS [25].
3.5.2 Numerical Results
To evaluate the performance of the proposed system we developed the simulation pro-
gram using C++ and IBM CPLEX. We execute the simulation with 40 iterations and
compare the obtained results with decentralized and naive methods by considering
both V2G and G2V modes of EV.
Fig. 3.2 depicts the amount of imported electricity vs. number of EVs for optimal
(EV with and without discharge capabilities) and naive scheduling. The amount of
imported electricity is always high in naive scheduling in comparison to the optimal
scheduling schemes. The reason of this improvement in optimal scheduling schemes
over naive scheduling is that optimal scheduling is able to predict future loads and
power generation whereas the naive approach schedules appliances and EVs without
any prior knowledge. We also observe that the optimal scheduling with EVs having
discharge capabilities performs substantially better than EVs without discharge capa-
bilities. Note that both schemes can predict future loads and the amount of generated




improvement is 175.37%. As the number of EVs increases, the storage capability of
the system increases as well and the optimal scheduling (EV with discharge) shows a
clearly superior performance over the naive approach. The optimal (with discharge)
scheduling also outperforms optimal scheduling (w/o discharge), as shown in Fig.
3.3. Optimal (w/o discharge) scheduling performs better than the naive scheduling
scheme. In this case, for 10 and 590 EVs the performance improvement is 4.30%
and 84.34%, respectively. Fig. 3.3 also shows that after reaching a certain number
of EVs (470) the performance improvement(optimal scheduling with EVs discharge)
decreases as the number of EVs increases. This is because the overall load of the
microgrid increases and a small amount of electricity is available to store.
Next, we compare the hourly imported electricity during a day for optimal and
naive scheduling schemes. In most cases, both optimal scheduling models require less
imported electricity than the naive scheduling. However, in some cases (e.g., hour 24
in Fig. 3.4) the imported electricity using the naive scheme is less than that of optimal
scheduling (without EV discharge capability). This is due to the fact that the optimal
scheduling algorithm intelligently shifts the soft load in order to consume electricity
during high power generation hours. In contrast, naive scheduling schedules a load
in a time slot if it is ready at that time and still has not yet achieved its target
consumption. As a result, the total amount of imported electricity is much higher
compared to the optimal scheduling schemes.
Fig. 3.5, depicts the imported electricity with respect to hourly load and hourly
renewable (here, solar cell) energy generation during a day. Fig. 3.5 illustrated how
the optimal scheduling with or without EV discharge capabilities shifts some loads
from low power generation regions to high power generation regions in order to min-







the other hand, optimal with EV discharge scheduling scheme minimizes the total
import in a day by jointly determining the optimal scheduling of EVs and home ap-
pliances to consume electricity. Therefore, our proposed optimal EV with discharging
imports less electricity compared to the decentralized EV charging control algorithm
in a day. This is also true because the decentralized algorithm only (i) regulates EV
load while the proposed algorithm regulates all soft load including EVs and (ii) for
non-homogeneous systems the decentralized EV charging control method produces
-Nash equilibrium. Fig. 3.10 shows the comparison of the hourly requested load,
load regulated by the decentralized EV charging control and the proposed optimal
EV with discharging. Both optimal and decentralized schemes schedule loads with
respect to the amount of electricity generated from the non-renewable energy sources
in each hour. The resultant load regulation shifts loads from peak hours to off-peak
hours in order to follow the energy generation curve. Both algorithms fill the valley
by shifting load from peak hours to off-peak hours. In Figs. 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10, our
simulations started at 1:00pm and ended next day at 1:00pm. Here, the load is shifted
from the evening high demand period to the midnight low demand period. Next,
Figs. 3.11 and 3.12 show the comparison between the decentralized EV charging
scheme and our proposed optimal EV with discharging scheme. In both cases, our
proposed scheduling strategy imports less energy than the decentralized EV charging
strategy. Fig. 3.11 shows the comparison between the amount of electric energy im-
ported by the decentralized EV charging control strategy and our proposed optimal
EV with discharging policy, while using a non-renewable energy source with a capac-
ity of 300kW in each hour. Also, Fig. 3.12 represents the comparison of both schemes
with respect to the amount of imported energy. For both cases, we vary the number of
EVs to determine the effect of EV population on the imported energy. The amount of
imported electric energy reduces for the increasing number of EVs (Fig. 3.12). This
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(Figs. 3.11 and 3.12). The rate of increment of imported energy for optimal EV
with discharging is less compared to the decentralized EV charging control. This is
because the optimal schedule with EV discharging jointly schedules home appliances
and EVs optimally, while the decentralized EV charging control only schedules EVs
for charging and discharging.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we presented a centralized joint scheduling of EVs and home appli-
ances for a grid connected residential microgrid with an aspiration to rely on renew-
able energy sources. The simulation results showed that the proposed centralized
(COPCS) model reduce the amount of imported energy from the external grid. Also,
we observed from the simulation results that the proposed optimal scheduling method
flatten the load curve throughout the day by using the advanced features of EVs and
home appliances. The proposed scheme is suitable for small to moderate sized micro-




Allocation Mechanism For Large
Residential Microgrid
In the previous chapter, we devised a solution for the centralized joint scheduling of
EVs and home appliances to minimize and balance the electric load of a microgrid
throughout the day. The model is profoundly dependent on the day-ahead load
forecast and predicted energy generated from RES. In this chapter, we manifest a
distributed real-time electricity allocation model to meet the immediate demand of a
microgrid customers. The model relies on the real consumption and generation of a
time slot and predicted consumption and generation for rest of the day.
4.1 Motivation
The centralized model COPCS presented in the previous chapter can produce a so-
lution for small and moderate sized microgrid. The COPCS model does not scale
well for a microgrid with a large number of customers. Also, the COPCS is an oﬄine
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solution and heavily dependent on the day-ahead prediction of load, EVs arrival, and
departure, renewable energy generation, etc., which may differ at the time of real
consumption. Moreover, the COPCS is a centralized model thereby all detail specifi-
cation of appliances, and EVs usage pattern should be sent to the central controller or
EMS which may violate the privacy of the microgrid customers and pron to possible
security risks. To address those problems, we investigated (see section 2.3) and de-
veloped an online distributed solution to schedule load based on the real-time use of
electricity at time slot and predicted load as well as energy generation for the rest of
the day. We use mechanism design to emphasize the user choice for scheduling their
consumption and EVs’ charging and discharging operations. Under the mechanism
design, customers play a mixed strategy in a non-cooperative repeated game to adjust
their equipment use, RES energy consumption, storage decision, and charging and
discharging of EVs to decrease the personal energy cost which results the increase of
the overall social benefit for the microgrid community.
4.2 System Model
In our mechanism design, the grid connected residential microgrid (MG) contains a
set of renewable energy sources (W), a set of homes connected each to a smart meter;
each home has a set of appliances including EVs, and a central controller with EMS.
Let N denote the set of residential users and An be the set of appliances of residential
home n ∈ N . The net electricity generation is E(t) at time slot t, where t ∈ T and
T , {ts, ts +∆t, ..., te}; ts and te are current real time slot and end of schedule time
horizon respectively. For energy sources, home appliances, load, electricity price, etc.,
we adopt the notations of Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Mathematical Notations for DRTA
Notation Description
W set of renewable energy sources
N set of residential homes
An set of appliances of home n
n index of a residential home, n ∈ N
E(t) net electricity (in kWh) generation from renewable at t
T set of time slots
∆t interval between two consecutive time slots
fren(t, w) electricity (in kWh) generated from source w at t
Fload load forecast model
ti, td start and end operational time slots of an appliance
Tn,a set of operational time slots of appliance a of home n
D(t) total load (in kWh) of the microgrid at time slot t
D−n(t) total electric load (in kWh) of home n at time slot t
te end time slot of simulation time
ts start time slot of simulation
ρt(.) cost function to calculate electricity price at t
dr(t) electricity (in kWh) consumed form renewable at t
dd(t) electricity (in kWh) consumed from EV discharge at t
de(t) electricity (in kWh) consumed from grid at t
βr unit electricity price for consumption form renewable
βe unit electricity price for consumption form grid
βd unit electricity price for consumption form EV or storage
ltn,a consumption/discharge strategy at t of appliance a of n
Ln,a target electricity consumption (in kWh) of a of n
XIn,a electricity consumption (in kWh) of type-I appliance





n set of type-I, II & III appliances of n
τkn,a binary; consumption : continuous (1) or no (0) at k
ctn,a charging of EV a of n at time t
dtn,a discharging of EV a of n at time t
Φcn,a, Φ
d
n,a charging and discharging efficiency of EV a
Linitn,a EVs’ energy at arrival
Lmaxn,a , L
min
n,a EVs’ maximum and minimum energy level
Ωn,a set of feasible strategies
σn,a feasible strategy
ptn total electricity price of residential customer n at t
pt−n total electricity price of all customers except n at t
Dn(t) total demand of the community except customer n
θ(t) Excess energy at time slot t
ζ(t) shortage of energy at time slot t
M is a very big number
γ(t) binary variable to determine shortage or excess of energy at t
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4.2.1 Renewable Energy
Renewable energy sources (RES) are random in nature [116]. RES, such as wind
and solar energy, need weather forecasting model for reliable generation of the tar-
geted amount of electricity which is committed to the energy buyer market. Several
stochastic models exist to predict the short-term, medium term and/or long-term
energy generation such as ANN (Artificial Neural Network), ARMA (Auto Regres-
sion Moving Average), etc., [49, 42, 55]. Short term prediction is more accurate
than medium term and long term prediction [31]. Roughly, a day ahead predicted
wind/solar energy varies from 15% to 24% in MAPE (Mean Absolute Percentage
Error [63]) from the actual generation [49, 42, 55]. Hence, for residential microgrid,
in every real time slot (ts), the prediction of the electricity generated in the next few
time slots ({ts + ∆t, · · · , te}) is updated. Let the predicted amount of electricity be





fren(t, w), ∀t ∈ {T \ ts} (4.1)
where fren(t, w) can use any of the prediction models mentioned above.
4.2.2 Load Forecast
Over the last few decades, several researchers attempted to predict the anticipated
load of the power grid to estimate the production capacity. Among all the load
forecast models, ARMA, ARIMA, ANN are the most famous and popular [130]. The
predicted load varies from the actual real-time load. The variation increases with
the increase of forecast time. STLF (short term load forecast) is more accurate than
MTLF (midterm load forecast) or LTLF (long-term load forecast) load prediction.
Several investigations show that STLF varies from 0% to 3% whereas LTLF varies
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up to 19.3% [63, 134]. In the proposed system, we suppose each smart meter is
equipped with a load prediction model Fload
1 and estimates the start (ti) and end (td)
of operation time slots of the appliance if the appliance does not propose. Therefore,
the start and end instances of operation (ti, td) for appliance a of customer n can
be estimated by the forecast method Fload, where {ti, td} ⇐ Fload(a, n). Accordingly,
the set of operational time slots of appliance a of n can be defined as Tn,a , {ti, (ti+
∆t), · · · , (td − ∆t), td}, and T ,
⋃
a∈An,n∈N
Tn,a. Now, the total load of the microgrid







ltn,a ∀t ∈ T , (4.2)
where ltn,a is the amount of electricity consumed by appliance a of home n in the time
slot t.
4.2.3 Electricity Price
We define the cost function ρt(D(t)) at time slot t as the cost of the energy consump-
tion from (i) RES (dr(t)), (ii) discharging of EVs (dd(t)) as well as (iii) imported
amount of electricity (de(t)) from the outside grid or neighboring microgrids; hence:
ρt(D(t)) = βr · dr(t) + βd · dd(t) + βe(de(t)), (4.3)
and D(t) = dr(t) + dd(t) + de(t). Here, βr (e.g., 0.067
$
kWh
TOU (Time of Use) off-
peak price [119]) represents a constant for local energy use and βe(.) (e.g., mid-peak
10.4 cents/kWh, 0.104 · (de)
1.2 $
kWh
) is a function, which increases with the increase
of import from the outside grid or microgrids; βd (e.g., with 1.3 cents compensation,
0.08 $
kWh
) is a constant which represents the unit selling price of electricity (dd(t)) due
1Fload can follow any of the forecast models such as ARMA, ARIMA, ANN, etc.
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to EVs battery discharge. We assume βr < βd < βe and βr, βd, βe ≥ 0. Let the net
electricity generation from the renewable (local generator) sources be E(t), ∀t ∈ T
and demand is D(t) then equation (4.3) can be evaluated by determining the value
















0 if (D(t)− dd(t)) ≤ E(t)
D(t)− dd(t)− E(t) otherwise
(4.6)
4.2.4 Residential Load
Each residential customer n has a set of appliances An. Let us assume that each





Suppose, the consumption at time slot t is ltn,a then the value of l
t
n,a is determined by




n,a . The consumption rate can either be
continuous or take discrete values between X lown,a and X
high
n,a . In our proposed scheme,
the set of consumption rates is also interpreted as the action set of the appliance. The
operation window Tn,a of each appliance (a) of a residential home is either defined by
the user or the appliance (smart) or predicted by the smart metering system. In the
Section 3.2.2 we have discussed basic types of home appliances, here we classify and
explain the home appliance more precisely.
Load Classification: We classify the appliances based on the mode of operation
as (i) Type I : hard load, (ii) Type II : soft load with non-interruptable and deferrable
consumption, (iii) Type III : soft load with interruptible and deferrable consumption,
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and (iv) Type-IV: mixed mode appliance, the consumption pattern is the combination
more than one load type. Now, suppose the target electricity consumption of an
appliance a of n is Ln,a, then each appliance must meet the following participation
constraints [39].
Type I: Hard load
Certain appliances may have strict scheduling requirement; for example, a TV, re-
frigerator, etc., should remain operational between the period of operations. For each
type I appliance, the total electricity consumption is,
∑
t∈Tn,a
ltn,a = Ln,a, ∀a ∈ A
I
n (4.7)





lown, a = Xhighn,a ) is the non-zero constant consump-




Type II: Soft load
Many appliances (such as dishwasher, washing machine etc) may require constant
amount of electricity consumption in a continuous fashion with flexible scheduling for
a limited number of time slots (e.g., washing machine, dishwasher, dryer, etc.). Once
the consumption starts, the appliance continues to consume electricity until the target
consumption is achieved. Let the consumption or action profile of type-II appliance
(a ∈ AIIn ) be l
t
n,a ∈ {0, X
II







total consumption of such appliance must satisfy the following:
∑
t∈Tn,a
ltn,a ≥ Ln,a, ∀a ∈ A
II
n , ∀n ∈ N (4.8)
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, ∀k ∈ Tn,a, (4.9)
and, ∑
k∈Tn,a
τ kn,a = 1, τ
k
n,a ∈ {0, 1}, (4.10)
where rn,a is the required time slots (rn,a =
Ln,a
XIIn,a
) to achieve the target consumption.
The consumption strategy ltn,a = 0 for no consumption at t /∈ Tn,a; for all other cases
the consumption strategy is determined in a way that the total electricity price for
home n is minimized.
Type III: Soft load
Some appliances are flexible to consume electricity in irregular fashion (e.g., EVs).
The US NHTS study shows that the arrival and departure of EVs vary over time [109].
For example, the number of EVs is higher in the evening because EV owners come back
home after work and leave at morning. Now, let the EVs’ charging and discharging
strategy be ltn,a ∈ {−X
low
n,a , · · · , 0, · · · , X
high
n,a }, where −X
low
n,a denotes extreme discharge
rate and Xhighn,a denotes the maximum charging rate. Now, let the amount of charging
and discharging of an EV at time t be ctn,a and d
t
n,a respectively, then:





0 ≤ dtn,a ≤ (X
low





















Where, α is a binary variable and αtn,a = 1 indicates EV a charging its battery at
time t, otherwise discharging, and Φcn,a, Φ
d
n,a denote the charging and discharging
efficiency of EV a. We assume that the EV’s battery must be charged to a target
energy level before leaving the microgrid for the next driving schedule. Hence, for




ltn,a ≥ Ln,a, ∀a ∈ A
III
n (4.15)
Note that EV’s battery has a minimum discharging and a maximum charging capacity.
For both safety and longevity, this should always be maintained. Thus, for any time
slot t ∈ Tn,a, EVs’ battery must not discharge beyond the minimum discharge level
Lminn,a , and charge over the battery capacity L
max









n,a , ∀tk ∈ Tn,a, (4.16)
All other (non-EV) appliances of Type-III must satisfy equations (5.9) to (5.11) and
(4.16) (eg., Backup Battery Bank).
Incentive to the EV owners: EV owners are encouraged to participate in
V2G operation when the demand is high, and production is low. In other words,
EVs should discharge their stored energy when the total demand exceeds the total
electricity generation in a time slot.
Type IV (Mixed Mode Appliance)
Some appliances (e.g., heat water tank, water reservoir, ice reservoir for cooling sys-
tem, etc.,) perform a mix of operations similar to type I and Type II appliances.
When the water or ice level is less than the minimum threshold, the appliance needs
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to start immediately and continues its operation until the level is above the mini-
mum threshold. The controller of these appliances should constantly monitor, and
take actions to start the appliance to keep the water or ice level above the minimum
threshold. Suppose, at a time ti a water motor is switched on to keep the water tank
filled with water above the minimum level. Now, if the water level in the tank is
lower than the minimum threshold, then the motor will be started immediately and
maintain its operation up to tk to raise the water level (to a safety level) above the
minimum level. Next, the water motor will be started sometime later between tk+1
and tl to keep the water in the safety level. The controller of the water motor esti-
mates that after tl the water level will be lower than the minimum threshold. Hence,
the appliance is operated like Type II appliance.
Uncertain Behavior of appliances: Now, suppose the duration of operation
changes from Tn,a to T
′
n,a for appliance a of home n. The changes may occur due
to a prediction error or an unpredictable behavior of the appliance. The system will
automatically adjust the changes in the subsequent time slot. For example, an EV
owner may want to leave earlier due to inevitable circumstances. Therefore, a new
finish time and target (energy level) for the EV is assigned. Depending on the changes
in operational time slots, a new target energy level, and current energy consumption,
the appliances will be operated as type-I, type-II or type-III.
4.2.5 Social welfare and game formulation
Suppose, the unit price of electricity at time slot t is ηt =
ρt(D(t))
D(t)
, where ηt is constant
to every home during each optimization step, and ηt changes (recalculated) before each
optimization step begins. Let Ωn,a be the set of all feasible consumption strategies
and σn,a (σn,a ∈ Ωn,a) be any feasible consumption strategy of appliance a at home
n. Here, we define σn,a , {l
t
n,a|t ∈ Tn,a}. Then, the electricity price (in $) of home n
89






n,a), ∀t ∈ T , l
t
n,a ∈ σn,a (4.17)











where σ∗n,a ∈ Ωn,a is the optimal strategy of appliance a of home n. Therefore,
ptn ≥ p
∗t
n . Before optimization, if the total electricity price of the residential home n
at time slot t is P initn (t), then the utility function u(Dn(t), ηt) for residential home n
can be defined as, un(Dn(t), ηt) = (P
init
n (t) − p
t
n). For the optimal strategy of each
appliance, the utility/payoff at any time period is u∗(Dn(t), ηt) ≥ u(Dn(t), ηt), and












where, the electricity cost ptn of home n is determined by playing the dominant strat-
egy2 [114] ltn,a of each appliance a at any t ∈ T . Home n will get the maximum benefit
by determining the optimal strategy ltn,a of each appliance a ∈ An minimizes the total
electricity cost. Next, the highest social benefit of the microgrid can be achieved by





(P initn (t)− p
∗t
n ) (4.20)
We assume that players are rational, and they play the game to increase its benefit
(or payoff) which ultimately increases the overall social benefit (sum of all customers
personal benefits). Therefore, a home customer will change its current strategy of its
2The formal definition of dominant strategy is given in section 4.4.
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appliances iff there is an increase in its payoff (eq. (4.20)). Hence, the objective of













where pt−n is the total electricity cost of all homes without n. Therefore, in each
time slot, customer n independently maximizes its own benefit and updates its charg-
ing (or consumption), discharging strategy ltn,a, ∀a ∈ An. Next, the microgrid oper-
ator wants to maximize (minimize the unused energy) the use of local energy and
minimize the amount of imported energy from the outer grid. The amount of excess
or shortage of energy for a microgrid can be expressed as,







. At each time slot, either des(t) is positive
(excess energy θ(t)) or negative (shortage of energy ζ(t)). If des = 0, there is nothing
to do and θ(t) and ζ(t) can be expressed as,
θ(t) ≤ des + {(1− γ(t)) ·M} , (4.23)
θ(t) ≥ des − {(1− γ(t)) ·M} , (4.24)
{γ(t) ·M − des(t)} ≥ 0, θ(t) ≥ 0, ζ(t) ≥ 0, (4.25)
ζ(t) ≤ −des + {γ(t) ·M} , ζ(t) ≥ −des − {γ(t) ·M} (4.26)
where γ(t) = 1 indicates the excess of energy and otherwise, a shortage of electric-
ity. The above equations (4.23) to (4.26) are the logical constraints; these constraints
always produce positive value or zero for the objective function in (4.27). Accordingly,
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this will force a customer to either consume energy or restrain from consumption (or
discharge) for certain time slots. Now, the objective function in eq. (4.21) (n ∈ N )









ηt · {θ(t) + ζ(t)}
]
(4.27)
The above objective function eq. (4.27) is the social benefit of the community when
observed from the community point of view and in that case consumption strategies
of all players are determined to get an optimal social benefit. On the other hand,
to an individual player, it is the payoff function where all other players consumption
is known, and the player will play its strategy for the use of electricity to increase
personal benefit or payoff. Note that the electricity bill is dependent on the total
demand for a particular time. Hence a player cannot decrease its electricity bill
ignoring the demand of other players. The consumption strategy of one player will
affects the electricity price for the whole community. A player cannot increase its
payoff by harming payoffs of other players. Therefore, the simultaneous and repeated
play of the game will improve the overall social benefit of the microgrid community.
4.3 Game Theoretic Mechanism Design
Game Controller: The central controller calculates the unit price ηt of electricity
for each time slot and sends it to each home (smart meter). The central controller
executes the following steps in each time slot (ts),
(S1) Receive initial load information from all (n ∈ N ) customers and calculate
initial total load D(t), ∀t ∈ T .
(S2) Forecast electricity generation E(t), ∀t ∈ {T \ ts}
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(S3) Calculate electricity price ηt, ∀t ∈ T , total Initial price P
init, and D−n(t),
n ∈ N , t ∈ T .
(S4) Send ηt, D−n(t),∀t ∈ T and P
init to home n upon receiving a request from
home n.
(S5) Receive the proposed load Dn(t) from home n and update the total load
D(t), and unit price ηt, ∀t ∈ T .
(S6) Compare the calculated price in (S5) with the electricity price calculated
before. If there is no change in price, go to (S7). Otherwise, repeat (S4) to
(S6).
(S7) Allocate electricity for time slot ts and update ts ← (ts+1) and te ← (te+1)
in T and go to (S1).
Players: In each real time slot, with a finite number of iterations, residential homes
n (eq. (4.27) ) play the non-cooperative repeated game to maximize its own benefit.
Here, the formulated non-cooperative repeated game calculates payoff for the current
time slots without considering payoffs calculated in the previous (past) time slots.
Each player (home) will change the strategy (ltn,a) of its appliances if the total cost of
electricity is less (or get more benefit) than before. The game converges to optimal
scheduling when there is no change in either the benefit or electricity price. Each
player will continue (repeatedly) to play the game in a time slot ts until the its own
benefit (for current and future slots) does increase. In each play, a home customer
tries to maximize its benefit using the objective (or utility) function expressed in
equation (4.27) and with the constraints in equations (4.7) to (4.16), (4.22) to (4.26)
(S1) Each player (independently) will select an optimal strategy for each of its
appliances to achieve the objective of eq. (4.27).
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(S2) Determine new hourly load profile Dn(t) and calculate the electricity price
and payoff (or benefit).
(S3) Compare the benefit with that from the previous iteration; if no improve-
ment in benefit, the customer will keep the previous strategy, otherwise a new
strategy is adopted and the calculated hourly load Dn(t) is sent to the central
controller with a request for the updated D−n(t) and ηt for the next iteration.
The game will end whenever there is no improvement in each player’s personal benefit
which results from the maximum social benefit of the community. In other words,
the game ends at a Nash equilibrium when the players are unwilling to change their
current strategies if there is no improvement in its benefit. The overall social benefit
for the community will increase for any improvement of a player’s personal payoff.
Further, the operator can terminate the game anytime by broadcasting an hourly
unit price more than once, which facilitates for the microgrid management system to
set the time bound for the electricity allocation process.
4.4 Analysis of the game
Definition 4.1 (Dominant Strategy). A strategy is dominant, if a player is always
better off choosing it instead of choosing all other strategies, regardless of the strategy
chosen by all other players. To be more precise, a strategy is strictly dominant if the
payoff for choosing this strategy is always strictly higher than the payoff of any other
strategy. A strategy is a weak dominant strategy if payoff for choosing this strategy
is as high as the payoff for choosing some other strategies.
Definition 4.2 (Dominant Strategy of MG). Let, Sn , {l
t
n,a|∀a ∈ An, ∀t ∈ T } be
the set of strategies played by a player n. Sn is dominant if it increases the overall
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social benefit defined in eq. (4.27) and no other strategy can achieve a higher benefit.
If Sn is dominant, we say Sn satisfies (4.27).
At each iteration, player n determines the strategies of its appliances which min-
imize the electricity price and increase the overall social benefit. The strategy Sn is
the best response to the current strategies (S−n) of all the players. The strategies
(S−n) of other players are fixed at the time of optimization. Hence, Sn is a dominant
strategy of all appliances of customer n.
Note: If there exists one (or more) strategy S
′
n which results in the same social
benefit as Sn, then the strategy Sn is referred to as a weak dominant strategy.
Lemma 4.4.1 (Nash Equilibrium). The N player game with a set of strategies
{Sn|n ∈ N} and with objective function (4.27) converges to a Nash equilibrium.
Proof Nash equilibrium: ηt is constant when there is no import and discharge of
energy, otherwise ηt increases with the increase of discharge and/or import energy
(Section 4.2.3).
• case 1 (constant ηt) : The game will terminate immediately with the current
strategy, therefore current strategy of the game is the dominant strategy and
forms a Nash equilibrium. In this case ζ(t) of eq. (4.27) becomes zero ∀t ∈
T , and θ(t) is minimized by charging the EVs beyond their target up to the
maximum capacity, otherwise θ(t) does not have any effect to change the current
strategy of the players.
• case 2 (ηt is an increasing function for any t ∈ T ): Each player n deviates from
the current strategy (to a new strategy S
′
n), as a best response to the other
players current strategies (S−n) to minimize
∑
t∈T
ηt · {θ(t)+ ζ(t)} and to increase
its own benefit (eq. (4.27)). Let ti and tj be two time slots in the simulation time
horizon T , where θ(ti), ζ(tj) > 0 and θ(tj), ζ(ti) = 0. Therefore, by definition
95
(Section 4.2.3) ηti < ηtj . Let, the payoff (or overall social benefit) be Z . Now,
player n changes its strategy from Sn to S
′
n, and let, the new benefit be Z
′
.
Then the changes in the benefit of the player became,
(4.28)(Z
′










(tj)− ηtj · ζ(tj)
where θ(ti), θ
′










represent the old and new shortage of
energy and unit prices at tj. Now, according to equation (4.27), the change of
strategy minimizes θ(ti) and ζ(tj). Which definitely forces player n to consume
(and/or charge EVs) energy at ti and seize consumption of those appliances










≥ 0 and ζ
′
tj
≥ 0. Hence, the overall benefit
will increase. The player n will change its strategy. Conversely, the players




terminates where the change of strategy will not improve the benefit of the
player. Therefore, the game always converges to a Nash equilibrium. Further,
at the Nash equilibrium state, the benefit calculated by each user is the social
benefit of the microgrid community because the payoff function of each player
has included the benefits for all other customers.
Lemma 4.4.2 (Optimal Solution). The Nash equilibrium state of N player microgrid
game (in section 4.3) is an optimal solution of the problem.
Proof Let Z be the optimal solution of the problem which produces Nash equilibrium
of the game. For the proof, let us assume that there are at least two slots ti and tj of
player n, where increasing of consumption at ti and decreasing of consumption at tj
produce an optimal solution Z
′
(i.e., increases social benefit from Z). Therefore,
(4.29)Z
′












But, if such strategy exists for player n, then the player n must play the strategy
because by definition the strategy for Z
′
is the dominant strategy (eq. (4.27)). Either,
no such strategy exists (impossible) or the strategy produces the same results as Z,
otherwise, it is a contradiction.
4.5 Simulation and numerical results
4.5.1 Simulation setup
In this section, we evaluate our proposed real time energy allocation algorithm and
compare the results with those obtained from COPCS [120] based on the observed
load and the observed energy generation. In our proposed model, we consider wind
turbines, each with a maximum radius of 3.5m, air density 1.28 kg/m2, cut-in wind
speed 2m/s, cut-off wind speed 25m/s, Cp = 0.59 with a maximum hourly production
capacity of 200kWh. We also consider photovoltaic energy sources with a maximum
radiation 1000W/m2, panel area 5m2, and with 50kWh production capacity. The
amount of electricity from the RES is predicted for each hour of a day by using the
renewable energy models described in [120]. We consider microgrid communities sized
from 100 to 1.0 × 106 homes for the simulation. For each microgrid community, we
choose the number of RES such that the generated energy can fulfill at least 50%
of the demand. Next, in each time step the energy from the renewable sources for
next 24 hours (starting from noon (0h) to next day before noon (23h)) is amended
(with random values) based on the multinational model forecast error growth chart
[31]. The load amendments includes variation of switch on and/or switch off time,
amount of target energy consumption, addition of new appliances, and elimination
from existing appliances of homes.
In the simulation, we choose 10 to 15 appliances at random for each home. Such
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appliances include hard (type I) loads (7 to 10), soft (type II & III) and mixed (type
IV) loads (3 to 5). Hard loads with daily and hourly consumption include electric
ovens, microwave oven, light bulbs, flat screen TV, refrigerators, heating system,
and laptops. Soft loads include washing machines, dishwashers, dryers, and battery
charger. For detailed specification, see [120]. In the simulation, we choose 0 to 2 EVs
randomly for each home. Each EV applies 2.0 to 6.0 kW (0.5 kW interval) per hour
charging and discharging rate with 24 kWh capacity, and randomly selected 3.0 to
7.5 kWh minimum discharge energy level. We assume the charging and discharging
efficiency of each EV to be 0.85 (85%) and 0.95 (95%) respectively. The arrival and
departure of each EV (66% of all EVs) in a time slot follows a Poisson distribution




n,a ) and target energy level (L
T
n,a is in between 70%
to 100% of Lmaxn,a ) are selected randomly, with the restriction that the time span of
each EV is sufficient to charge its battery to the target energy level. We have also
considered certain real life EVs pattern where most of the EVs (34%) are unavailable
during the morning to afternoon. In this case, we took the EVs arrival and depar-
ture pattern extracted from the investigation of NHTS [109]. In addition, we also
admit mixed mode appliances such as hot water tank (capacity 60 gallons, energy
consumption 1.2kW, minimum water level 60% of the capacity, minimum and maxi-
mum water temperature 49◦C and 60◦C), ice bank cooling system (capacity: 2000kg,
initial freezing time: 8 hours with 2kW, minimum ice temperature: −5◦C to −3◦C,
consumption rate (in operation): 1.2kW), etc. In case of electricity price we admit
the charging rate from Hydro ONE (see, http://www.hydroone.com/TOU), add in-
centive (CAD$0.02) for EV discharge and CAD$0.0012(de)
1.2 for each 1kWh energy
imported from the grid.
We use C++ MPI, IBM CPLEX concert technology to develop the simulation
programs. The dominant (best response) strategy of each play (iteration) of a player
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is determined by the IBM CPLEX MILP optimizer. The simulation is executed
several times with various setups to get more accurate results. The simulations were
executed on HP cirrus cluster which composed of composed of 100 computing nodes
with AMD Opteron processors x86, 64 bit, 4 to 8 cores in our university.
4.5.2 Numerical results
To evaluate the performance of the DRTA algorithm, we execute both allocation
schemes on variable sized residential microgrid which comprises, 100 · · · 1000 homes.
At each time slot, the microgrid EMS estimates the electricity generation (a day
ahead) for the future slots and correct the errors of previous prediction. We consider
current time slot ts in real time; hence the energy generation at ts gives the actual
amount of electricity. At this slot, all homes correct their appliances predicted op-
erational time slots and amount of electricity consumption. All homes are playing
the game independently to increase the overall social benefit in a rational way. The
microgrid EMS allocates energy to the appliances for the slot (ts) as soon as the
game converges, forward to the next time slot, and repeat the whole procedure again
and again. At the end of the simulation of the 24 time slots, the centralized optimal
algorithms (COPCS) is executed using the observed load and amount of energy gen-
erated. Next, we run the simulation for 2K, 5K, 50K, 100K, 200K, 500K, and 1M
homes and evaluate the performance of the proposed DRTA algorithm.
Fig. 4.1 shows the hourly amount of imported electricity of the day for COPCS,
DRTA and a naive (UREG) system for the microgrid with 500 homes. The UREG is
a consumption scheduling scheme that allocates electricity to the appliances as soon
as it receives a consumption request [120]. The figure shows that the total amount
of electricity imported by UREG is always higher than the amount of electricity
imported by DRTA and COPCS. Next, we found that the distribution of the hourly
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amount of electricity imported in the UREG system is irregular, which in effect
increases the electricity production overhead and price as shown in Fig. 4.2. However,
the distribution of imported electricity in COPCS and DRTA is almost regular. The
reason of this improvement in COPCS and DRTA schemes over UREG system is that,
both schemes are able to predict future loads and electricity generation whereas the
UREG schedules appliances and EVs without any prior knowledge. We also observe
that COPCS imports smaller amount of electricity than DRTA (Fig. 4.1), and that
the hourly distribution of the amount of imported energy is more linear than DRTA,
but for both cases the deviation is very small as shown in Fig. 4.2. The proposed
DRTA scheme optimizes the electricity allocation and schedules appliances with the
knowledge of the current energy production and future estimation of energy and load;
however, the COPCS scheme schedules appliances based on observed energy and
load. In reality, however, the COPCS scheme based on the observed load and energy
generation is not practical and is used as a benchmark for evaluating the efficiency of
DRTA. Further, DRTA outperforms the COPCS scheme based on a day ahead load
and energy prediction (Fig. 4.3). Note that both COPCS (based on prediction) and
DRTA predict future load and electricity generation but the real time adjustment of
load and energy prediction of DRTA significantly improves performance and energy
efficiency over COPCS.
One of the main goals of IEA 2DS is to build energy efficient equipment and/or
to improve the energy efficiency of the existing system. Fig. 4.4 demonstrates the
improvement of energy efficiency of the microgrid, as well as the appliances connected
to it. The DRTA allocates energy in a way that all the appliances can use the
microgrid energy efficiently. This helps the energy sector to build a sustainable energy
system. Fig. 4.4 clearly shows that DRTA and COPCS schemes perform better and








Table 4.2: Energy efficiency : increase Microgrid efficiency (%).
Home E/L Saving (%) Home E/L Saving(%)
1.0× 103 0.57 29.43% 5.0× 104 0.79 46.27%
2.0× 103 0.81 39.23% 1.0× 105 0.94 67.18%
5.0× 103 0.80 44.39% 2.0× 105 0.98 81.08%
1.0× 104 0.99 70.56% 5.0× 105 0.96 76.32%
2.0× 104 0.97 72.45% 1.0× 106 0.93 72.74%
Table 4.3: Fairness Index: UREG Vs. DRTA.
No. Home Fairness Index No. Home Fairness Index
UREG DRTA UREG DRTA
1.0× 103 0.96 0.99 5.0× 104 0.87 0.97
2.0× 103 0.95 0.99 1.0× 105 0.85 0.97
5.0× 103 0.93 0.98 2.0× 105 0.86 0.98
1.0× 104 0.91 0.98 5.0× 105 0.87 0.97
2.0× 104 0.89 0.99 1.0× 106 0.82 0.97
and energy cost savings of the microgrid/smart grid. We are unable to present the
percentage of electricity cost saving for COPCS due to the extremely long running
time and large memory requirement to solve the model. From table 4.2, it is evident
that DRTA increases the % electricity cost saving for the microgrid community as the
energy to load ratio (column 2 & 4) increases. Indeed, DRTA flatten the load curve
to minimize the distance between hourly load and energy which results in minimum
imports and decrease the hourly electricity charges for the customers. Also, the higher
energy to load ratio in a randomized system usually increases the deviation (positive
and negative) between hourly load and energy profiles.
Finally, we show that the DRTA scheme not only increases the social benefit but
also increases the fairness of electricity billing for the customers. Table 4.3 demon-
strated the fairness index of the proposed DRTA and UREG schemes. To calculate
the fairness index, we use the Jain’s fairness index described in [61]. Here, for a given
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. In table 4.3, the DRTA scheme constantly shows a very high
fairness in electricity billing for the customers. This is because the DRTA scheme
decreases the electricity price to a near-optimal value by lowering the amount of
import energy and increase the use of local energy.
4.6 Conclusion
We developed a real-time distributed model for energy allocation method to minimize
the electricity cost and increase the overall social benefit of the microgrid customers.
The DRTA scheme reduces the time to obtain a solution for large residential microgrid
and transfers responsibility on the consumer to make the decision of their RES energy
use, schedule their appliances and EV for power consumption. We simulated the
DRTA model and compared the results with the centralized COPCS scheme which
was illustrated in Chapter 3. The DRTA model offers better electricity price for
the microgrid customers because it considered immediate demand and decided the
allocation of power instantly. The design may help the microgrid customers to reduce
their electricity costs but does not support microgrid operator enough for a day ahead





Discharging of the EV, ESS, and
Utilizing Renewable Energy
In Chapter 4 we described an online electricity allocation model, DRTA to allocate
power to the microgrid customers according to the immediate need by adjusting the
consumption scheduling for the current time slot, and future anticipated demands.
The DRTA scheme exhibits outstanding performance and results in continuous mod-
ification of the electricity usage pattern in each time slots which may increase the
instability in the generation plant. To minimize the uncertainty in the production
plant, we develop a real-time decentralized demand-side management (RDCDSM)
system to help the energy producer or microgrid operator to sketch a price-ware con-




The DRTA method in the previous chapter allocates electricity based on current
demand and adjust the consumption schedule for the rest of the day. The DRTA
scheme is a game based mechanism design which gives preference to the user choice
to determine the current allocation and future consumption profile such that the
social benefit of the whole community is increased conversely reduce the electricity
cost. The DRTA method may introduce instability in power generation and price
because, in each time slot, the DRTA system may change the consumption amount for
current and rest of the time slots. Therefore production plant may face an uncertain
demand which may differ from the original estimation in the previous time slot. In
some cases, this may force the utility to start or shut down a generator instantly or
increase or decrease the amount of generation due to changes in consumption pattern.
Generators need a certain amount of time to lowering or raising the production;
therefore immediate changes in use may increase the electricity generation costs or
cannot be honored at all.
To solve this problem and balancing between electricity prediction and consump-
tion, we review some related work in section 2.3 and proposed RDCDSM scheme
which initially encourages customers to estimates their loads, renewable generation
and processes the predicted load by sharing energy and storage capacities among the
users to obtain a flat load curve for the operator. Thus, results in lower electricity
price. Then, at the time of consumption customers are again encouraged to minimize
the variation from the estimated price-ware predicted load by sharing and depreciate




t. At consumption time, each customer compares its real demand with the proposed
predicted demand ptn. Any discrepancy/deviation triggers the customers to play an
allocation game between them to minimize the gap between the predicted and actual
demands. For all t, our proposed system allocates electricity from the microgrid to
every home based on the home’s actual consumption.
To develop a mathematical model for real-time demand-side management, we
analyze and investigate the prediction of residential loads, energy generation from
RESs, ESS features, as well as the EVs’ driving schedules and distances. For simplicity
purposes, we illustrate the consumption pattern of each of the components of the
residential home. We present the mathematical model of each of the elements before
formulating the RDCDSM problem.
5.2.1 Residential Load (ltn,p)
Most practical load forecast models are based on oﬄine schemes, where predictions
are conducted in advance. The uncertainty of prediction increases with the increase
of the forecast time [121]. The STLF is thus more accurate than MTLF (midterm
load forecast) or LTLF (long-term load forecast) [121]. Currently, several STLF tech-
niques exist, but aside from their varieties, these methods mainly depend on historical
demands, weather forecasts, and other variables to estimate the aggregated demand
of all consumers [57]. However, the efficiency of any forecasting algorithm depends
not only on the accuracy and time horizon of the forecast but also on its capabil-
ity to reduce the complexity, cost, and memory needed for predicting the demand
of customers [57, 105]. In the proposed system, we suppose that each residence is
connected to a HEMS. These HEMSs are enabled to assist consumers in forecasting
their demand based on an average household demand [6], refine and send the data
over a data network to other customers and the operator [57]. Moreover, the HEMSs
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provide a real-time two-way interaction with the microgrid operator and other clients.
A consumer first sends its predictions for the next 24 hours at the start of the day.
Next, at each time slot, a consumer determines its consumption strategy for its ac-
tual demand in the current time slot, and modify its forecast demand for the rest
of the day. This forecasting approach reduces the complexity of real-time electricity
demand by shifting the forecast burden from the operator to the customers, enhances
the accuracy of the predictions. Now, let the predicted household load of n be ltn,p





5.2.2 Renewable Energy (ωtn,p)
It is assumed that RESs are available for some residences. RESs such as Solar PV
and wind turbines generate electricity in a random manner [117]. However, the RES
provides a great promise for significantly improving the efficiency of distribution, and
residential renewable energy generation is becoming more popular as the installation
cost is decreasing and electricity prices are rising [65, 117]. Hence, several stochastic
models have been developed to forecast the energy generation over time, and thereby,
to enhance RESs exploitation and penetration in smart grids. In our proposed system,
the customer decides whether to store the energy generated by the RES or to supply it
to other clients, according to the power demands in every real-time slot (ts). Let ω
t
n,p
be the predicted amount of electricity used from RES where the predicted generation











5.2.3 Energy Storage System - ESS (αtn,p)
The introduction of new types of batteries with higher storage capacities has en-
couraged ESS to emerge as a way to improve the power management in smart grid
[127, 37]. ESSs play a vital role in matching the generation with demand which leads
to an increase in the efficiency and reliability of the system against uncertainties. In
general, every home with a RES has an ESS installed to store the excess energy which
is used later when the demand is high. Now, let the charging and discharging strate-
gies of an ESS b of n at time t be αtn,b ∈ {−X
low
n,b , · · · , 0, · · · , X
high
n,b }, where −X
low
n,b
denotes extreme discharge rate and Xhighn,b denotes the maximum charging rate of a
given ESS b. Let the amount of charging and discharging of ESS of n at time t be
ctn,b and d
t
n,b, then ∀t we have:





0 ≤ dtn,b ≤ (X
low
n,b · (1− η
t
n,b)) (5.6)
where, ηtn,b is a binary variable; η
t
n,b = 1 indicates that ESS b is charging at time t,
otherwise it is discharging. Let Φcn,b, Φ
d





− dtn,b · Φ
d
n,b. (5.7)
Note that ESS’s has a maximum capacity and minimum discharge level. For both
safety and longevity, this should always be maintained. Thus, for any time slot t,
ESS b must not discharge below its minimum discharge level Cminn,b , and charge over












where, Cinitn,b is the initial energy stored in the ESS at the start of the day. Now, let





that each residential customer has an ESS which is connected to the RES.
5.2.4 Electric Vehicle (θtn,p)
Large-scale energy storage requires vast land spaces, high installation, operation, and
maintenance costs [121, 77]. Conversely, compared with oversized storage devices,
plug-in EVs can be used as a cheap way to store and transport the surplus of energy.
EVs may appear as loads during charging periods, meanwhile they may also be used
as storage to store the surplus of energy or discharge stored energy to balance the
demand and generation in the smart grid[77]. Hence, EV may charge, discharge, or
remain idle throughout the day. According to [92] we assume the EVs arrive home in
the evening an arbitrary initial energy level. An EV stays connected to the home for
a random amount of time and then leaves home in the morning for the next driving.
When connected to the microgrid, the energy stored in a given EV must attain a
certain target level required for the following driving schedule. Let the arrival and
departure time of a given EV e of consumer n be tan,e and t
d
n,e respectively. Also, let,







e + 2 ∗∆t, ..., t
d
n,e}. Now, suppose the charging and discharging
rate of the EV be θtn,e ∈ {−Y
low
n,e , · · · , 0, · · · , Y
high
n,e }; where −Y
low
n,e denotes extreme
discharge rate and Y highn,e denotes the maximum charging rate. For EVs, similar to
the ESSs, equations (5.5) to (5.8) must be satisfied only for timeslots t ∈ Tn,e. Let
the amount of charging and discharging of an EV e of consumer n at time t be rtn,e
and vtn,e accordingly, then:






0 ≤ vtn,e ≤ (Y
low,e






− vtn,e · Φ
v
n,e. (5.11)
Where, ζtn,e is a binary variable and ζ
t
n,e = 1 indicates EV charging at time t, otherwise
discharging, and Φrn,e, Φ
v
n,e denote the charging and discharging efficiency of EV.










n,e , ∀t ∈ Tn,e, ∀e ∈ V (5.12)




n,e are the initial, minimum discharge and maximum ca-
pacity of the EV. Moreover, before leaving the home for the next driving schedule,
the energy stored in a given EV must attain a certain target level Ln,e (in KWh).






n,e) ≥ Ln,e (5.13)
In general, an EV consumes 0.13− 0.20 kWh/km [92] and the average daily trip
length of 90% of EVs is between 20 to 60km [131, 94, 104]. Most customers also use
their vehicles from 6 : 00 am to 10 : 00 am to drive to work and return home after
work from 4 : 00 pm to 8 : 00 pm. Let τn,e be the trip length of an EV and the
amount of energy stored in an EV (before the trip) be Ln,e; then, the initial energy
stored in an EV (when arrived at home) can be calculated as,
Rinitn,e = Ln,e − τn,e ∗ ρn,e (5.14)
where ρn,e is an amount (kWh) of electricity consumed by the EV to drive 1km. Now
Let us assume that a customer has an EV. Then the probable EV consumption profile
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As discussed earlier, we assume the microgrid operator plans its energy production
and/or purchase a day ahead, based on the aggregate demand it received from its
users. However, the actual user’s consumption and need for energy during the day
may vary from its predicted demand. The frequent changes of the demand force
the microgrid to produce a variable amount of power which may not be possible, or
expensive, on a short notice. Moreover, the start or shut down of a generator to
match the user variable demands involve substantial cost and time. Thus, our system
will help the microgrid operator as well as the users to close the gap between the real
time and instantaneous actual and predicted aggregate demands. The integration
of ESS, EVs, and an intelligent energy management system may help in mitigating
the problem and thereby reduce the electricity costs and instability in the power
generation. We address these issues and design an intelligent solution (RDCDSM) to
reduce the electricity costs by flattening the predicted demand at the start of a day.
The system delivers electricity to the customers according to their actual demands,
such that the deviation between nominated and anticipated amounts is minimized.
The RDCDSM has two consecutive phases: (i) prediction or planning phase and (ii)
allocation phase.
Prediction phase
At the start of each day, each home predicts its load, renewable energy generation,
EV arrival and departure times and target energy. Next, all customers individually
optimize their anticipated consumption pattern to reduce the electricity cost, and then
sends the resultant predicted load to the operator. To devise a fine-grain predicted
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consumption profile, each customer plays a mixed strategy with others to determine







∀t ∈ T , where tn,p is the charging or discharging strategy of the MESS (microgrid











Now, let γt−n be the strategy of all other customers which results in a consumption












m,p), ∀t ∈ T (5.15)











n,p), ∀t ∈ T (5.16)
where (ptn + p
t




−n be known to customer n which is the
current load of all other customers due to their current consumption strategies. Each
time a customer sends its load profile to other clients when the change of its previous
strategy is profitable. Upon receiving the load profiles from other clients, customer n





−n) = Z −min
[∑
t∈T
(aP 2t + bPt + c)
]
(5.17)
where Z is a positive constant, a, b, c are positive coefficients and a >= b. aP 2t +bPt+c
is a quadratic cost function for electricity. The variable Pt is the total amount of





−n, ∀t ∈ T (5.18)
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Pt ≥ 0, thus the cost function aP
2
t + bPt + c is convex and the strategies in γ
t
n are all
continuous and therefore the game will converge to a Nash equilibrium state and gives
an optimal solution. At a Nash equilibrium state, let the strategy of any customer n










−n). Once done, then
all customers send their fine-grain predicted demand p∗tn , ∀t (for the strategy γ
t∗
n ) to
the microgrid operator. Upon receiving the predicted demand, the operator sets a
plan to produce or purchase electricity from the grid. Hence, the day-ahead predicted




ptn, ∀t ∈ T (5.19)
Allocation Phase
Unfortunately, the uncertainties in household demands, RES generation, EVs arrival
and departure times and target energy may vary at the time of consumption from
the predicted one. In that case, each customer needs to adjust its use of electricity
to reduce the gap between the actual and the predicted demand. Otherwise, the
microgrid will respond by purchasing the extra energy needed (to satisfy the demands)
and hence charges an extra cost (or penalty) proportional to the deviation between
the actual and predicted demand of electricity. Let us assume that the current time
slot is ts. Then the optimal consumption determined in the prediction phase from
ts to |T | may not be optimal in the current scenario. Hence, each customer plays
mixed strategy of a new non-cooperative game, at ts, with the current (real time)
need and the modified (adjusted) predicted demand for rest of the day. Therefore,
the objective of the play is to reduce the penalty for the deviation of present and
anticipated future needs from that of the submitted consumption pattern. Let Q be
a fixed amount of additional cost (penalty) charged for one unit of electricity due to
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the deviation from the original consumption profile. Then, the payoff for customer
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T∑
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where p¯tn is the current (ts) and future demands based on the current and projected
household demands l¯tn,p, EVs’ consumption (charging and discharging) θ¯
t
n with respect
to new arrival and/or departure times and target energy, ESS consumption α¯tn, current
and modified predicted generation of RES w¯tn, and new charging and discharging





















































Similar to the game in the earlier Section 5.2.5, the allocation game also terminates
at a Nash equilibrium state where no consumer is willing to change its strategy which
results in reducing the payoff.
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Centralized Allocation Model with Naive Prediction
The centralized allocation model can easily be realized by modifying the parameter










m,p of eq. (5.15) to variables.
Hence, the solution of the model with the objective function defined by eq. (5.17)
results in the optimal predicted consumption profile of the microgrid. All customers
transfer their predicted load profile, RES generation, EV and ESS parameters (for a
day) to the microgrid operator. For each time slot, the allocation of the electricity
for each home can be determined, by the operator, by solving (5.21) with the related
constraints where p¯t−n and the terms in eq. (5.25) are considered as variables. Hence,







p˜tn|, ∀ts ∈ T (5.26)
where P˜ tN is the predicted load, which is determined by the microgrid at the begin-
ning of the day by accumulating raw predicted load sent by the customers (naive







n,p) such that P˜
t
N ≥ 0, which keeps a
balance between energy production and consumption. θtn,p designates the charging of
EV; here, as soon as an EV arrives, it starts charging at full charging capacity until
a target (Ln,e) is achieved. p˜
t
n is the load which presents the current (i.e., in time slot
ts) and modified future demand of customer n.
5.3 Numerical Evaluation
5.3.1 Simulation Setup
We consider grid connected microgrids with 100, 200, 300, · · · , 1000 homes connected
with each other through an electrical and a data network. Each customer has an
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energy management system (HEMS) which is responsible for forecasting the load,
RES generation, EV arrival and departure times and target energy level, and for
sending (and receiving) information about energy, load, and other control information
to other HEMSs. Each HEMS runs the energy optimization (RDCDSM) model to
optimize the energy usage of the owner. A data network carries load and control
information from one HEMS to other HEMSs as well as to the operator. The HEMS
forecasts the household load for a day based on the average residential load hourly
load which given in [6, 121]. A typical household in U.S./Canada consumes 11,000
kWh to 12,000 kWh whereas in China a customer uses 1,349 kWh per year. For
our simulations, we assume that each household consumes around 4 to 20kWh per
day. We consider RESs with capacities between 0.5 and 1 kW, and the long term
RES generation during a day and forecast is presented in [120]. Both EV and ESS
(such as Tesla, Nissan, Toshiba, Toyota, and etc) configurations are assumed as shown
in Table 5.1. The arrival and departure times, and consumption (kWh/Km) while
Table 5.1: EV and Storage (ESS) configuration
Type Capacity Min Capacity Max Charging Max Discharging
(kWh) (kWh) (kW) (kW)
ESS 6.4, 6.3, 10.0 0.32,0.32, 0.5 2.0, 2.0, 2.5 2.0, 2.0, 2.5
Centralized ESS 2500 500 740 740
EV 90, 85, 70, 60, 24 9, 8.5, 7.0, 6.0, 2.4 9, 9, 9, 8, 3 6, 6, 6, 5, 2.5
driving are assumed as discussed in Section 5.2.4. For electricity price, we assume the
values of coefficients a, b, and c to be 0.0001, 0.0001, and 0.05 respectively. We also
assume the penalty (Q) for each kWh is 0.01 $. We use Cplex and Java to develop
the simulation program and execute the simulation on a desktop computer running
Linux OS with 8 GB RAM, Intel Core i7 processor.
5.3.2 Numerical Results
Fig. 5.2 presents the predicted (naive) load, actual load, and hourly electricity deliv-








distribution system) that due to capacity and other constraints the ESSs and EVs
may not collectively supply energy to a time slots where demand is very high. On the
other hand, RDCDSM system uses ESSs and EVs optimally such that RES energy
can be used properly. It is also found that the penalty is higher in high load duration
compare to the light load period. This is evident because the actual demand changes
more in high load compare to the low or moderate amount of load duration.
5.4 Conclusion
We formulated two separate non-cooperative games with mixed strategy profiles to
generate the price-ware estimation of electricity use for the next day and deliver power
in real-time according to the price-ware predicted load. Moreover, we developed
a simulation program to evaluate the validity and performance of the RDCDSM
method. In theory, we showed that the proposed RDCDSM scheme converge to an
optimal Nash equilibrium state and produce optimal results. We believe that the
RDCDSM system will help the energy planner to plan for electricity generation and




A Novel Algorithm for Optimal
Electricity Pricing in a Smart
Microgrid Network
In this chapter, we investigate and present a new algorithm for energy management
and pricing of electricity in a microgrid network (MGN). The primary goal of this
methodology is to control the flow of energy among the microgrids to minimize trans-
mission (T&D) and generation costs of electricity for MG customers.
6.1 Motivation
It is anticipated that shortly the energy network may contain hundreds and thou-
sands of microgrids (which are using DSM, such as DRTA, RDCDSM, etc.) may
need to share electricity and storage to meet their demands as a whole. The MGN
network creates new market scenarios where once always consumer may act as a sup-
plier. It is nearly impossible for these new providers to enter the existing regulatory
market which is controlled by a governing body. For the benefit of both supplier and
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(feeders) be L which are connected with each other using a bidirectional LV/HV
interfaces (transformers) as shown in Fig 6.1. The set of feeders represents the virtual
connections between MGs, therefore creating our MGN. Let a set of all pairs (seller,
buyer) of MGs be Ki (Ki ⊂ N N ), each connected through a feeder li (li ∈ L).
A feeder li has a capacity limit Γi. The flow of energy among them is controlled
by mutual decisions of the management system. At any instance of time, let M
and B be the set of sellers and buyers, where M∩ B = ∅ and M∪ B ⊆ N . Each
MG has a set of DGs Wn (n ∈ N ), primarily to fulfill the local demand. A MG
sells energy in case of surplus or buys energy, when the demand is more than its
production. Let cm,b be the cost of transporting one unit (1 kWh) of electricity from
seller m (m ∈ M) to buyer b (b ∈ B), and En,w (n ∈ N , w ∈ Wn) be the pre-
authorized amount of electricity generation of energy source w with capacity ECn,w of
smart microgrid n. Here, En,w ≤ E
C
n,w, and the pre-authorized generation (En,w) of
DG w of n is controlled by the energy management system (EMS). The EMS decides
the price (µ), to satisfy the MGN electricity demand D˜B (total amount of electricity
buyers want to buy), from the prices (monotonic non decreasing) proposed by each of
the seller MGs. Then, the buyer b (b ∈ B) contacts the sellers (M) to buy electricity
from them to compensate for its shortage.
6.2.1 System Assumption
We employ ANSI C84.1 standard voltage rating for the MGN. Similar to several Volt-
VAR optimization research, we assume that the MGN system uses a lower voltage
(from range A of C84.1) as the service voltage to minimize the losses. Each of the MGs
has a linear vector that comprises the cost of electricity transportation from the sellers
to the buyers, and the capacity of the transmission lines. To minimize the thermal
losses, we assume the maximum capability of the transmission line is predefined,
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Table 6.1: MEPM mathematical notation
Notation Description
N Set of Microgrids
L set of transmission lines
Ki set of microgrids connected by transmission line li
Γi capacity of the feeder li
B, M Set of Buyers and Sellers
b, m buyer and Seller
n a microgrid
Wn Set of DGs in a Microgrid n
En,w amount electricity needed from DG w of n
ECn,w generation capacity of DG w of n
D˜B buyers excess demand or shortage
w generator of a microgrid
µm,w(Em,w) marginal cost function for w of m
cm,b Electricity Transmission Cost from m to b in $/kWh
µ(E) combined or overall marginal cost function
E Total Generation of M
Rlim,b, X
li
m,b resistance and reactance of li from m to b
Im,b amount of current flow from seller m to buyer b
pim,b capacitance of capacitor bank added to the input of b
xm,b amount of electricity transported from m to b without loss
Vb voltage at buyer MG (b) (predefined)
xdm,b electricity transmission loss from m to b
Vm voltage at seller MG m (predefined)
x˜m,b Actual amount of electricity transferred from m to b with losses
D˜b excess demand or shortage of b
E˜m Excess or surplus of m
Γi transmission capacity of the line li connecting Ki
µl lower bound overall marginal cost
µu upper bound overall marginal cost
µo, Pˆ qB pair of optimal marginal and T&D costs
Pˆ lB, Pˆ
u
B lower and upper bound T&D costs
Dm demand of seller m
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whether they use a shared or dedicated transportation system. Also, transmission
cost cm,b is payable to the owner of the transmission and distribution network which
is imposed by the transmission and distribution operator in a competitive electricity
market. The transmission is equipped with VAR compensation component at the
receiving point to raise the power factor to unity (or near unity). We also assume that
i) bi-directional electricity flow, ii) coupling between microgrids, and iii) integration
of renewable energy sources to the grid should comply with the standard found in
[24, 8, 89] and IEEE1547A, IEEE1547.4 standard. The energy generated from the
renewable sources in predicted using the model described in [120].
6.2.2 Marginal Cost & Cost Function
It is widely accepted that the cost functions are cubic in nature (approximated) but
in reality the only and most important feature of the cost curve is to be monotonic
non-decreasing [45]. The cost of a product (such as electricity) is dependent on
various factors such as, quantity, investment, labor, fuel (such as gas, oil, wind, solar
radiation etc), market demand, establishments, etc. Therefore, it is nearly difficult
to express the cost by a regular curve (function) [45, 46, 51, 102]. The truth is that a
unit cost (marginal cost) or total cost never decreases with the increase of the amount
of production. The amount of production is determined by the total demand of a
market for an instance of time. Let Em,w be the amount of electricity generated by a
generator w of a seller microgrid m; then the total cost of producing Em,w is [45, 102]:
C(Em,w) = v(α,Em,w) + cEm,w + d, (6.1)
where α, c, d ∈ R+, and c & d are the minimum cost (fixed) for producing one unit of
electricity and producing nothing respectively, which is dependent on capital or initial
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The marginal cost is a non-decreasing monotonic function, and it can be deter-
mined by the first order derivative of the total cost function. Hence, the marginal cost
function can be expressed by a linear, quadratic, step, piecewise convex or nonlinear
non-convex cost-function (see fig. 6.2). For simplicity, most researchers assume the
marginal cost or cost function to be convex or approximate it near to a convex func-
tion [45, 93, 53, 125, 133]. In reality, however, this is not accurate; the marginal cost
can not be expressed by a regular function such as linear, nonlinear, convex. Indeed,
it is a function which is irregular in nature and non-decreasing with the increase of
the production quantity. Also, the marginal cost function of a company having more
than one generator is more complex and certainly nonlinear non-convex, even if the
individual cost function is linear [93, 46]. The operation and maintenance cost of the
non-renewable energy sources increase with the amount of production. Therefore, the
marginal cost described in the Appendices (from 6.2.2 to 6.2.2) are suitable for the
non-renewable energy sources. Whereas the operation and maintenance cost of the
renewable energy sources barely increases with the amount of the electricity genera-
tion. The LRMC (long run marginal cost) also known an LCOE (Levelized cost of
electricity) is used to determine the energy cost of the renewable energy sources (see
section 6.2.2).
Quadratic Marginal Cost function
It is widely accepted that the total cost functions are cubic in nature [45] and accord-





m,w + cEm,w + d (6.3)
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where α, β, c, d ∈ R+ and therefore, the marginal cost function for cubic cost is




= 3αE2m,w − 2βEm,w + c (6.4)
Fig. 6.2(c) shows the quadratic marginal cost curve. For the monotonic non-decreasing
quadratic cost function, we assume α ≥ β in eqs. (6.3) and (6.4). Here, c is the long
term minimum cost for one unit of electricity production. Eq. (6.4) determines the
marginal cost for the amount of generation from generator w of m. Now, let the
marginal cost µm,w(Em,w) for Em,w be given as µ, such that µm,w(Em,w) = µ. Then,
by solving (6.4), a utility company can determine the maximum amount of electricity





4β2 − 12α(c− µ)
6α







Here the generation is only possible when µ ≥ c.
Linear Marginal Cost function
Similarly, marginal cost for a quadratic cost function is linear i.e.
µm,w(Em,w) = αEm,w + c, (6.7)
where α and c are constants. For the linear marginal cost, when the marginal cost (i.e.,






; where Em,w ≤ E
C
m,w (6.8)
otherwise, eq. (6.6), and the generation is possible when µ ≥ c.
Piecewise Marginal Cost function
Sometimes a marginal cost function is expressed as a piecewise convex function to
accommodate the peak hour and off-peak hour electricity price (see Fig. 6.2(b)).












Ejm,w, where f1(.), f2(.), ..., fk() are the convex functions to calculate
the costs for various specific range (amount) of production. For the piecewise convex
marginal cost function, we assume that the convex functions are sorted (or indexed)
according to the lower cost µil with the amount of generation E
i
m,w. The appropriate
function fi is selected such that µ
i
l ≤ µ ≤ µ
i+1
l (where µ: µmw = µ is the given cost),
and the amount of generation is given by,
Em,w = E
i
m,w + arg fi(µ− µ
i




Nonlinear Non-Convex Marginal Cost function
Sometimes, the rate of a product increases or remain the same for increasing the
generation of one more unit of electricity. In this case, the marginal cost function is
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a nonlinear and non-convex function such as (see Figs 6.2(a) and 6.2(d)),
µm,w(Em,w) = αnlEm,w + c (6.11)
where αnl and Em,w both are variables and µm,w(Em,w+1) ≥ µm,w(Em,w). The amount












Eq. (6.12) is similar to eq. (6.8) but here, the denominator αnl is a variable which
varies according to the amount of generation. Therefore, the cost of electricity can
be calculated instantly by maintaining a sorted (according to the cost µm,w) linear
list containing distinct generation costs and the corresponding maximum amount
of generation. Therefore, for a given cost µ (µm,w = µ), the amount of electricity
Em,w can be determined from the linear list. Let the sorted linear list be {µ1 →
E1m,w, · · · , µi → E
i
m,w, · · ·}, where µi is the unique marginal cost and E
i
m,w is the
corresponding maximum amount of electricity generated from the generator w of
m. Now, suppose the given cost is µ, then the amount of electricity is Ejm,w, if
µj−1 < µ ≤ µj.
Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE)
Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) is the most transparent metric used to measure the
electricity generation cost for renewable. LCOE is used for renewable energy since
the renewable energy does not need fuel, maintenance cost is very low, government
incentive for customers and producers, and the technological innovation has reduced
manufacturing cost 100 times [14, 96]. The important and most influential cost for
the RES is land cost, and long term investment costs. Also, in a competitive market
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when grid parity is considered, then the long term average cost or LCOE is used to
calculate the cost of the renewable energy. The most important aspect for renewables
cost calculation is that the variable expense is negligible. The LCOE is a measure of
the marginal cost (MC) of electricity over a long duration and sometimes is referred
to as Long Run Marginal Cost (LRMC) [14, 96]. LCOE cost is calculated in $/kWh
considering total cost and energy generated over the life time of the energy generating
system [14]. LCOE is sensitive to the input assumption. Let the life time of a
RES be Y r, in year y, the initial investment/cost of the system be Iy, operation
and maintenance cost be Oy, interest expenditure be Fy, discount rate be r, energy
production Ey, and degradation rate be dg, then the LCOE for a renewable energy











where LCOEm,w is the electricity cost or rate (in $/kWh) of a renewable sources
w in a seller microgrid m. The renewable energy cost therefore be a no decreasing
constant value for a instance of time and can be written as,
µm,w(Em,w) = LCOEm,w, ∀Em,w (6.14)
Given a marginal cost µ, the amount of generation used is,
(6.15)Em,w = E
C
m,w; where µ ≥ LCOEm,w
Em,w = 0; otherwise
As mentioned, for the survival of a company, the selling price should not be less
than the marginal cost. The marginal cost is a monotonic non-decreasing function
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[93]. Now, let E be the total amount of electricity generated by the MGN system,
then the total cost of the electricity to fulfil excess demand D˜B is,
µ(E) · D˜B (6.16)






Em,w. We use the marginal cost functions from Appendices 6.2.2
to 6.2.2 to calculate the cost of nonrenewable energy sources and LCOE (Appendix
6.2.2) for renewable energy sources. The model is applicable for any of the other
marginal cost functions by replacing the marginal cost functions illustrated above
with the appropriate non-decreasing marginal cost function.
6.2.3 Electricity Transportation
In our MGN system, we assume that all the microgrids are connected with each
other using electricity transmission and distribution lines. Most of the energy losses
in electricity transportation are due to the resistance of the energy network and
reactive power which is injected by the reactive load. The T&D (transmission and





where Rlim,b is the resistance, X
li
m,b is the reactance of the transmission line from m to
b, and j is the complex variable dependent on the phase of the voltage Vm (voltage
at seller m) and current Im,b (amount of current a seller m sends to b). The values of
Rlim,b and X
li
m,b are dependent on the physical characteristics of the transmission line.
X lim,b (in ohm) is the reactance of the transmission line which can be expressed as,






where Llim,b is the inductance (in henries) of the transmission line li from m to b, f is











. Here, θ is the angle between apparent power and active power. Now,
to reduce the losses, let the power factor of the transmission be cosφ (near to unity
and θ >> φ); that is θ is reduced to φ. To do so, a reactive compensation equipment
(such as, a shunt capacitor bank) is added at the input of the buyer microgrid (b). Let
the capacitance of the capacitor bank be πm,b and the amount of energy transferred




m,b) cos θ(tan θ − tanφ)
2πfV 2b
, (6.18)
where Vb is the voltage at buyer microgrid and x
d
m,b is the total loss (resistive and
reactive) of electricity while transmitted from m to b. In general the value of the
receiving voltage (Vb) should be within ±5% (Vm ± 5%) of voltage (Vm) at m [91].
Here, we assume Vb is chosen a value between Vm and (Vm − 1%). Therefore, the








and the total amount of electricity needed to be transported by a seller m to a buyer
b is,
x˜m,b = xm,b + x
d
m,b (6.20)




(cm,b · x˜m,b) (6.21)
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A buyer may choose another seller to decrease the buying amount if the transmission
(or transportation) loss is lower than the current seller. Let D˜b be the shortage of




Definition 6.2. [Allocation Problem] The optimal matching of sellers and buyers




(cm,b · x˜m,b) (6.22)
Transformer thermal limit
Both ends of the transmission line are connected to a delivery (at m) and a receiving
(at b) transformer. The amount of current flow through these transformers generate
heat which is typically resolved by coolant (such as oil). Hence, a transformer has an
upper limit of energy handling capacity to sustain and extend its life time. Beyond
this limit, the transformer temperature increases and may burn out or shorten the
life of a transformer. Therefore, a transformer must not handle electricity beyond a
rated power. The hot-spot temperature of the transformer can be computed for any
load by using the following standard relations which are given in [15],






where ωHS, ωTO, and ∆ωHR are hot-spot temperature, top-oil temperature, and rated
hot-spot temperature rise above top-oil respectively. Im,b, I
R
m,b, and e are load current,
rated current and winding exponent accordingly. Now, if the voltage at the input of





where Pm,b is the rated power of the transformer and therefore it limits the input
energy of the transformer as,
xm,b ≤ P
r




m,b, for delivering transformer (6.26)
where P rm,b and P
d
m,b are the receiving and delivering rated power of transformers at
m and b.
6.3 Electricity Pricing Model
It is clear that the electricity price a buyer has to pay is dependent on both the overall
marginal cost and the transportation cost of electricity. For simplicity, we assume
that the profit of the seller for selling electricity is included within the marginal costs.
Therefore, the price (paid by the buyer) of electricity can thus be expressed as:





(cm,b · x˜m,b) (6.27)
Here, the overall marginal cost (µ(E)) depends on the marginal costs of the sellers.
Hence, there are ample scopes to determine the optimal electricity price by jointly
considering overall marginal cost and transmission losses, in an optimization model,
and subsequently solve it optimally. Therefore, a model needs to be developed which
will concurrently minimize the overall electricity price (6.27).
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6.3.1 Minimum Electricity Pricing Model (MEPM)
Eq. (6.27) illustrates the total payment of electricity of the MGN buyers. Therefore,



















x˜m,b ≤ Γi, ∀li ∈ L















, ∀m ∈M, ∀b ∈ B
(6.34)πm,b =
x˜m,b cos θ(tan θ − tanφ)
2πfV 2b
, ∀m, ∀b

















Em,w −Dm, ∀m ∈M (6.38)
∑
m∈M











Em,w ≥ DB (6.41)
where variable E˜m is the excess generation of electricity by seller m, and DB, Dm
represent the total actual demand of the MGN buyers and the seller demand respec-
tively. Γi (li : (m, b) ∈ Ki) is the transmission capacity of the line (li) which connects
a pair of MGs in Ki. The solution to the above optimization model (from eqs. (6.28)
to (7.11)) will yield the joint optimal overall marginal cost and transportation cost for
the MGN. Eq. (6.29) states that the electricity transmitted from sellers (M) must
be equal to the total shortage (or excess demand: Db) of the buyer microgrid (b).
The constraint in eq. (6.30) limits the total flows of electricity from m to b through
a transmission or distribution line which should not surpass the capacity of the line.
Second part of eq. (6.31) ensures that the amount of electricity transported from m is
zero when xm,b is zero. A number of current flows through li from m to b is calculated
in eq. (6.33). Constraint (6.36) ensures that the delivering and receiving electricity
should be less than the power rating (P dm,b and P
r
m,b) of the transformers attached.
The selling amount of the power should satisfy the amount of electricity buyers (B)
wants to buy from a seller m which is outlined in eq. (6.37). Eq. (6.38) asserts that
the total excess amount of generation is equivalent to the sum of excess electricity
generated by all sellers. The MGN total excess production must satisfy the shortage
of electricity which is manifested in eq. (6.39). Finally, the overall marginal cost of
the electricity for the MGN is determined by eq. (6.40).
Here, if all the marginal cost functions µm,w(Em,w) are convex, then the MEPM
problem remains a nonlinear and non-convex problem due to the overall marginal
cost which is the superimposition [103] of all the marginal costs. Therefore, the
above MEPM problem is a difficult (NP-Hard) problem, and no polynomial solution
exists [124]. Moreover, in practice, the marginal cost function does not need to be
147
convex; rather, the more accurate property of the marginal cost function is monotonic
non-decreasing [45]. The monotonic non-decreasing function will increase or remain
the same by increasing the production of electricity. To obtain a polynomial time
solution of the MEPM problem, we decompose into two subproblems, the overall
marginal cost problem (OMCP) and an optimal electricity allocation. These two
sub-problems are both used as modules in our solution methodology of MEPM to
determine the optimal solution to our original problem. OMCP is used to determine
a feasible interval for the optimal marginal cost, with a lower bound (µl) and an upper
bound (µu). Now, the problem reduces to a search for the optimal marginal cost that
yields optimal overall price of electricity (µc+ Pˆ cB). The MEPM performs a search for
the optimal marginal cost and at each iteration (after solving an allocation problem)
it removes a segment of the feasible interval that is of no use (i.e., a marginal cost
in a segment removed by the method will always result in higher overall price). Our
solution methodology follows a divide and conquer approach since such method is
deterministic (it will always converge and return the optimal result) and enjoys low
complexity. In the following sections, we describe the decomposition and polynomial
time solution of MEPM.
6.4 Decomposition of MEPM
The MEPM clearly is a combination of two inter-related optimization problems, (i)
minimum overall marginal cost problem (OMCP) by setting the value of cm,b = 0 and
Em,w = E
C
m,w, and (ii) minimum transportation cost problem (allocation problem)
by setting the value of µ(E) = 0 in the objective function (Def. 6.2). The overall
marginal cost has lower and upper bound values. The MEPM is infeasible below the
lower bound overall marginal costs. Beyond the upper bound value, the system will
always produce the same cost for transportation but the overall marginal cost will
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increase.
Definition 6.3. [Lower Bound Overall Marginal Cost, µl] The lower bound overall
marginal cost, µl ≡ µ(E) is the combined marginal cost that is calculated while
(∀w ∈ Wm, ∀m ∈ M), Em,w and cm,b of MEPM are set to E
C
m,w and 0 respectively.
In other words, the overall marginal cost below µl must be infeasible for the MGN,
i.e., E < D˜B, where Em,w ≤ E
C
m,w.
Definition 6.4. [Upper Bound MGN Overall Marginal Cost, µu] The upper bound
overall marginal cost, µu ≡ µ(E) is the combined marginal cost that is calculated after
the optimization of the transportation costs. The optimization of transportation costs
is carried out with an initial setting of MEPM, where µ(E) = 0 and Em,w = E
C
m,w,
(∀w ∈ Wm, ∀m ∈M).
The overall marginal cost beyond µu does not have any effect on the transportation
cost (TC) because any value of Em,w between the value determined by the optimiza-
tion of transportation cost and ECm,w will yield the same transportation cost TC and
the MGN system is infeasible for Em,w > E
C
m,w.
Lemma 6.4.1. The decrease of the overall marginal cost µ(E) from upper bound µu
to lower bound µl will monotonically increase the value of the minimum transportation
cost (TC).
Proof Consider two marginal costs µ(E) and µ(E ′) of the MGN, where µ(E) ≥ µ(E ′)
and E,E ′ ≥ D˜B. In this case, E > E





(Em,w − ∆Em,w), where





Em,w. Here, (Em,w −∆Em,w) indicates the amount of
production of some generators which will decrease due to decrease of the marginal cost
from µ(E) to µ(E ′). Now, suppose for a generator m,
∑
b∈B




then the transportation cost remains the same but if
∑
b∈B
x˜m,b > E˜m, then, we have to
find one or more lower cost generators which have surplus electricity to fulfill the need
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of buyer b. Suppose, all these new sellers are S, then cm,b ≤ cm′,b, ∀m











(x˜m,b · cm,b). Similarly, if we decrease the
overall marginal cost, then the transportation costs will increase gradually or remain
unchanged. The system will choose the same set of generators, and the amount of
electricity generation of the selected generators remain the same if E = E ′. Therefore,
the overall marginal costs in both cases remain the same, i.e., µ(E) = µ(E ′).
From the lemma 6.4.1, we find that each overall marginal cost, µi (µl ≤ µi ≤ µu) has
a minimum transportation cost (TCj) or minimum average transportation cost Pˆ jB,
where, Pˆ jB =
TCj
D˜B




o × D˜B + Pˆ
q
B × D˜B ≤ µ
i × D˜B + Pˆ
j
B × D˜B, ∀µ
i ∈ {µl, µu} \ µo and ∀Pˆ jB ∈






B is the minimum average transportation cost due to marginal
cost set to a value, µo.
6.4.1 Algorithmic Solution for MEPM
The MEPM algorithm chooses a value for µi between µu and µl, and determines the
minimum transportation cost (Pˆ jB). The optimal solution is the lowest value of the
summation of µi and Pˆ jB. An efficient polynomial solution (divide-and-conquer) of
the MEPM problem is presented in Fig. 6.3. In Fig. 6.3, steps (III) to (XIV) are
repeated while all the partitions are deleted and the MEPM scheme terminates with
minimum (optimal) per kWh price µc+P cB of the MGN network. In short, the MEPM
method divides the marginal cost space (Fig. 6.3, step (IV)) into two partitions, then
determines the average transmission cost (Fig. 6.3, step (VI)). Then, the MEPM
discards one or both partitions when the minimum possible cost of the partition(s)
is greater than µc + P cB (Fig. 6.3, steps (VIII) and (XII)). Otherwise, it updates the
µc + P cB (Fig. 6.3, steps (IX) and (XIII)) and repeat the same divide-and-conquer
method. The MEPM solution contains two sub-problems, hence the solution of the
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MEPM is derived by combining the solution of OMCP (Fig. 6.3, step (I)) and the
allocation problem (Fig. 6.3, step (VI)) interactively.
Start MEPM
(II) input initial














to get the initial val-












(IV) Partition [µl, µu]




(X.I) For [µu ≤ µl]: [µk +
Pˆk
B




















], [µc + Pˆ c
B
])
(V) Determine E˜m, ∀m ∈ M
using marginal cost µi
(VI) Simplex Algorithm For
LP Allocation Problem: Mi-
nAvgTransCost and get Pˆ
j
B
(VII) Update [µc + Pˆ c
B
] ←
min[(µc + Pˆ c
B









(µc + Pˆ c
B
) ?
































Figure 6.3: Schematic diagram of MEPM Algorithm; L: left partition; R: right par-
tition
Algorithm for OMCP
One of the objectives of our MEPM algorithm is to determine the overall marginal
cost and E˜m, ∀m ∈ M, by solving the OMCP which is described in Section 6.4.
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Suppose, both µ(E) and E˜m are unknown and the excess demand D˜B, E
C
m,w are
known. The mathematical model for OMCP can be realized by replacing x˜m,b = 0
in eq. (6.28) (objective) and eqs. (6.38) – (7.11) as constraints of the objective.
The solution of the OMCP model will determine the overall marginal cost µ(E) by
achieving the minimum total cost of the excess demand D˜B for any configuration of
the MGN. Then, µ(E) and E˜m can be determined by the following steps which are





(i) Divide D˜B equally among
the generators ∀(m,w)
(ii) Determine µm,w(Em,w)
for the extra generation
eq. (6.4), (6.7), (6.9), and








∀w ∈ Wm, ∀m ∈ M
(iv) Adjust the generation
of (Em,w) all genera-
tor according to the cost
µmin (6.5), (6.8), (6.10),
(6.12), (6.14) or (6.6)
(v) Delete generators from










Figure 6.4: Schematic diagram of OMCP Algorithm
Step 1: Divide the excess demand D˜B among the generators (∀w ∈ Wm) of all sellers
(∀m ∈M), and determine the marginal costs µm,w(Em,w) (see, eq. (6.4), (6.7), (6.9),
(6.11), and (6.14)). Take the µmin = min{µm,w(Em,w)|w ∈ Wm,m ∈M}.
Step 2: Adjust Em,w with a calculated (step 1) marginal cost µ
min using eqs’.(6.5), (6.8),
(6.10), (6.12), (6.15) or (6.6).




and discard w ∈ Wm, Em,w ≥ E
C
m,w. Repeat Step 1 to Step 3 while D˜B > 0.
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Step 4: E˜m =
∑
w∈Wm
(Em,w −Dm), ∀m ∈M and µ
l = µmin.
Step 1 (above) and (ii) in Fig. 6.4, return the marginal costs of a generator to
produce the excess amount of electricity. However, since a generator cannot produce
more electricity than its capacity, the OMCP (ii in Fig 6.4) will then return a marginal
cost of a generator with only its maximum generation capacity if the requested excess
amount of generation exceeds the capacity (ECm,w).
Second, let Em,w be known, then the overall marginal cost is µ
i = max{µm,w(Em,w)|w ∈
Wm, m ∈ M}, and µm,w(Em,w) is determined by Step 2. This is the case when the
allocation of electricity (x˜m,b) is determined by solving the allocation problem before
solving the OMCP. With maximum capacity of the DGs, the solution results into the
upper bound overall marginal cost µu (µu = µi).
Third, when the value of µi is known, then the suggested generation of the DGs
is determined at Step 2 or (iv) in Fig. 6.4. This calculation is repeatedly used in the
MEPM algorithm to determine E˜m (in Fig. 6.3, V).
Lemma 6.4.2 (Optimal Overall Marginal Cost). The solution of OMCP (Fig. 6.4)
determines the optimal overall marginal costs for any configuration of MGN.
Proof Let the overall marginal cost determined by the solution of OMCP presented
in Fig. 6.4 be µ
′
(E), where E = DB (total demand of the MGN). Now, let the optimal
overall marginal cost for the MGN configuration be µ∗(E). If µ
′
(E) ≤ µ∗(E), then
µ
′
(E) is the optimal overall marginal cost. Now, suppose, the OMCP shown in
Fig. 6.4 is unable to produce an optimal solution of the overall marginal cost for a
configuration of MGN, i.e., µ
′
(E) > µ∗(E). If this is true, then there are at least two
generators (in the proposed solution), which generate different amount of electricity
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compared to the optimal solution (shown below):
(6.42)
Optimal Solution Generation Set (G*)
G∗ = {E1,1, · · · , Em,w , · · · , Em′,w′ · · ·}
and
µ∗(E) = max(µ1,1(E1,1) · · · , µm,w(Em,w) , · · · ,








Em,w −Dm) = D˜B
(6.43)
MEPM Generation Set (G′)
G′ = {E1,1, · · · , E
′
m,w , · · · , E
′





1,1) · · · , µm,w(E
′
m,w) , · · · ,
µm′,w′(E
′









E ′m,w −Dm) = D˜B
Let the index of the two generators be (m,w) (generator w of microgrid m), and
(m′, w′) (generator w′ of microgrid m′). Now, suppose the amount of generation of
both generators determined by optimal solution be Em,w and Em′,w′ (eq. (6.42)) and
OMCP be E ′m,w and E
′
m′,w′ (eq. (6.43)). Let us also assume (without loss of generality)
that (m,w) is a low-cost generator and (m′, w′) is a high-cost generator. Now, the
claim (µ′(E) > µ∗(E)) is true if and only if E ′m,w < Em,w and E
′
m′,w′ > Em′,w′ ,
therefore, the costs which are calculated in the optimal solution (µ∗(E)) are less
than the costs determined by the OMCP solution (µ′(E)). This leads us to a fact
that the low-cost generator (m,w) must produce more or equal (at least) amount of
electricity (with a greater overall marginal cost µ′(E)) in OMCP than the amount
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of electricity produced by the same generator in the optimal solution (see, step (iv)
in Fig. 6.4)1. This is always true because the marginal cost is non-decreasing (see
Section 6.2.2). Therefore, the total amount of excess electricity produced by the
generators in OMCP must be greater than the total demand of the buyers or E > D˜B
which is a contradiction according to the steps (i) and (vi) of the OMCP solution
presented in Fig. 6.4. In general, let E ′ be the electricity produced by the OMCP,
then we claim that E ′ = E = D˜B, but
(6.46)if µ
′(E ′) > µ∗(E) then
E ′ > E,
because, some or all generators in OMCP will produce more electricity (without vio-
lating the capacity constraint) than the amount determined by the optimal solution.
This is a direct violation of steps (i) and (vi) of the OMCP solution (see Fig. 6.4).
The steps (i) and (vi) of the OMCP solution controls the amount of total excess pro-
duction to the total demand of the buyers. The solution is valid, if only if both or all
(in general) generators produce the same amount of electricity which is determined
by the optimal solution. Thus, the OMCP method always determines the optimal
overall marginal cost of any configuration of the MGN system.
Solving the Allocation Problem (MinAvgTransCost)
Step (VI) of Fig. 6.3 is the solution for the allocation problem (defined by Def. 6.2) by
setting the value of µ(E) = 0 of the MEPM objective function in eq. (6.28) and taking
(6.29) to (6.39) as the constraints. We use the Simplex method to solve this problem.
The inputs to the allocation problem are E˜m, ∀m ∈ M which are determined by
the algorithm for OMCP and the output is the minimum transportation cost Pˆ jB.
The value of Pˆ jB is the lower bound value (Pˆ
l
B) for electricity transportation, when
1At a higher marginal cost, a generator will produce more electricity compared to the amount





ECm,w − Dm), and upper bound value (Pˆ
u
B ) when E˜m is the output of
OMCP for µl. The mathematical model of the allocation problem is a LP problem
with continuous variables x˜m,b (∀m ∈ M, ∀w ∈ Wm). Hence, the problem can
be solved (using the Simplex algorithm) in a polynomial time and takes at least
O(|B|×|M|) comparisons.
Once the minimum transportation cost (Pˆ jB) is determined (for µ
i), then, we up-
date [µc, Pˆ cB] ← min([µ
c, Pˆ cB], [µ
i, Pˆ jB]) (see, steps (VII) and (XII) of Fig. 6.3), and
compare the possible minimum payment µi + Pˆ lB and µ
l + Pˆ jB of right ([µ
i, µu]) and
left ([µl, µi]) partitions with the current minimum payment (µc + Pˆ cB) (see, Alg. 6.1
from lines 11 to 17). If any or both of the partitions’ possible minimum costs are lower
than (µc+ Pˆ cB), then Alg. 6.1 (or the steps (III) to (XIV) of Fig. 6.3) is repeated with
one (left or right) or both partitions, otherwise (µc + Pˆ cB) is the minimum payment.
The details of the MEPM algorithm are presented in Alg. 6.1. Initially, the algo-
rithm (from lines 5 to 7) compares the upper and lower bound values of both overall
marginal costs and transportation costs. Alg. 6.1 will terminate, if the upper and
lower values of the overall marginal costs or transportation costs are found similar,
otherwise, the algorithm continues as discussed above.
6.4.2 Analysis of the MEPM algorithm
Lemma 6.4.3 (Minimum Payment). Algorithm 6.1 determines the optimal price for
electricity.
Proof Alg. 6.1 divides the overall marginal cost space [µl, µu] into two, [µl, µi] and
[µi, µu], then, it determines the minimum transportation cost, Pˆ jB for overall marginal
cost µi. The solution of the allocation problem (QLP problem) always gives the
optimal value Pˆ jB for an overall marginal cost µ
i. Alg. 6.1 discards one partition
([µl, µi] or [µi, µu]) or both when the minimum possible cost of each partition is
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Algorithm 6.1 Algorithm for MEPM.




. µc, Pˆ cB are the global variables, function min() returns the value pair, sum of which is minimum
2: Initialize: [µc, Pˆ cB]← min([µ
l, PˆuB ], [µ
u, Pˆ lB])
3: 0 <  << 1 .  is a very small value
4: Begin
5: if







∣∣∣PˆuB − Pˆ lB






8: µi ← µ
l+µu
2
9: Pˆ jB ← MinAvgTransCost(B,M) . Simplex method for solving the allocation problem.
10: [µc, Pˆ cB]← min([µ




11: if (µl + Pˆ jB) < (µ
c + Pˆ cB) then . left partition







13: [µc, Pˆ cB]← min([µ
c, Pˆ cB], [µ
k, PˆkB ])
14: end if
15: if (µi + Pˆ lB) < (µ
c + Pˆ cB) then . right partition
16: [µk, PˆkB ]←MinMGNCost(µ




17: [µc, Pˆ cB]← min([µ
c, Pˆ cB], [µ
k, PˆkB ])
18: end if
19: return [µc, Pˆ cB]
20: End
21: end procedure
greater than the current global minimum cost (µc + Pˆ cB). Suppose, partition [µ
i, µu]
is discarded. We claim that there is an overall marginal cost µk, (i ≤ k ≤ u) and
transportation cost Pˆ qB (j ≥ q ≥ l) which produce minimum payment ((µ
k+Pˆ kB)×DB)
of MGN. The claim indicates that (µk+Pˆ kB) < (µ
c+Pˆ cB), but it is not possible because





k + Pˆ kB) ≥ (µ
i + Pˆ lB) and Alg. 6.1 discards
a partition (lines 11 and 15), iff (µi + Pˆ lB) > (µ
c + Pˆ cB), hence the claim is false.
Further, if the values for any pair (overall marginal costs or transportation cost) are
the same (µl = µu or Pˆ lB = Pˆ
u
B ), then Alg. 6.1 returns the minimum cost by taking
the minimum of inequal cost pair (overall marginal cost or transportation cost) and
value of equal cost pair. Thus, Alg. 6.1 solves the MEPM problem correctly. The
complexity of the MEPM algorithm is given in Appendix 6.4.2.
Complexity of Algorithm Alg. 6.1
In general the complexity to the quadratic linear programming (QLP) problem can be
solved in polynomial time using interior point method [11]. Our allocation problem
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takes polynomial time to solve, let the complexity be O(Q) (a polynomial function).
For the divide and conquer, let there be η discrete marginal costs between µl and
µu which produce η distinct values between Pˆ uB and Pˆ
l
B. Let the largest buyer wants
to buy 2ρ unit (in MWh or kWh) of electricity, then it is meaningless (or negligible)
if the total payment (in dollar or any currency unit) contains more than two digits
after the decimal point. Therefore, the set contains less than (µu − µl) × 2ρ values.
Therefore, the precision value for decimal number of Alg.1 is selected as  = 2−ρ. To
determine the complexity of the MEPM, let η = (µu − µl)× 2ρ or η = 2log2(µ
u−µl)+ρ.
Then, for the best case, the algorithm takes O(Q), that is in the first iteration the
MEPM deletes both partitions. Now, let k = log2(µ
u − µl) + ρ,thereby η = 2k. In
the worst case the MEPM method expands the search for the minimum electricity
price to the depth k of the binary tree of the MEPM search space. Each level the
MEPM compares 2 × 2l, where l is a level of the search space. Therefore the worst
case complexity of the MEPM is O(Q × 2k) ≡ O(Q × η). For the average case, the
algorithm may terminate at any level l of the tree. Therefore, the average number of



























Hence in general, the average case complexity of the proposed MEPM is O(Q ×
log2 η) or O
(




6.4.3 The role of ESS to handle the uncertainty in electricity
generation and load
In case of intrinsic uncertainty of electricity load and generation, we use electricity
storage system to store or supply electricity. The storage system will not be used as
the regular electricity source or storage. It is included to resolve the instantaneous
variation of load and generation after the decision is made by the MEPM method.
The price of the electricity to supply is the price decided by the MEPM system for
the MGN. The storage system is an intrinsic part of the demand-response algorithm
of a microgrid which we assume to be the internal energy management system of a
microgrid (whether a buyer or a seller).
Further, in the microgrid level, ESS can play a vital role to reduce the uncertainty
in the power generation and load prediction which leads to an increase in the effi-
ciency and reliability of the system. At the time of actual consumption, ESS can be
used to store extra energy or release energy to compensate the shortage compare to
the amount of energy planned for trading. Studies showed that demand and power
generation varies between 0 to at most 10% from one hour before the prediction.
Hence, the uncertainty of the power system maybe mitigated by storing at least 10%
of the energy which maybe required for next hour and 10% excess storage capacity
to store presumably excess of energy. Let the minimum and maximum capacity to
reduce the uncertainty of the ESS be Essln (i.e., 60% of ESS capacity) and Ess
h
n (i.e.,
80% of ESS capacity) then the amount of energy needed to be stored or released to
meet the uncertainty is xsn, thus Essln≤Esscb+xsn≤Esshn, where Esscb is the current amount
of energy stored in the ESS, xsn can be a zero, positive or negative value which is
accumulated with the demand. In the time of actual purchase, buyers and sellers
charge or discharge energy from the ESS if there is excess energy (demand is reduced
or surplus RES generation) or shortage of energy (or increase demand), thereby the
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mitigation is trivial.
6.5 First Come First Serve (FCFS) Allocation
In FCFS method, the EMS first decides the marginal cost according to the buyers’
demand and a series of bid prices placed by the sellers. Then, it assigns the amount
of electricity to be transported from a seller microgrid to a buyer according to the
minimum transportation costs and not exceeding the capacity of the connected trans-
mission line. The FCFS scheme first determines the overall marginal costs for total
excess demand of the buyers (line 6), then, assigns each of the buyers (b) to the
available sellers to buy x˜m,b amount of electricity from seller m (from lines 10 to 30).
First, in line 9 the transmission costs are sorted in ascending order according to the
buyer. Next, we select a buyer-seller pair and allocate electricity to fulfill the demand
of buyer b with the restriction that the capacity of connected transmission line li is
not exceeded. Otherwise, we select next seller-buyer pair and continue the allocation
of electricity from a seller to a buyer accordingly. In every successful allocation, we
modify the demand of the buyer with the allocation amount. We assume that the
transmission lines have sufficient capacity for the allocation of electricity and at the
end, demands of all the buyers are fulfilled.
6.6 Simulation
6.6.1 Simulation Setup
We consider an MGN system which contains a set of MGs, each with a number of
energy sources (DGs) randomly chosen from a set of renewable and non-renewable
energy sources; such as, (i) renewable: we choose the random (given LCOE range
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Algorithm 6.2 First Come First Serve (FCFS) Allocation
1: procedure FCFS(B,M)
2: DB ← 0; t cost← 0
3: for ∀b ∈ B do
4: DB ← (DB + D˜b)
5: end for
6: Determine µopt for DB by Alg. OMCP of Sec. 6.4.1 (step1 to step4)
7: Cm,b ← {cm,b|∀b ∈ B, ∀m ∈M}
8: Randmize(Cm,b)
9: sort values in Cm,b of each b in ascending order
10: for cm,b ∈ Cmb do
11: if D˜b > 0 then
12: if D˜b ≤ (E˜m) & D˜b > 0 & (Γi − D˜b) ≥ 0 then
13: xm,b ← D˜b, D˜b ← 0; E˜m ← (E˜m − D˜b)
14: calculate xt
m,b
and πm,b (eqs. (6.33),(7.7), (6.32))
15: x˜m,b ← (xm,b + xdm,b)
16: t cost← (x˜m,b × cm,b)
17: else if E˜m ≤ Γi then
18: D˜b ← (D˜b − E˜m);xm,b ← E˜m; E˜m ← 0
19: calculate xt
m,b
and πm,b (eqs. (6.33),(7.7), (6.32))
20: x˜m,b ← (xm,b + xdm,b)
21: t cost← (x˜m,b)× cm,b
22: else
23: d← Γi
24: D˜b ← (D˜b − d);xm,b ← d; E˜m ← (E˜m − d)
25: calculate xt
m,b
and πm,b (eqs. (6.33),(7.7), (6.32))
26: x˜m,b ← (xm,b + xdm,b)




return (µopt + t cost)
31: end procedure
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in brace) price of the electricity for offshore wind turbine ($0.15 to $0.218/kWh),
onshore wind ($0.05 to $0.116/kWh), solar energy ($0.05 to $0.15/kWh), hydropower
($0.030 to $0.059/kWh). The amount of electricity from the RESs is predicted for
each hour of a day by using the renewable energy models described in our previous
work in [120], (ii) non-renewable: gas turbine generator ($0.144/kWh) with given unit
production costs ($) in [96]. We choose one to five generators at random to power each
of the MGs. For non-renewable sources, in the cubic cost function α, and β are given
random values from 0.2×10−6 ∼ 0.8×10−6, and 0.05×10−6 ∼ 0.2×10−6, respectively.
We generate a set of convex functions to simulate the piecewise convex marginal cost
and choose α between 0.2× 10−6 ∼ 0.8× 10−6 for the linear marginal cost function.
Also, nonlinear non-convex costs are generated with the random values chosen for
α with the variation of Em,w. For all the cases, we choose a random value between
$0.002 to $0.008 for c. The capacity of each generator is chosen randomly from 300kW
to 1MW , and demand for each MG is also chosen at random between 200kWh to
2400kWh. We have chosen ANSI/IEEE standard network transformer with 300kV A
to 2500kV A power range, primary voltage up to 34.5 KV and secondary voltage is
up to 600V [26]. Once the capacity of the generators is fixed, a forecasting algorithm
[120] based on the historical meteorological data is executed to estimate the amount of
electricity generated from the RESs. For the simulation, we place the capacitor banks
with a maximum of 600 MVAR and the impedance of the transmission/distribution
lines (with 11/33KV base voltage) are considered which is given in [29]. An energy
transportation network is set up among the smart microgrids, each of which costs
cm,b ($0.05/kWh ∼ $0.1/kWh) to transport one unit of electricity. We implemented
the algorithms for MEPM in C++ programming language used IBM CPLEX concert











MEPM is always lower than the variation in FCFS electricity price. Also, it is found
that the change of electricity price in MEPM system is insignificant (less than 0.5%).
Therefore, the MEPM system is more stable in predicting the electricity price for any
configuration of the MGN.
6.7 Conclusion
We developed an energy management system and marginal cost-based electricity pric-
ing scheme for the MGN. We showed that our proposed MEPM scheme determines
optimal energy flow among the microgrids with a minimum electricity price for the
MGN customers. We simulated the MEPM algorithm and compared the results with
an FCFS system to evaluate the performance of MEPM. We found that the MEPM
always performed better compared to the FCFS system.
172
Chapter 7
Volt-VAR Control through Joint
Optimization of Capacitor Bank
Switching, Renewable Energy, and
Home Appliances
In the previous chapter 6 we have presented a scheme for MGN system to determine
the optimal electricity price by reducing T&D and generation costs of the electricity.
In fact, the T&D losses are assumed to be compensated by the use of compensation
devices (such as capacitor bank) along the transmission and distribution network.
Several types of research have been performed (see section 2.3) to reduce T&D losses
which are known as VVO (Volt-VAR optimization). In this chapter, we provide
a solution for VVO where compensation is jointly done by shifting flexible loads
consumption from peak demand duration to off-peak demand period and integrating
renewable energy sources into the grid.
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7.1 Motivation
It is evident from the discussion in section 2.3 that VVO works by adjusting the feed-
ers and substation components in response to the operator’s demand to reduce losses.
Further, the addition of renewable energy sources and electric vehicles (EVs), and
home appliances with flexible consumption featured the power grid with a new load
dimension. Such load dynamism has become an attractive feature, triggering activi-
ties to reduce peak load and adjust the demand, according to the generation. More-
over, studies show that many electrical devices operate more efficiently at reduced
voltage [71]. However, beyond a certain minimum operating voltage, the efficiency
of the device drops. Unfortunately, all the solutions (see, section 2.3) for VVO/VVC
select the lower voltage from ANSI C84.1 standard without considering the perfor-
mance of the appliances. With the recent technology advancement, a cost-effective
fine-grain solution for the VVO could be achieved while maintaining maximum effi-
ciency of the devices. Moreover, such solution will provide a quality electricity service
without reducing the lifespan of the equipment but with reduced generation and cost.
To address these challenges, we develop a new VVCO/OECM scheme to decrease the
electricity costs, adjust OLTC TAP and capacitor bank for Volt-VAR compensation
while rendering a lower terminal voltage to maintain efficient operations of electrical
and electronic devices in the customer premises.
7.2 System Model
We consider a distribution network which is shown in Fig. 7.1, having n feeders
: f1, f2, · · · , fn. Each of the feeders, i.e., fi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) supplies electricity to a
set of neighborhood1 microgrids ri,j ({ri,j|1 ≤ j ≤ mi}),∀i and mi is the number
1A neighborhood is also considered to be a microgrid.
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the electricity cost µ(Etg) to the CEMS. Upon obtaining the electricity cost, each of
the community improves the consumption pattern and transfer the control to the
HEMS.
We assume that HEMS connects the appliances of a customer through an HAN
(home area network), and a NAN (neighborhood area networks) connects the HEMS
to the CEMS. Also, CEMSs are connected to the substation EMS using a WAN
(wide area network) to transfer control and measurements between them. Besides,
all other components of the grid (PMU, PDC, etc.) are dedicated to monitoring and
reporting measurements for the stability and the fault-free operation of the electrical
network according to the decision made by the EMS. Based on the mentioned system
architecture, our proposed system is composed of two major energy management
schemes: (i) VVCO and (ii) OECM which are shown in Fig. 7.3 which interact
to achieve the minimum energy generation cost and billing of the customer while
satisfying the demand.
7.3 Volt-VAR and CVR Optimization Model (VVCO)
The primary objective of our proposed VVCO system is to minimize the electricity
generation cost by adjusting the capacitor bank switches and OLTC transformer TAP
(at the substation) to serve the customers demand at time t. The objective can be
accomplished by minimizing losses along the distribution feeders.
7.3.1 Distribution Losses and Volt-VAR
Let the capacitor banks and PMUs (Phasor Measurement Unit) be placed on the
distribution feeders (i.e., fi) to compensate for the reactive power losses and obtain
the measurements (voltage, current, and phase). Let, κi,j be the set of communities
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for which a capacitor bank j is installed, where Ri,j and XLi,j are the resistance and
inductance of the feeder fi at location j (see Fig. 7.2). Further, assume that the
phase between voltage and current at j is θti,j. Let I
t
i,j be the amount of current
flowing through the feeder to serve the demand of the communities κi,j during time
slot t. Then, for the communities load, the voltage drop V tdi,j (magnitude) on the
feeder fi at j can be calculated using the phasor diagram in Fig 7.2 (above) as,









Now, assume a shunt capacitor is added to compensate for the inductive loss; hence
the voltage drop V tdi,j is modified and equation (7.1) becomes,














where X tci,j is the impedance of the capacitor bank at j on the feeder fi. The value of
X tci,j can be adjusted to minimize the loss, more specifically the loss is reduced when,





X tci,j sin θ
t
i,j = η.
where η is a very small positive number near to zero. Next, we assume the PMUs at
communities κi,j send the phasor measurement data such as, voltage (V
t
i,j), current
(I ti,j), and phase (θ). If a PMU is not available for some or most of the communities,
then data from RTU and SCADA (Supervisory control and data acquisition) can
be used to calculate the phase. Note that, the received data from PMUs or RTUs
may have errors which must go through a filtering and screening process to increase
the accuracy of the measurements to an acceptable level [78]. We assume the power
system has such capabilities.
Now, by applying the measurements, we can easily evaluate the terms of the above






























2 + (P tXLi,j
)2 (7.4)




are the apparent, real, and reactive power of the feeder at
time t for communities κi,j. Let P
t
XCi,j
be the energy supplied by the capacitor to
compensate the reactive power at κi,j then,
(7.5)P tXLi,j
= P tXCi,j
from eqs. (7.3) and (7.5), it is evident that the reactive power of the feeder will only
be compensated when the capacitive power is equal to the induction (reactive) power,
then,





Assume the capacitor bank contains a series of identical capacitors which can be
switched on/off electronically (e.g., using thyristors). Assume the capacitor bank has
l capacitors and st switching state, where, st = 0 means all capacitors are switched
off at t, and st = k (1 ≤ k ≤ l) indicates that k of l capacitors are switched on. Now,





where the value of variable st is defined as, 0 ≤ st ≤ l, f is the frequency of the line
(50 or 60Hz) and ci,j is the capacitance of each identical capacitor of the bank.
To ensure the quality electricity service, besides capacitor bank switching, the
substation EMS must ensure that the voltage of the furthest service-drop of a feeder
is greater than or equal to the minimum primary voltage of the community (ri,mi). As-
sume the OLTC of the distribution feeder (fi) has ψi taps, indicated as TAP1, TAP2, · · · , TAPψi .
Each TAPi represent the ratio of primary and secondary windings of the distribution
transformer. Now, let the primary (at the substation) voltage be V tp and the sec-
ondary feeder input voltage for feeder fi at t be V
t
s . To ensure uninterrupted services
and quality of power, the following must be satisfied,






V tdi,j , ∀i, (7.8)
V ts ≥ V
t
p × TAPk, 1 ≤ k ≤ ψi (7.9)
where V ti,mi is the terminal voltage of the last customer on feeder fi. Now, the energy











































Figure 7.3: VVCO and OECM interactions, Volt-VAR and energy management.
Next, let the terminal (primary) voltage of each of the communities at j of feeder fi













Let µ(Etg) be the cost function of the electricity generation at t. We assume that














2 + bEtg + c (7.12)
where a > 0 and b, c ≥ 0 and Etg is the amount of electricity generated by the energy
source or generator. The electricity cost is solely dependent on the total demand of
the customers and various losses throughout the distribution system.
7.3.3 VVCO Mathematical Model





subject to, Eq. (7.2), (7.3), (7.7), (7.8), (7.9), (7.11), and (7.12)
After solving the above VVCO model, the utility determines the amount of energy
to be generated (Etg) and the cost µ(E
t
g). Note that this was decided according to the
input obtained from the CEMS (such as I ti,j), a shown in Fig. 7.3. The rate of the
electricity πt, ∀t (πt =
µ(Etg)
Etg
) is now sent back to the CEMS, so that each community
can solve an optimal energy consumption model (OECM) to reschedule local loads,
decide the charging/discharging state of EVs as well as the use of renewable energy.
The objective here is to redistribute the load, using the current price and send back
to the utility for a new decision from the VVCO model.
7.4 Optimal Energy Consumption Model (OECM)
In our proposed model, each community is assumed to be connected to the distribution
feeder through a step-down transformer, known as a service drop transformer. The
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transformer has two hot legs (Hot L1 and L2) output voltage (+120V, -120V) with
opposite phase and a center tap known as neutral. The multi-wire (L1, L2 and
neutral) branch circuit supplies 120/240V for the residential appliances. The hot leg
L1/L2 and neutral are used to supply 120V and for the 240V appliances are connected
to L1 and L2. Some appliances (like EV, electric motor, etc.) are connected to 240V
circuit to get better performance. Devices such as, light bulb, television, microwave
oven, dishwasher, dryer, etc. are connected to the 120V circuit. We assume a voltage
regulator connected to 120V circuit to adjust the voltage level (ANSI C84.1 standard
between 108 to 120V) according to the requirement determined by the CEMS.
7.4.1 Customer Load
A customer may have elastic appliances (such as an EV, heat water tank, heating/air
conditioning system, washing machine, dishwasher, etc.,) and inelastic appliances
(such as light bulbs, electric oven, electric iron, etc.) [121, 120]. Contemporary
technology advances are emerging as one of the growing trends for home appliances.
Evolution of such new devices and IEEE 802.15.4, ZigBee, are enabling the HEMS
with easy access to appliances information and consumption control. Moreover, nu-
merous studies have been done and are ongoing to recognize the non-intelligent home
appliances consumption patterns [20, 4, 62, 106]. Once the operating appliances
are detected, the HEMS can pull the efficiency voltage specification from the local
database. Next, the HEMS sends the measurement (such as minimum terminal volt-
age, consumption duration, admittance, etc.) to the CEMS. The CEMS adjusts the
consumption pattern, and the terminal voltage according to the energy cost received
from the substation EMS. Moreover, to reduce the consumption from the grid, the
CEMS may schedule V2G on EV, and energy use from renewable. Then, the CEMS
sends the demand (current, voltage) to the substation EMS to improve the energy
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cost.
Let w (w ∈ ri,j) be a customer, Aw be set appliances of customer w, and a (a ∈ Aw)
be an appliance. Now, for simplicity an elastic and inelastic load of a customer can
be represented by a tuple as follows,
Lw,a = (V,Ew,a, v
l
w,a, Tw,a) (7.14)
where V is a voltage set (within ANSI C84.1 utilization voltage range) with interval
of 1 volt, Ew,a is a set of power (ZIP power) consumed by a load (appliance) a of
customer w for an operation voltage of V , vlw,a is the minimum operating voltage,
below this voltage the efficiency is low [122, 71], which may cause a shorter lifespan
of the appliances. We assume that vlw,a is a value between the standard voltage range
of ANSI C84.1. Tw,a is the acceptable period of operation such that an appliance a
of customer w may consume electricity exactly for one slot2 in Tw,a (|Tw,a|> 0. When
|Tw,a|= 1, then the load is an inelastic load, otherwise it is an elastic load. Let P
k
w,a
and Qkw,a be the active and reactive power of a load a of w at operating voltage Vk
(where Vk ∈ V ). Then for the constant current, power and impedance, the ZIP model
[118, 10] for the active and reactive power of the load can be expressed as,






















, ∀Vk ∈ V, (7.16)
where P0 and Q0 are the active and reactive power consumed at nominal voltage V0.
Zp,Ip and Pp are the ZIP coefficients for active power and Zq,Iq and Pq are the ZIP
coefficients for reactive power [10]. Therefore the magnitude of the consumed energy
2Multiple slots operation of the appliance can easily be extended from this model.
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For each voltage V k ∈ V , the corresponding power consumption of each a of w can
be determined. Thus, a set Ew,a is determined and E
k
w,a ∈ Ew,a corresponds to the
operating voltage V k.






V kαk,tw,a, ∀t, ∀w, ∀a (7.18)
where h = |V | and αk,tw,a is a binary variable which determines the status of the load
a of w at t. αk,tw,a = 1 indicates that the load is consuming energy at t, otherwise
it remains idle. For energy efficiency and long life operation of the equipment, the
following constraint should be satisfied,




w,a, ∀w, ∀a (7.19)







The VVCO system must ensure that each of the elastic loads must be scheduled to






αk,tw,a = 1 (7.21)
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7.4.2 Electric Vehicle (EV)
Assume each customer has one or a set of electric vehicles EVw which participate in
both V2G and G2V operation. Let the target charging (energy) of the electric vehicle
be Ew,e, and initial energy stored in the EV be E
i
w,e, where e ∈ EVw, the constant
charging rate be Cw,e and maximum discharging rate be D
max
w,e . Also, let the set of
slots of the EV at home be Tw,e, and discharging rate at t be d
t
w,e then,
(7.23)G2V Mode : ctw,e = α
t
w,eCw,eφc























w,e ; ∀ti ∈ Tw,e





are the discharging and charging limit of the EV, and ts is the starting slot in set
Tw,e. Term α
t
w,e in equations. (7.23) and (7.24) is a binary variable which indicates
that EV e of w charging its battery when (αtw,e = 1) and otherwise discharging at t.








7.4.3 Residential Energy Sources
Assume that some customers may have roof-top solar panel or micro wind turbine
to meet the partial demand. Let Etw,s be the electricity produced by the renewable
source of customer w at t and the maximum capacity be RESw. Then,
(7.29)0 ≤ Etw,s ≤ RESw,





7.4.4 OECM Mathematical Model













Subject To: eqs. from (7.17) to (7.30)
where πt is the unit cost of the electricity at t which is received from the EMS of the
substation. We assume that each community always consumes a certain amount of





7.5 Non-cooperative Game: Iteraction between VVCO
and OECM
The problem presented in Fig. 7.4 can be modelled using a non-cooperative game with
mixed strategy. Let the payoff of each community (player) be β(σi,j, [πt|∀t]) and σi,j
be a set of actions (consumption or discharging) for each of the elastic (including EV)
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and inelastic load of the community ri,j in response to the electricity price πt; ∀t ∈ T .
The payoff of the community is the negative of the cost of total electricity drawn from
the distribution feeder fi. Thus (from eq. (7.31)),










Unfortunately, the payoff in Eq. (7.32) does not guarantee an optimal solution in
a Nash equilibrium state of the system. At each iteration, upon receiving the cost
due to the strategy determined in the previous state, the game forces the community
to reschedule the consumption to those time slots which have lower electricity costs.
Thus, in the successive iteration, the cost of slots which have lower cost in the previous
iteration will increase, and the expenses of the other slots will decrease. Therefore,
the payoff of each community may not increase. In fact, the payoff of a player is
dependent on the strategies played by other communities, which are unknown. To
design a good payoff function which always results from higher payoff in the following
games, let us consider the ideal scenario where the average load of each client is nearly
the same, and the loads are uniformly distributed throughout the hours of a day. In
this typical scenario, the average cost can be expressed as,








Lemma 7.5.1. Any deviation from the average cost will decrease the payoff of the
players of the game VVCO/OECM.
Proof Let the average consumption in each time slot t be E¯g. Therefore, the cost of
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electricity at each time slot t is,
π¯ = a(E¯g)
2 + bE¯g + c (7.34)
then, the total cost for the whole time span is,
πT = π¯T = (a(E¯g)
2 + bE¯g + c) · T (7.35)
Now, let a player shift its consumption (smallest possible) from time slot t to t
′
, thus
the utility need to decrease generation ∆Eg at t and increase ∆Eg (where ∆Eg > 0)
at t
′







2 + bE¯g + c) · (T − 2) + a(E¯g +∆Eg)
2
+b(E¯g +∆Eg) + c) + a(E¯g −∆Eg)
2
+b(E¯g −∆Eg) + c)
= (a(E¯g)
2 + bE¯g + c) · T + 2a(∆Eg)
2
> πT
Therefore, the payoff defined in eq. (7.32) will decrease for the player deviated from
the average costs. A higher deviation further will reduce the payoff of the committed
players. Thus, the optimal solution of the OECM game can only be obtained by set-
ting the consumption strategies such that the overall consumption in each slot t has a
minimum deviation from the average consumption. Hence, each player can maximize
its payoff by playing a strategy which minimizes the deviation of the resultant costs
from the average costs.
Therefore, the target of each community is to achieve an electricity cost near the cost
expressed in the above Eq. (7.33). This will result in minimum changes in OLTC
transformer TAP and capacitance of the capacitor bank, flatten the generation curve,
and increases the life of the distribution system components. In practice, however, the
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load may not be uniformly distributed or might not be achieved by rescheduling the
variable loads and the discharging of EVs. Without loss of generality, we assume that










where π∗t is the optimal electricity costs at any t, and the cost π
∗
t has the minimum
average distance from π¯. Therefore, we redefine the payoff function as,
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the average load. Let the optimal payoff of the community be β∗(σ∗i,j, [πt|∀t]) then,




This is possible when each player plays its best strategy, and all other strategies will
result in less payoff for some or all of the communities. This is known as Nash equilib-
rium of the mixed strategy game. The game is a non-cooperative multi-player mixed
strategy game because the player may draw the non-discrete amount of electricity
from the feeders, and discharge continuous (non-discrete) amount of electricity from
the EVs and consume energy from RES. Other than these, the elastic loads have
discrete strategies. In each iteration, the communities play the best strategy to min-
imize (OECM) its consumption cost and send the demand to the EMS, which runs
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the VVCO scheme and returns the electricity unit costs to the community OECM
scheme. The interaction will continue until the game ends in a Nash equilibrium
state. The community CEMS will act as the player of the game while the substation
serves as the controller of the game.
Game Controller Game Player
Start Game
Controller EMS
Initialize send pit =











pit, ∀t & Start
Determine New
Etg & pit, ∀t by
solving VVCO
















Is pit, t ∈ T
changed?
Adjust Capacitors
& TAP of Substa-
tion OLTC at t
No
Yes





































Load & RES Gen.
Figure 7.4: Volt-VAR optimization : VVCO/OECM Game.
Players: Each CEMS is the player of the game. In each slot, with a finite number
of iterations, community ri,j plays the game (eq. (7.38)) to maximize its payoff. The
player will change its strategy σ to maximize the payoff for electricity cost (πt) received
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from EMS. The player will continue its play until the payoff reaches its maximum.
Let π
′
t, ∀t ∈ T be the one-time cost of the electricity. Then steps (OECM) of the
play are shown in Fig. 7.4.
Game Controller: The substation EMS will act as the controller of the game.
Upon receiving the demand from the communities, the EMS calculates the electricity
costs πt, ∀t ∈ T using eq. (7.13) for the amount of electricity E
t
g (eq. (7.11)) and
send it to the CEMS. The interactions of EMS (VVCO) with the CEMS (OECM)
are shown in Fig. 7.4. Once the game reached to a Nash equilibrium state, then
the substation controller will send the switching command to all the capacitor bank
and set the OLTC tap of the feeder at the substation. Each of the communities also
adjusts voltage regulator or OLTC according to the terminal voltage selected by the
optimization process.
7.5.1 Uncertainty of the community load
Load variation and uncertainty of load is common in the existing electrical network
as well as for the VVO system [100, 101, 126]. The VVO system is designed to min-
imize the impact of the uncertainity of the load. The introduction of EV, customer
load, and the uncertainty of customer’s behaviors will affect the VVO. Most of the
solutions consider and try to minimize the forecast errors [100, 101, 126] which is also
applicable to our proposed system. Moreover, we find that the correct response to the
uncertainty of load is to mitigate and adjust the load locally (community) and mini-
mize the effect on the electrical network in real time. The proposed VVCO/OECM is
a decentralized method and the response time of the system is low (less than 15 Sec-
onds) hence the community load and corresponding capacitor bank can be adjusted
more accurately just before the consumption. Moreover, to reduce the uncertainty
the VVCO/OECM can be run in each operational (just before the time of actual
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consumption) time slot without any modification. Further, shorter time slot (such
as 1 to 5 minutes) will decrease the uncertainty near to zero. A local storage (com-
munity grade) system may be used to mitigate the change (instantaneous) of load
due to unpredictable behavior of the user. The charging and discharging of the local
storage system are similar to that of EV without the constraint which is presented
by equation (7.25). In this case, the storage system may consume extra energy or
discharge stored energy for the instantaneous change in community load.
7.6 Numerical Evalution
7.6.1 Simulation Setup
We consider a distribution system with several feeders, each of which connects 50 to
100 communities by inexpensive OLTC transformers. Also, an OLTC transformer
connects the distribution line to the substation. Each community has 20 to 25 res-
idential homes with or without the renewable sources, one or more EVs, 5 to 15
inelastic, and elastic loads. The consumption corresponds to terminal voltages rang-
ing from 108 to 127 (with skip 1 volt) volts and are calculated using the ZIP model
(eq. (7.17)) for each elastic and inelastic load. To calculate the load, we use the values
of ZIP coefficients given in [10]. The renewable sources have the maximum capacity
to produce 3 to 10 kW electricity. Here, we use ARMA prediction method to predict
the amount of generation from the renewable sources for the next 24 hours. In our
simulation, the residential load was chosen between 10 to 20 kWh for a day [123]. We
assume that each home has a level 2 charger to charge the EV. The battery capacity
of EV is chosen randomly from 18, 24, 60, 70, and 85kWh with charging and dis-
charging efficiency 80%-95%. For the simulation, we place the capacitor banks with a









We developed a solution VVCO/OECMmixed strategy game based to solve Volt-VAR
problem by exploiting EVs, RESs and customer shiftable loads and adjusting capac-
itor banks, OLTC TAP in a distributed fashion. We proved that the VVCO/OECM
system solves the VVO problem by ensuring minimum electricity costs. We devel-
oped an Open MPI based simulation program to realize the distributed community
environment and thus determine the terminal voltage locally and use it to help the
substation to adjust the capacitor banks and OLTC transformer TAPS. The simula-
tion result showed that the proposed VVCO/OECM system outperform the existing
VVO system while ensuring the efficient operations of the home equipment.
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Chapter 8
Discussion and Future work
8.1 Discussion
In this thesis, we addressed the several challenging issues for modernizing the ex-
isting power grid and presented intelligent solutions by using microgrid technologies
and integrating and exploiting the electric vehicles, energy storage systems, home ap-
pliances, and renewable energy systems. Throughout this thesis, a couple of energy
management schemes were developed to help achieve the objectives the modern power
grid or smart grid is expected to meet. In each of proposed methods, we perform nu-
merical analysis to show the validity of the model. We developed various simulation
programs, and manifest the results in several graphs and tables to evaluate the per-
formance of the proposed schemes. Starting from the micro-level which is energy
management at home to the substation, and transmission and distribution system,
we investigated various critical issues of the grid and proposed schemes to modernize
it with the help of microgrid and smart grid technology. Electricity pricing models,
minimization of electricity price, quality of service of power delivery, planning and
balancing between energy production or purchase and real-time consumption, and
reduction of the T&D losses were the primary goals of this thesis. Our proposed
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systems successfully demonstrated the integration of renewable energy sources, en-
ergy storage systems, electric vehicles and shiftable loads to the power system and
developed management systems which we believe will contribute to addressing the
challenges of the microgrid or smart grid.
First, we proposed joint optimal scheduling schemes for home appliances and EVs
in a grid-connected microgrid powered by renewable energy sources. The scheduling
scheme is also known as centralized optimal consumption schedule (COPCS). The
microgrid uses EVs for electricity storage to improve the efficiency and reliability of
the system. We have observed that the optimal scheduling schemes clearly outper-
form the naive scheduling scheme by better managing the electricity consumption
and shifting soft loads from high demand (and low power generation) periods to low
demand (and high power generation) duration. For instance, our simulation results
show that the performance improvement of optimally scheduling EVs with or without
discharge capability is almost 175% for 400 EVs and 85% for 590 EVs, respectively,
compared to naive scheduling. Also, the optimal algorithm with EV discharge outper-
forms the decentralized EV charging control method using a non-cooperative game.
The running time of the proposed joint scheduling algorithm is small for a residential
community. For 500 homes (3500 home appliances) with 1000 EVs, it took less than
a second to 138 seconds for each iteration on a computer with Intel Core i5 processor
and 4GB memory. In a real-time implementation, upon receiving the requests from
the hard load appliances, the microgrid allocates energy with no delay. In the case
of soft loads (types B and C), the microgrid determines the schedule of electricity al-
location and allocates power according to the schedule. For a very large community,
we observed that the algorithm may have some scalability issues in real-time imple-
mentations. The proposed algorithm has two very significant properties: (i) load
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regulation and (ii) energy or power regulation. The proposed joint charging sched-
ule optimally regulates power and load, which yields a minimum electricity import
needed by the microgrid. This will save energy production costs of the electricity grid
and ensure optimal use of locally generated renewable energy of the microgrid. The
proposed joint, centralized scheduling schemes do not depend on several interactions
between end systems and the central controller, which is essential for decentralized
EV charging control methods to determine the optimal schedule. The interactions
may not produce an optimal EV charging schedule due to inconsistencies in the flow
of information. The proposed joint scheduling policies are capable of accommodating
any energy source model. The optimal joint scheduling is sensitive to the variation of
load, load characteristics and stochastic nature of renewable power generation. We
have shown that our proposed model always produces optimal results for a microgrid
with renewable, non-renewable, or both energy sources.
The centralized scheme, COPCS, does not scale well for a microgrid with a wide
range of residential home. The execution time increases exponentially with the size
of the microgrid which contains more than 800 residential users. Moreover, COPCS
is an oﬄine algorithm which processes and allocates energy based on predicted con-
sumption of the equipment and EVs. Hence, the amount of energy generated from
renewable energy sources, EVs arrival and departure time and target energy, con-
sumption of home appliances vary at the time of consumption from the day ahead
prediction. Also, COPCS needs device detail information for the projected time span
such as consumption start and end time, the rate of consumption or charging, dis-
charging rate of EV, the amount of renewable energy generation in different time
slots, etc. Therefore, the consumer will have to send all this information to the EMS
of microgrid which may cause an issue of privacy and security. To address these prob-
lems, we proposed a distributed real-time allocation (DRTA) scheme of electricity to
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the homes in a grid-connected microgrid power by a mix of renewable and non-RES.
The scheme is an online scheme schedule and allocates power as it is requested from
the user. The microgrid uses EVs as the electricity storage to improve the energy
efficiency and stability of the system. Each home in the microgrid independently
schedules its home appliances and EVs to increase the overall social benefit of the
microgrid. DRTA is a distributed real-time scheme which does not depend on the
number of households in the smart grid or microgrid because, in DRTA scheme, each
home independently optimizes its energy cost and increase the overall social benefit.
In each time slot, DRTA modifies or adjusts the energy allocation plan according
to the observed and predicted amount of load and energy, and allocates energy to
all homes for the current time slot. We have also seen that, in all the cases, DRTA
demonstrated a solution close to the COPCS scheme. Similar to the COPCS, DRTA
has two very significant properties: (i) load regulation which shifts flexible load from
high to the low demand duration, and (ii) energy regulation which stores excess energy
to EVs batteries (G2V) from off-peak hours, and later use the stored energy (V2G)
to meet the peak hours demand. The DRTA scheme converges to a stable state in
few iterations (Fig. 4.6) and has the flexibility to terminate anytime, therefore, the
proposed scheme is suitable and practical for a smart grid or microgrid operator of
any size. The DRTA scheme with a centralized coordinator gives more control to the
microgrid operator for real-time electricity pricing function; therefore, it is indeed a
more practical approach. Conversely, the coordinator functions can easily be adapted
to the customer point. In that case, each customer will send load information to all
other customers, and the total current load and prices will be calculated locally. Each
customer still needs to communicate with the operator to get the current informa-
tion about the amount of electricity produced. In the practical implementation, the
information of energy usage pattern of every home is exposed which may raise some
203
privacy issues.
DRTA is an online scheduling and allocating system which schedule and deliver
electricity according to the immediate demand; it does not however help much the
energy retailer or microgrid operator for a day ahead or hour before generation and
purchase of energy. We addressed this problem and developed a real-time distributed
energy management RDCDSM system to mitigate the intermittent nature of the RESs
and fulfill the demand of a residential microgrid. The proposed RDCDSM processes
the raw predicted load to produce a predicted load curve, balanced throughout time,
for the microgrid and allocates electricity in real time in an intelligent way which
reduces the gap between the predicted and distributed amount of power. Hence,
the proposed system forces customers to produce a flat load profile collectively and
stick to that profile at the time of actual consumption using a penalty. RDCDSM
eases the integration of RESs with the grid by exploiting ESSs and EVs. We also
developed a centralized allocation method to allocate electricity according to the
day ahead simple prediction method to evaluate the performance of RDCDSM. The
RDCDSM system took less time (less than a minute) to produce the results whereas
the centralized scheme needs days (and sometimes weeks) to provide a solution for
a large microgrid. The proposed system requires more sensible equipment (HEMS)
whereas the centralized system required a less intelligent system in the user premises.
The centralized system, however, needs detailed information on consumption from
users which may violate their privacy.
Next, we proposed an optimal pricing scheme, MEPM, for minimizing the elec-
tricity price in a microgrid network. Originally, the power cost optimization prob-
lems are non-linear and non-convex. Hence, the problems are intractable, and no
known polynomial solution exist to solve them. We have analyzed the minimum cost
(MEPM) and decomposed the problem to solve it optimally, and compared with a first
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come first server pricing scheme. For various configurations of the MGN, the MEPM
method showed outstanding performance. The MEPM scheme takes less time to
evaluate the electricity price of an enormous size MGN. Therefore, MEPM is a good
choice for determining real-time electricity pricing of MGN. Moreover, the MEPM
can identify and predict near accurate (optimal) electricity price for the variation of
load and renewable energy generation of the MGN system. Also, the proposed model
considers various energy sources including renewable energy and dynamic behavior
of the smart microgrid in the electricity system as a seller or a buyer. Although we
have presented the model for non-decreasing marginal cost function, the proposed
algorithm produces optimal results for both general convex and monotonic marginal
costs but not for the nonlinear marginal costs with peaks and valleys.
Finally, we proposed a new model (VVCO/OECM) for VVO, which acknowledges
the current technological advancement of the power grid, evolution of the smart grid,
and EVs. We found that the proposed model and its game-theoretic solution could
solve the VVO problem optimally. The existing VVO method only solves the problem
with the coarse-demand received from the customers. In our solution, we developed
an interactive method which enables the utility to communicate with the customer to
flatten the load and ultimately, reduces the reactive loss and flatten the generation.
Thus, VVCO/OECM can reduce the overall production cost of the electricity. The
VVCO/OECM system is scalable and can be implemented for any size power system
infrastructure. The system can be deployed without the intervention of the substation
by calculating the cost at the CEMS premises and adjust the compensation devices
by the local demand.
To evaluate the models we developed simulation programs using C++, MPI, and
IBM CPLEX. The centralized model is developed using C++ and CPLEX and per-
formed the experiment as a single process with several instances of a microgrid or
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microgrids. For the game based model including the mechanism design, we devel-
oped C++ MPI, IBM CPLEX based parallel program where each of the processes
represents a player or agent of the game. Most of the experiments were executed on
Calcul Quebec (Compute Canada) advanced research computing (ARC) system to
emulate the parallel essence of the real system [99].
8.2 Future Work
The work presented in the thesis provided considerable effort to solve the challenges
of the transition from a traditional power grid to a modern smart grid by integrating
renewable energy sources, electric vehicles, shiftable loads, and energy storage sys-
tems. The objective was to minimize losses, optimal power management, and quality
of electricity delivery to the customer with reducing electricity price. However, there
remains several future research directions which may add extra benefits to meet the
challenges of the future power grid.
In our energy management models for the residential microgrid (COPCS, DRTA,
RDCDSM), we assumed that microgrid is connected to the traditional grid which is a
reality. We assume that the shortage of electricity of the residential microgrid will be
purchased from the power grid. In the islanded mode, when microgrid is disconnected
from the power grid due to a natural disaster or cyber-physical attract, the microgrid
needs a contingency and emergency energy management plan. Each residential home
energy management system needs to identify the emergency or essential loads to be
serviced such that all the households in the microgrid have the fair share of available
power. The proper management of storage systems such as EVs and ESSs may always
preserve a sufficient amount of energy to meet the demand of an emergency situation.
In the MGN and VVO/OECM system, we have considered active and reactive
power in the power line due to the resistance and inductance of the power line.
206
We do not regard the capacitance of the transmission and distribution line, reactive
power injected by loads (for MGN), renewable energy sources, heat loss, transformer
losses, frequency variation, etc. These parameters may complicate the model, but
it is essential for a perfect design of an energy management system. In general, the
problem is a well known optimal power flow (OPF) problem. Much research has been
done for several decades to solve the optimal power flow problem in the traditional
electrical network which has centralized generation. The modern power system is
more complicated due to the dynamic load, storage, bidirectional flow of energy and
distributed generator; thereby the optimal power flow problem becomes more difficult.
This needs intense investigation, modeling, and solution to address the power flow
problem for the modern power network.
We have used PMU in VVCO/OECM which has potential synchronization and
phase offset problems due to the unaligned clocks of PMU and PDC or central con-
troller. Some control applications may not tolerate clocks drift greater than 1µs.
Therefore, clock synchronization between PMU and PDC or central controller (or
EMS) may result in better management and control system for the power grid.
Alteration or tampering, denial of service, delay due to network congestion or cy-
ber attract on control, demand, and various other messages may create an immediate
problem in power delivery and increase the cost of operation and electricity. This
may not jeopardize to achieve the objectives of the microgrid. Therefore, study and
active research may improve the resiliency, reliability, and availability of power grid.
Microgrid and smart grid are nowadays an active research topic. A significant
investment will be made over next decade to modernizing the century-old power grid.
The experience and expertise obtained through microgrid research will provide market
opportunities for participating enterprises as the demand for microgrid technologies
raises around the world. To improve this position, and ensure continued success,
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given the emphasis on research, the collaboration between national and international
partners will be necessary. These efforts will help to educate all stakeholders and, also,
will stimulate the improvement of next generation power grid, and energy economics.
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